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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, I document a small
spousal earnings response to the job displacement of the family head. The response is
even smaller in recessions when earnings losses are larger and additional insurance is most
valuable. I investigate whether the small response is an outcome of crowding-out effects
of existing government transfers. To accomplish this, I use an incomplete asset markets
model with family labor supply and aggregate fluctuations whose predicted spousal labor
supply elasticities with respect to transfers are in line with microeconomic estimates both
in aggregate and across subpopulations. In this model, counterfactual experiments indeed
show that generous transfers in recessions discourage spousal labor supply significantly
after the head’s job displacement. Then, I solve for optimal means-tested transfers paid to
poor families and employment-tested transfers paid to the unemployed. Unlike the current
policy that maintains generous transfers of both types in recessions, I find that the optimal
policy features procyclical means-tested and countercyclical employment-tested transfers.
The second chapter (joint with Kurt See) studies the optimal design of unemployment
insurance (UI) over the business cycle, paying particular attention to the effects of generous
UI payments on firm vacancy creation. While UI provides insurance to jobless individuals,
generous UI payment results in higher reservation wages, a corresponding reduction in
firm vacancy creation, both of which lead to a decline in the job finding rate. Using
a heterogeneous agent job search model, designed to consider the effects of UI on labor
demand, we find that optimal UI policy should be countercyclical.
Finally, the third chapter (joint with Anmol Bhandari, Ellen McGrattan, and Kurt Gerrard
See) examines the reliability of widely used surveys on U.S. businesses. We compare survey
responses of business owners with administrative data and document large inconsistencies
in business incomes, receipts, and the number of owners. We document problems due to
nonrepresentative samples and measurement errors. Nonrepresentativeness is reflected in
undersampling of owners with low incomes. Measurement errors arise because respondents
do not refer to relevant documents and possibly because of framing issues. We conclude
that predictions based on current survey data should be treated with caution.
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Chapter 1
Spousal Labor Supply Response to
Job Displacement and Implications
for Optimal Transfers
1.1 Introduction
Job displacement has large negative and long-lasting effects on individual labor earnings.
These effects are more pronounced when the displacement happens in recessions. The
impact of earnings losses on family consumption is mitigated through both public insurance
and private insurance. Government transfers in the United States are more generous in
recessions. At the same time, households also have access to self-insurance mechanisms,
a crucial component of which is spousal labor supply adjustments in response to severe
earnings loss within the household.1 Importantly, the magnitude of spousal labor supply
response to unexpected earnings fluctuations depends on the generosity of government
transfers made available to these households. Thus, while generous transfers in recessions
are thought to alleviate earnings losses in the event of a head’s job loss, they may crowd out
private insurance in the form of spousal labor supply and, in effect, leave households worse
off because of a higher tax burden. Given the interaction of public and private insurance,
1For example, Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2016) show that family labor supply provides
sizeable consumption insurance against wage shocks within the family.
1
I ask the following questions: how much do government transfers affect the magnitude of
the spousal labor supply response to the family head’s job displacement over the business
cycle? What is the optimal design of transfers over the business cycle when spousal labor
supply is endogenous to policy?
To answer these questions, I first measure the impact of a family head’s job displacement in
both recessions and expansions on family labor earnings and spousal labor earnings, using
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).2 Little is known about the change
in family and spousal earnings upon the head’s job displacement across recessions and
expansions, but it has an important role in quantifying the magnitude of private insurance
available to families over the business cycle under current public insurance programs. I
address this gap by documenting two novel results. First, families enjoy some insurance
from the presence of a second earner who was simultaneously employed with the head
prior to his displacement. In particular, the decline in family labor earnings is around
two-thirds of the decline in the head’s labor earnings one year after the job displacement
in recessions and expansions. Second, the change in spousal earnings in response to the
head’s displacement is small, especially after displacements that occur in recessions. Over
10 years after the head’s displacement, the average change in spousal earnings relative to
the spousal earnings of non-displaced head is only −0.8 percent in recessions and 8 percent
in expansions. This result is particularly interesting because one might expect a stronger
spousal earnings response during times when the head experiences larger earnings losses.
Hence, this finding motivates an investigation of the potential reasons behind the small
change in spousal earnings upon the head’s displacement in recessions.
I argue that the small spousal earnings response in recessions is an outcome of crowding-out
effects of existing government transfers, which feature more generous transfers in recessions
relative to expansions (i.e., countercyclical). To investigate this, I use an incomplete asset
markets model with family labor supply and aggregate fluctuations. In the model, employed
individuals are subject to idiosyncratic job displacement risk, while unemployed individuals
face the risk of a long duration without a job because of frictions in the labor market
that prevent the formation of matches. Negative and persistent effects of unemployment
on individual earnings are captured by human capital depreciation, as in Ljungqvist and
2Family labor earnings is defined as the sum of the head’s and spouse’s labor earnings.
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Sargent (1998). The strength of the labor market frictions varies over the business cycle:
job displacement rate increases, while job finding rates endogenously decrease in recessions
since firms decrease vacancy posting when labor productivity is lower. Individuals can
partially self-insure against idiosyncratic and aggregate risk through their spouse’s labor
market earnings, savings of their family in an incomplete asset market, and means-tested
and employment-tested government transfers.3
The key contribution of this framework is to endogenize the labor supply decisions of both
members of the household to changes in government transfer generosity over the business
cycle. I show that when the model is calibrated to match the level and cyclicality of i)
the head’s earnings loss upon job displacement, ii) job finding rates, and iii) government
transfers, it generates small changes in spousal earnings upon the head’s displacement as
I have documented in the data.
I quantify the crowding-out effects of existing government transfers on spousal earnings
responses to the head’s job displacement over the business cycle in a counterfactual exper-
iment. When government transfers are designed to be less generous in recessions and more
generous in expansions (i.e., procyclical), I find that spousal earnings increase significantly
following the head’s displacement in recessions but remain small in expansions. The pro-
cyclical policy leaves the marginal utility of consumption high after job loss in recessions
and induces spouses to supplement family earnings by working. In expansions, earnings
losses are relatively smaller and the marginal value of increasing spousal earnings is lower.
Hence, during these times, spousal response to the head’s displacement is small and inelas-
tic to government transfer generosity. To ensure that the role of crowding-out effects of
transfers in explaining the small spousal earnings response is not overstated in the model,
I show that the model implied female labor supply elasticities are in line with empirical
estimates. In particular, female participation elasticity with respect to net wages is 0.31 in
the model and between 0.15− 0.43 in the data. Female earnings elasticity with respect to
transfers is 0.37 in the model and 0.44 in the data. Furthermore, the female participation
elasticity with respect to net wages in the model is decreasing in household income as in the
3The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and Medicaid are examples of means-tested transfers,
while Unemployment Insurance (UI) is an example of employment-tested transfers. These types of govern-
ment transfers are typically available to families with frequently displaced members.
3
data. This corroborates why spousal labor supply is more elastic to transfers in recessions
when the head’s earnings loss is larger.
The results of this counterfactual experiment show that the incentive costs of transfers in
the form of reduced spousal labor supply are larger in recessions and smaller in expansions.
Since existing transfers are more generous in recessions, there may be potential welfare gains
from changing the generosity of government transfers over the business cycle. Motivated
by this observation, I study the optimal design of means-tested and employment-tested
transfers over the business cycle. In my main optimal policy analysis, I restrict policy
instruments to take the form of the means-tested transfer amount and the employment-
tested transfer amount as linear functions of current aggregate labor productivity and a
constant income tax used to balance the government’s budget for any proposed government
program.4
I find that the optimal policy features countercyclical employment-tested and procyclical
means-tested transfers. Overall, however, total government transfers under the optimal
policy are procyclical which is in contrast to the current policy that maintains generous
transfers in recessions. Means-tested transfers are procyclical because lower transfers in
recessions induce a large increase in spousal entry into the labor force upon a head’s
displacement. This is a direct implication of the high incentive costs of transfers during
recessions. Employment-tested transfers are more generous in recessions because these
benefits are smaller and short-term, and thus have relatively lower incentive costs on spousal
labor supply. As a result, the provision of insurance is better accomplished through more
generous employment-tested transfers in recessions when unemployment is higher.
In an economy in which the optimal policy is implemented, female labor force participation
is 5 percentage points higher compared to an economy in which the current policy is
implemented. Higher employment reduces the income tax required to finance a similar
average level of government transfers.5 Moreover, the economy under the optimal policy
4When solving for the optimal mix of means-tested and employment-tested transfers, I follow a large
literature that uses calibrated models to study the optimal policy for a restricted class of policy instruments.
See Hansen and Imrohorog˘lu (1992), Acemoglu and Shimer (2000), Abdulkadirog˘lu, Kurus¸cu, and S¸ahin
(2002), Wang and Williamson (2002), Krusell, Mukoyama, and S¸ahin (2010), and Koehne and Kuhn (2015).
5I will show in Section 1.5 that the optimal policy has similar levels of average transfers to the current
policy.
4
is wealthier and has a lower fraction of families with non-positive liquid wealth. These
differences in the macroeconomy result in a higher average consumption level and a slightly
lower average consumption volatility. Overall, the optimal policy yields an ex-ante welfare
gain of around 0.6 percent additional lifetime consumption compared with the current
policy. Most of the welfare gains are enjoyed by wealth-poor families with an unskilled
male who is married to a skilled female. It is precisely for this family that a spouse’s
participation in the labor force can bring higher levels of income to the family especially
when a displacement of the head occurs.
To understand why accounting for the response of spouses in the presence of transfers
is critical in determining the optimal policy, I modify the model such that spousal la-
bor supply is exogenous to government policy. In particular, I keep female labor supply
decisions unchanged even when government policy is varied. Abstracting from the incen-
tive costs of transfers on spousal labor supply results in an optimal policy that is more
generous on average than the optimal policy in the model with endogenous spousal labor
supply. Furthermore, the optimal policy now features slightly countercyclical means-tested
and employment-tested transfers because the optimal cyclicality of government transfers
is driven largely by the cyclicality of insurance benefits, which is larger in recessions. This
exercise shows that endogenizing the spousal labor supply response to changes in govern-
ment policy is critical in determining both the optimal level and cyclicality of government
transfers. As a result, policy makers should recognize that married households have an im-
portant source of self-insurance through adjustments in spousal labor supply, and generous
payments to these households make them worse-off due to large crowd-out.
Related Literature This paper contributes to the literature that explores the role of
female labor supply as an insurance mechanism against idiosyncratic earnings risk within
the family. Importantly, Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2016) find that female
labor supply provides sizeable consumption insurance against wage shocks faced by the
husband. Wu and Krueger (2018) show that a calibrated life-cycle two-earner household
model with endogenous labor supply can match well these empirically estimated labor
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supply and consumption responses to wage shocks within the family.6 In this paper, I con-
dition the change in spousal earnings and hours in response to the head’s job displacement
to the aggregate state of the economy, rather than looking at an average spousal response.
Empirically, I find small changes in spousal earnings and hours upon the head’s job dis-
placement in recessions. In expansions, spousal responses are positive and statistically
significant, but only a few years after the head’s displacement. I then explore the effects
of more generous government transfers on the small changes in spousal earnings upon the
head’s displacement in recessions and study the optimal design of these transfers over the
business cycle.
Another strand of literature studies the optimal design of transfer programs. It is possible
to divide this large literature into two groups based on their modeling choices and welfare
analysis. The first is a group of papers that study the optimal design of transfers using
models with endogenous family labor supply but without aggregate fluctuations (Ortigueira
and Siassi 2013, Haan and Prowse 2017, Mankart and Oikonomou 2017).7 The second is
a group of papers that study the optimal design of taxes or transfers in a model with
aggregate fluctuations but without endogenous family labor supply as a private insurance
mechanism (Mitman and Rabinovich 2015, Birinci and See 2017, McKay and Reis 2017,
Bhandari, Evans, Golosov, and Sargent 2018, Kekre 2018, Landais, Michaillat, and Saez
2018).8 This paper combines these two groups of studies because it analyzes the optimal
6Previously, Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2005) also quantify the role of female labor supply
response to earnings risk within the family. They also find that female participation rates increase when
risk is larger. Guler, Guvenen, and Violante (2012) study joint search problem of household and show
that higher wage offers received by spouses allow the family head to look for better employment opportu-
nities. Furthermore, Rendon and Garcia-Perez (2018) study the change in job search decisions due to the
employment risk of the other member and their wealth.
7Mankart and Oikonomou (2017) incorporate aggregate fluctuations into their baseline model to explain
the acyclicality of labor force participation, which is their main focus. However, when they study the optimal
design of UI program, they reduce the model into a stationary environment.
8Among these papers, my paper is closest to Birinci and See (2017). There, we emphasize the importance
of incorporating endogenous changes in precautionary saving motives in response to changes in UI generosity
over the business cycle using a directed search model with aggregate fluctuations and incomplete asset
markets. Here, I extend our previous work by analyzing the role of endogenous spousal labor supply
response to idiosyncratic and aggregate risk on the optimal mix of means-tested and employment-tested
transfers over the business cycle.
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level and cyclicality of means-tested and employment-tested transfers using a model with
endogeneous family labor supply and aggregate fluctuations. I overcome the computational
difficulties encountered in models of this nature through an application of segmented search
across skill requirements of jobs, achieved by an extension of block recursivity (Menzio and
Shi, 2010, 2011).9 Relative to the first group of papers, I study the optimal cyclicality
of transfers using a model with aggregate fluctuations and find that more than half of
the welfare gains from the optimal policy are attributable to its cyclicality since insurance
benefits net of incentive costs vary substantially over the cycle. Relative to the second
group of papers, I show that endogenizing spousal labor supply changes the optimal level
and cyclicality of means-tested transfers.
Finally, this paper contributes to two empirical literatures. The first literature studies the
impact of job displacement on individual earnings (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993,
Ruhm 1991, Stevens 1997). More recently, Davis and Von Wachter (2011) estimate the
earnings loss upon job displacement separately for recessions and expansions. In addition
to individual earnings, I estimate the impact of a head’s job displacement in recessions and
expansions on family earnings and on spousal earnings and hours. This helps me to quantify
the available spousal insurance to displaced individuals in recessions and expansions.10 The
second literature actually estimates the contemporaneous change in spousal earnings upon
her husband’s unemployment, otherwise known as the “added worker effect”, without con-
ditioning on the time of his unemployment (Heckman and MaCurdy 1980, 1982, Lundberg
1985, Cullen and Gruber 2000, Stephens 2002, Hendren 2017). Pruitt and Turner (2018)
measure spousal earnings responses to earnings fluctuations of the household head in both
recessions and expansions using Social Security Administration data but do not focus on
measuring these responses to job displacements. Job displacement events are particularly
relevant because their effects are large and long-lasting compared with temporary earnings
fluctuations. My paper focuses on measuring the dynamic response of spousal earnings
9To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to extend the concept of a block recursive equilibrium
in an endogeneous family labor supply model with aggregate fluctuations.
10Davis and Von Wachter (2011) also show that standard search and matching models fail to generate
such large negative and long-lasting effects of job displacement on labor earnings. More recently, Jarosch
(2015), Huckfeldt (2016), Krolikowski (2017), and Jung and Kuhn (2018) develop variants of such models
that can endogenously generate these persistent effects of job displacement.
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specifically in response to a head’s job displacement and how this response varies over the
business cycle. I then use these empirical findings in a structural model to understand the
effects of government transfers on spousal earnings response to the head’s displacement,
and then study the optimal design of these transfers over the business cycle.11
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the model. Section 1.3 docu-
ments the empirical findings about the impact of the head’s displacement on family and
spousal earnings, and explains the calibration strategy and the model’s validation against
untargeted data moments. Section 1.4 discusses the effects of transfer policies on spousal
labor supply response to the head’s displacement. Section 1.5 studies the optimal design of
government transfers. In Section 1.6, I provide a list of extensions and robustness checks
on the optimal policy analysis. Finally, Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Model
In this section, I develop a tractable job search model of families with incomplete asset
markets and aggregate fluctuations. The key contribution of this framework is to endog-
enize labor supply decisions of both members of the household to changes in government
transfers.
1.2.1 Environment
Setting
Time t is discrete and runs forever. The economy is populated by a large number of ex-ante
identical households, and each household j consists of a male m and a female f individual
11A separate literature studies the effects of income taxation on i) the observed time series of married
female labor force participation (Kaygusuz 2010), ii) participation of married women over their life cycle
(Borella, De Nardi, and Yang 2018), and iii) international differences in married women’s hours worked
(Bick and Fuchs-Schundeln 2017). These papers conclude that reducing marginal tax rates for married
households incude a sizeable increase on the labor supply of married women. Gayle and Shephard (2018)
show that the optimal tax system for married couples is characterized by negative jointness, i.e. reducing
marginal tax rates on the wife when the husband makes more money. My paper complements them as I
show that a decline in the implicit tax rate of work during recessions encourage spousal labor supply upon
a large permanent decline in household income.
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i, i.e. i ∈ {m, f} ∀ j.12 At any point in time, a household can be in the labor force or
retired. I model retirement as an exogenous event. In every period, both members of the
household retire with probability ζR. Retired households die with probability ζD and they
are replaced by new households entering into the labor force. Households discount future
at rate β.
Households are heterogeneous in terms of their asset holdings a, human capital level of each
member hi, and employment status of each member li. An individual can be classified into
one of the following employment statuses: employed E, unemployed individual who is
eligible for employment-tested UI benefits Ub, unemployed individual who is ineligible for
such benefits Un, or retired R.
Households have access to incomplete asset markets where they can save or borrow up to a
limit at an exogenous interest rate r. They make joint choices of savings and labor supply
of the non-employed members. Preferences of a household are given by
U (c, lm, lf , sm, sf ) = u (c) +
∑
i
ηi × 1 (li 6= E, and si = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
out of labor force
where u (· ) is a strictly increasing and strictly concave utility function over household
consumption level c that satisfies Inada conditions, si ∈ {0, 1} is labor supply decision
of individual i at the extensive margin, and ηi is the value of leisure.
13 Thus, the above
functional form assumes that individuals only enjoy value of leisure if they do not look for
jobs when unemployed.14
The aggregate state variables of the economy are summarized by µ = (z, Γ), where z
is aggregate labor productivity, and Γ is the distribution of households across individual
states.
12Throughout the chapter, I suppress the index j when it is clear that a variable is a household variable.
Instead, I use the index i for individual variables to differentiate them from household variables.
13The only parameter that defines gender in this model is ηi. This implies that utility cost of work or
search is different between male and female to capture the employment differences between them.
14In Section 1.6, I also analyze the effect of a utility function with non-separable consumption and leisure
on my main results, following Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1994) and Attanasio and Weber (1995).
9
Labor market
The labor market is segmented in human capital h, i.e. jobs are characterized by their
human capital requirement level h. Vacant firms post job openings in specific human
capital submarkets after paying a fixed cost κ of posting a vacancy. On the other side of
the labor market, when unemployed individuals decide to participate into the labor market
by exerting positive job search effort si, they look for jobs that are compatible with their
own human capital level.
The labor market tightness of submarket h is defined as the ratio of vacancies v posted in
the submarket to the number of unemployed individuals searching for a job within that
submarket. It is denoted as θ (h; µ) = v(h;µ)u(h;µ) . Let M (v, u) be a constant returns to scale
matching function that determines the number of matches in a submarket with number
of unemployed u and number of vacancies v. Then, p (h; µ) = M(v(h;µ),u(h;µ))u(h;µ) is the job
finding rate and q (h; µ) = M(v(h;µ),u(h;µ))v(h;µ) is the vacancy filling rate in submarket h when
aggregate state is µ. The constant returns to scale assumption on the matching function
guarantees that the equilibrium object θ suffices to determine job finding and vacancy
filling rates since p (θ) = M(v,u)u = M (θ, 1) while q (θ) =
M(v,u)
v = M
(
1, 1θ
)
.
Once matched, the firm-worker pair operates a constant returns to scale technology that
converts one indivisible unit of labor into final consumption goods. The amount of produc-
tion output is given by g (h, z), where g (·) is strictly increasing function of both worker’s
human capital level h, and aggregate productivity z. Firm pays a wage w (h, z) to the
worker. I assume that the period output is shared between the firm and the worker.
In particular, worker receives α share of the period output as wage, which implies that
w (h, z) = αg (h, z).15
15This assumption is similar to Herkenhoff, Phillips, and Cohen-Cole (2017) and it serves for two pur-
poses. First, when I analyze the role of government transfers in explaining the small changes in spousal
earnings upon head’s displacements in recessions, this assumption implies that varying the government
policy does not affect equilibrium wages and thus firm vacancy posting decisions, leaving the labor demand
same across policies. This allows me to better isolate the effect of transfers on labor supply. Second reason
is tractability. This is because if unemployed also choose the wage submarket when looking for jobs, I would
then need to keep track of wage levels of employed members of the household as additional state variables.
I refrain doing this in the baseline model, but, in Section 1.6, I extend the baseline model to endogenize
wage choices of the unemployed into a directed search model, and analyze the effects of this assumption on
my main results.
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The firm-worker pair continues to operate until the match exogenously dissolves with prob-
ability δ (h, z) or the worker retires with probability ζR. δ (·) is a decreasing function of
both h and z.
Human capital dynamics
Human capital of an individual h lies in an equispaced grid H ≡ {hL, ..., hH}. All new-
born individuals begin with the lowest skill level. Employed and unemployed individuals
experience stochastic accumulation or depreciation of skills as in Ljungqvist and Sargent
(1998). For an unemployed individual with human capital level h, human capital evolves
as follows:
h′ =
h with probability 1− piUh−∆U (z) with probability piU .
Similarly, for an employed individual with human capital level h, human capital evolves as
follows:
h′ =
h+ ∆E with probability piEh with probability 1− piE .
The only extra assumption in this process when compared to the one in Ljungqvist and
Sargent (1998) is that I allow ∆U to vary over the business cycle z. This assumption helps
the model to generate cyclical difference in the magnitude of individual earnings drop upon
job displacement, as documented by Davis and von Wachter (2011).16
Government transfers
Government runs three transfer programs: means-tested transfers, employment-tested
transfers, and retirement transfers. Employment-tested and means-tested transfers are
paid to only eligible households in the labor force, while only retired households receive
16In principle, the model generates larger earnings losses upon displacements in recessions relative to
displacements in expansions due to endogenously lower job finding rates in recessions. However, this alone is
insufficient to generate the observed difference in magnitude. Hence, the extra assumption on larger human
capital loss when unemployed in recessions is needed. Moreover, this assumption is in fact reasonable, given
that most of the human capital is indeed occupation specific (Kambourov and Manovskii 2009), and finding
a job within the same occupation is much more difficult in recessions (Huckfeldt 2016).
11
retirement transfers. The time-invariant amount of retirement transfers paid to the retired
households is given by bR.
Eligibility for the means-tested transfers is determined at the household level. A household
is eligible for the means-tested transfers if the amount of household assets a is lower than
an asset threshold a, and the amount of household labor income y (which is the summation
of the labor income of male and female) is lower than an income threshold y. Both a and
y are policy instruments of the government. Eligibility for means-tested transfers never
expires as long as the income and assets tests are satisfied. The amount of means-tested
transfers may also vary over the business cycle, and it is given as follows:17
φ (z; a, y) =
φ (z) if y < y, a < a0 otherwise.
Eligibility for the employment-tested transfers is determined at the individual level. An
individual may be eligible Ub or ineligible Un for employment-tested transfers upon job
displacement, and the eligible individual only starts receiving these transfers if he/she
actively searches for a job, i.e. si > 0.
18 Employment-tested transfers stochastically expire
at rate e, as in Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001), Albrecht and Vroman (2005), Faig and
Zhang (2012), and Mitman and Rabinovich (2015). This assumption simplifies the solution
of the model because I do not need to carry the unemployment duration as another state
variable for the eligible unemployed. The generosity of employment-tested transfers b and
the expiration rate e may vary over the business cycle. Hence, the amount of employment-
tested transfers is given as follows:
b (z; li, si) =
b (z) if li = Ub, si > 00 otherwise.
17I restrict the policy instruments to depend on the aggregate state of the economy µ only through
the current aggregate productivity z and not through the distribution of individuals across states Γ. This
restriction allows my model to retain the block recursitivity, which I will explain in Section 1.2.4.
18Here, I assume that government can observe the search behavior of the unemployed. In the U.S., UI
offices may verify job search activities of UI recipients by asking them to fill a form about name, location,
and contact information of the employer that recipients have recently contacted. In Section 1.6, I remove
the assumption that search effort is observable to the government and check the implications on my main
results.
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To finance these programs, government levies a flat income tax τ applied to labor income,
employment-tested transfers, and retirement transfers.19 The government balances the
following budget constaint in expectation:20
∞∑
t=0
(
1
1 + r
)t
×
[∑
i
1{lit=E}witτ −
∑
i
1{lit=Ub, sit>0}bt (1− τ) (1.1)
−
∑
j
1{yjt<y, ajt<a}φt −
∑
j
1{ljt=R}bR (1− τ)
]
= 0
where the terms in the bracket respectively are total income tax revenues generated from
employed individuals, net employment-tested transfers paid to eligible unemployed indi-
viduals with positive search effort, total means-tested transfers paid to eligible households,
and net retirement transfers paid to retired households.
Timing
Every single period t is divided into three stages. In the first stage, ζR fraction of house-
holds in the labor force retires, and ζD fraction of retired households dies and they are
replaced with new households entering into the labor force. Then, aggregate productiv-
ity z realizes. The period productivity level z completely determines i) the government
policy of generosity of employment-tested transfers b (z), its expiration rate e (z) ∈ [0, 1],
and the generosity of means-tested transfers φ (z), ii) the exogenous job separation rate
δ (h, z) ∈ [0, 1] in each submarket h. This implies that δ (h, z) fraction of those who were
employed in t− 1 in each submarket h loses their jobs and must spend at least one period
being unemployed. Among those who lose their job, e (z) fraction become ineligible for
employment-tested transfers.
Search and matching in the labor market occurs in the second stage. Vacant firms decide the
human capital submarket in which to post a vacancy, while the unemployed individuals look
19According to the U.S. tax policy, social security and UI benefits are subject to income tax, while means-
tested transfers are mostly non-taxable. Moreover, in Section 1.6, I also analyze the effects of progressive
taxation on the main results.
20This assumption is motivated by the fact that according to the current transfer system in the United
States, states are allowed to borrow from a federal fund. For example, states may borrow from federal UI
trust fund when they meet certain federal requirements, and thus they are allowed to run budget deficits
during some periods.
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for a job in a submarket that is compatible their own human capital level. Then, p (h, z)
fraction of unemployed individuals searching for a job in submarket h finds a job. Human
capital stochastically evolves based on labor market outcomes. Finally, the third stage is
the production and consumption stage. Each firm-worker pair produces g (h, z) units of
consumption goods. Wages are paid to workers, employment-tested transfers are paid to
eligible unemployed individuals, means-tested transfers are paid to eligible households, and
retirement income is paid to retired households. Each household then makes their joint
saving/borrowing decision. Prior to time t+ 1, households in the labor force jointly decide
whether its unemployed members will supply labor in the labor market stage of time t+ 1
where the forgone utility of leisure for the member with positive labor supply is incurred
at time t.
1.2.2 Household problem
A household’s state vector consists of the net asset level a ∈ A ≡ [aL, aH ] ⊆ R, the current
employment status of each member li ∈ {E, Ub, Un, R}, and the current human capital
level of each member hi ∈ H ≡ {hL, ..., hH}.
The aggregate state is denoted by µ = (z, Γ), where z ∈ Z ⊆ R+ denotes the current
aggregate productivity and Γ : {E, Ub, Un, R} × {E, Ub, Un, R} × A × H×H → [0, 1]
denotes the distribution of agents across employment statuses, asset level, and human
capital levels. The law of motion for the aggregate states is given by Γ′ = Λ (µ, z′) and z′ ∼
Φ (z′ | z).
Among the households in the labor force, there are nine distinct types of households in terms
of the employment statuses of their members, given that individual employment status for
the individuals in the labor force can take three different values, i.e. li ∈ {E, Ub, Un}.
Thus, there are nine different value functions for such households. In the main text, I will
lay out the recursive problem of three types of households: i) one member is employed,
the other is eligible unemployed, ii) both members are eligible unemployed, and iii) both
members are employed. I will then discuss the changes for the problems of other types of
households. Finally, I will show the recursive problem of the retired households.
Let V lmlf denote the value function of household with male’s employment status of lm
and female’s employment status of lf after search and matching has occurred, i.e. the
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value at the start of third stage of a period. Let h ≡ (hm, hf ) and l ≡ (lm, lf ) be the
human capital and employment state vectors of the household. To simplify the notation
further in the recursive formulations below, let δi ≡ δ (hi, z) and pi ≡ p (hi, z) be the job
displacement rate and job finding rate of individual i ∈ {m, f}, and δ′i and p′i denote the
respective probabilities in the next period. Finally, let λb = 1−e (z) be the probability that
eligibility for employment-tested benefits does not expire, and λn = e (z) be the expiration
probability. Similarly, λ′b and λ
′
n denote the respective probabilities in the next period.
Employed - unemployed household
First, consider a household in which the male is employed and the female is eligible unem-
ployed. The recursive problem of this household is given as follows:21
V EUb (a, h; µ) = max
a′≥aL, sf∈{0,1}
u (c) + ηf (1− sf )
+ β
[
(1− ζR)El′,h′,µ′
[
V l
′ (
a′, h′; µ′
) ∣∣∣sf , l,h, µ]+ ζRV R (a′)] (1.2)
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ y + φ (z; a, y) + b (z; Ub, sf ) (1− τ)
y = w (hm, z) (1− τ)
Γ′ = Λ
(
µ, z′
)
and z′ ∼ Φ (z′ | z) .
In the current period, the household decides savings and female labor force participation,
given that she is the non-employed member of the household. If the household stays in
the labor force with probability 1− ζR, the household takes expectation over the transition
of employment statuses, human capital levels of both members, and the aggregate states,
conditional on current employment statuses, human capital levels of both members, and
the job search decision for the female. If the household retires with probability ζR, then
the only relevant state variable is assets a. The household receives employment-tested
transfers only if eligible female searches for a job in the current period. Given that male is
only employed member of the household, total labor income of the household y is equal to
his net wage.
21The problem of the symmetric household is identical to this household’s problem with the change of
indices for m and f .
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For the household in which male is employed but female is ineligible unemployed, the above
problem is the same except that she does not receive employment-tested transfers even if
she searchers for a job. This captures the fact that according to current UI policy in the
United States, the unemployed receive UI benefits only for a certain number of weeks -
which varies over the business cycle - and once that threshold is reached, the unemployed
cannot continue to collect UI benefits.
It is also insightful to discuss the expectation over the transition of employment statuses
of this household, which I lay out below:22
El′,h′,µ′
[
V l
′ (
a′,h′;µ′
) ∣∣∣sf , l,h, µ] = Eh′,µ′
[
sf
(
1− δ′m
)
p′fV
EE
(
a′,h′;µ′
)
+ sf
(
1− δ′m
) (
1− p′f
) ∑
k∈{b,n}
λ′kV
EUk
(
a′,h′;µ′
)
+ sfδ
′
mp
′
f
∑
k
λ′kV
UkE
(
a′,h′;µ′
)
+ sfδ
′
m
(
1− p′f
) ∑
k,d∈{b,n}
λ′kλ
′
dV
UkUd
(
a′,h′;µ′
)
+ (1− sf )
(
1− δ′m
)∑
k
λ′kV
EUk
(
a′,h′;µ′
)
+ (1− sf ) δ′m
∑
k,d∈{b,n}
λ′kλ
′
dV
UkUd
(
a′,h′;µ′
)) ∣∣∣∣∣h, µ
]
.
The first two lines in the right hand side is the case when she searches for a job in the
current period and he keeps his current job. In this case, if she finds the job, the household
will be an employed - employed household, otherwise the household will continue to be an
employed - unemployed household but she may retain or lose eligibility for employment-
tested transfers. The third and fourth lines describes the case when she searches for a
job and he loses his current employment. Then, if she finds a job, the household will
be an unemployed - employed household where the male may or may not be eligible for
22Expectations over human capital levels and aggregate states are relatively simpler and are already
discussed in the previous sections.
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employment-tested transfers.23 If she cannot find a job, then both members of the house-
hold will be unemployed, and they will both face eligibility risk for the employment-tested
transfers. The fifth line is the case when she does not search for a job and continue to be
unemployed with or without eligibility, and he keeps his current job. Finally, the last line
shows the case when she does not search for a job and he loses his job. In this case, again,
both members of the household will be unemployed, and they will both face eligibility risk
for the employment-tested transfers.
For the household in which male is employed but female is ineligible unemployed, the above
expectation is the same except that she stays ineligible for employment-tested transfers if
she does not find a job.24
Unemployed - unemployed household
Second, consider a household in which both male and female are eligible unemployed. The
recursive problem of this household is given as follows:
V UbUb (a,h;µ) = max
a′≥aL, sm,sf∈{0,1}
u (c)
+
∑
i∈{m, f}
ηi (1− si) + β (1− ζR)El′,h′,µ′
[
V l
′ (
a′,h′;µ′
) ∣∣∣sm, sf , l,h, µ]
subject to (1.3)
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ φ (z; a, 0) +
[
b (z;Ub, sm) + b (z;Ub, sf )
]
(1− τ)
Γ′ = Λ
(
µ, z′
)
and z′ ∼ Φ (z′ | z) .
Given that both members of the household are now unemployed, the household chooses
labor supply of both members. Moreover, both members enjoy leisure if they do not look
for a job, in which case they do not receive employment-tested transfers even if they are
both eligible. In the current period, the household does not have any labor income.
23According to the current UI policy in the United States, not all workers transitioning into unemploy-
ment qualify for UI benefits. In particular, individuals do not qualify for benefits if they voluntarily quit
their job or if they do not meet requirements for wages earned or time worked during an established period
of time referred to as the base period.
24This captures the fact that according to current UI policy in the United States, the unemployed
individuals receive UI benefits only for a certain number of weeks - which varies over the business cycle -
and once that threshold is reached, the unemployed cannot continue to collect UI benefits.
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Similarly, for the household in which any unemployed member is ineligible unemployed, the
above problem is the same except that this member does not receive employment-tested
transfers even if he/she searchers for a job.
The expectation term in the right hand side of Equation (1.3) is similar to the one I
discussed in Equation (1.2) except that employment statuses of both members in the next
period are determined by their labor supply decisions and job finding rates. In Appendix
A.1, I lay out and discuss the expectation over the transition of employment statuses of
this household.
Employed - employed household
Next, consider a household in which both male and female are employed. The recursive
problem of this household is given as follows:
V EE (a,h;µ) = max
a′≥aL
u (c) + β (1− ζR)El′,h′,µ′
[
V l
′ (
a′,h′;µ′
) ∣∣∣l,h, µ]
subject to (1.4)
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ y + φ (z; a, y)
y =
[
w (hm, z) + w (hf , z)
]
(1− τ)
Γ′ = Λ
(
µ, z′
)
and z′ ∼ Φ (z′ | z) .
The employed - employed household chooses only consumption vs savings given that there
is no on-the-job-search in the baseline model. Individuals of this household are not eligible
for employment-tested transfers. Total labor earnings of the household is equal to the sum
of net wages of male and female.
The expectation term in the right hand side of Equation (1.4) is similar to the one I
discussed in Equation (1.2) except that employment statuses of both members in the next
period are determined only by their job separation rates. In Appendix A.1, I lay out and
discuss the expectation over the transition of employment statuses of this household.
Retired household
Finally, I discuss the problem of retired households. Here, I assume that both members
of the households retire at the same time and the household receives a time-invariant
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retirement transfers bR upon retirement. In every period, retired households die with
probability ζD and they are replaced with new households entering into the labor force. I
also assume that retired members of the households do not enjoy leisure. Given that the
retired household is not allowed to re-enter into the labor market and that the retirement
households receive time-invariant transfers, the state variables of such households reduce
to only their asset holdings a.25
Let V R be the value of a retired household. The recursive problem of this household is
given as follows:
V R (a) = max
a′≥aL
u (c) + β (1− ζD)V R
(
a′
)
subject to (1.5)
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ bR
1.2.3 Firm problem
First, consider a firm that is matched with a worker in submarket h when the aggregate
state is µ. The pair operates under a constant returns to scale technology and produces
g (h, z) units of output, and the worker is paid a wage of w (h, z) . With some probability
δ (h, z) the match dissolves, and the worker retires with probability ζR. Let J (h; µ) be
the value of a matched firm in submarket h when the aggregate state is µ. The recursive
problem of this firm is given as follows:
J (h; µ) = g (h, z)− w (h, z) + 1
1 + r
(1− ζR)Eh′,µ′
[(
1− δ (h′, z′)) J (h′; µ′) ∣∣∣h, µ]
subject to (1.6)
Γ′ = Λ
(
µ, z′
)
and z′ ∼ Φ (z′ | z) .
Meanwhile, the value of a vacant firm that posts a vacancy in submarket h under aggregate
state µ is given by
V (h; µ) = −κ+ q (θ (h; µ)) J (h; µ) (1.7)
where κ is a fixed cost of posting a vacancy that is financed by risk-neutral foreign en-
trepreneurs who own the firms.
25Relaxing the assumptions about leisure or transfer payments to retired households has only small
quantitative effects on the baseline calibration of the model.
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When vacant firms decide the submarket in which to post a vacancy to maximize profits,
they face the trade-off between the probability of filling a vacancy and the level of surplus
from a possible match. This is because if a firm posts a vacancy in a high human capital
submarket, then the firm’s surplus from the match in that submarket will be higher given
that the period output net of wages is increasing in h and job displacement rate δ (·) is
decreasing in h. However, the probability of filling the vacancy is lower in high human
capital submarkets given that few unemployed individuals are able to visit such submarket
to search for a job.
The free entry condition implies that profits are just enough to cover the cost of filling a
vacancy in expectation. As a result, the owner of the firm makes zero profits in expectation.
Thus, V (h; µ) = 0 for any submarket h such that θ (h; µ) > 0. Then, imposing the free
entry condition to Equation (2.5) yields the equilibrium market tightness:
θ (h; µ) =
q
−1
(
κ
J(h;µ)
)
if h ∈ H (µ)
0 otherwise.
(1.8)
The equilibrium market tightness contains all the relevant information needed by house-
holds to evaluate the job finding probabilities at each submarket.
1.2.4 Equilibrium
Definition of the Recursive Equilibrium: Given government transfer policies{
b (z) , e (z) , φ (z) , a, y, bR, τ
}
z∈Z
, a recursive equilibrium is a list of household policy func-
tions for assets
{
a′lmlf (a, h, µ)
}
lm, lf∈{E,Ub, Un, R}
and labor supply of unemployed mem-
bers of the household
{
si (a, h, µ)
}
i∈{m, f}
, a labor market tightness function θ (h; µ), and
an aggregate law of motion µ′ = (z′, Γ′) such that
1. Given government policy, shock processes, and the aggregate law of motion, the
household’s policy functions solve their respective dynamic programming problems
(1.2), (1.3), (1.4), and similar problems for other types of households.
2. The labor market tightness is consistent with the free entry condition (2.6).
3. The government budget constraint (2.7) is satisfied.
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4. The law of motion of the aggregate state is consistent with household policy functions.
Notice that in order to solve the recursive equilibrium defined above, one must keep track
of an infinite dimensional object Γ in the state space, making the solution of the model
infeasible. To address this issue, I utilitize the structure of the model and use the notion
of block recursive equilibrium (BRE) developed by Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011).
Definition of the Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE): A BRE for this economy is
an equilibrium in which the value functions, policy functions, and labor market tightness
depend on the aggregate state of the economy µ, only through the aggregate productivity
z, and not through the aggregate distribution of agents across states Γ.
The model presented here is block recursive. Notice that the only payoff relevant individual
state variable of the unemployed for the firm is the human capital level h of the unemployed
because h determines the level of output, wage, and separation risk of the match. Thus,
given that the segmented labor market allows unemployed to self-select into a specific
submarket in searching for a job that is compatible with their own human capital level,
once the firm is inside this submarket, it does not need to know the entire distribution of
unemployed across the domain of the state space. Moreover, firms are indifferent across
human capital submarkets when they are posting a job opening because of the trade-off
between vacancy filling rate and their surplus from a match, and the free entry condition
for firms guarantees the entry of firms until the profits are run down to zero. Finally, the
constant returns to scale feature of the matching function implies that the relative ratio
of vacancies to number of unemployed visiting each submarket, i.e. the market tightness,
matters for agents when they make their own decisions. These features, together with the
assumption that government policy instruments are functions of aggregate productivity z,
allows the model to admit block recursivity. In Appendix A.4, I provide a proof for the
existence of BRE for an extended version of the baseline model with endogeneous wages,
which also shows that the baseline model is also block recursive. Appendix A.5 provides a
computational algorithm for solving BRE.
The block recursivity of the model is very useful because it allows me to solve the model
numerically without keeping track of the aggregate distribution of agents across states Γ.
This becomes especially important when I solve for the optimal government transfers, which
requires solving the equilibrium and finding the tax rate that balances the government
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budget over a long simulation period for each set of policy instruments.
1.3 Calibration and Validation
I calibrate the stochastic steady state of the model to match key labor market moments
pre-Great Recession. Besides these, I also calibrate the model to match three particularly
important moments: the level and cyclicality of i) head’s earnings drop upon job loss,
ii) government transfers, and iii) job finding rates. It is important to match the depth
and cyclicality of heads’ earnings losses because it determines how critical the role of both
public and private insurance when a displacement in the family occurs. Likewise, matching
the average generosity of government transfers and how it varies over the business cycle
allows me to correctly quantify the insurance benefits of increasing or decreasing transfers
as well as its incentive costs on family labor supply. Finally, the model must also match
well how job finding rates vary over the cycle since this directly affects the strength of
private insurance mechanisms through family employment. Since job finding rates are low
in recessions, spouses may find it difficult to find a job and may thus not be able to provide
adequate insurance to the family.
Next, I validate the calibrated model against the change in family earnings and spousal
earnings upon head’s job displacements in recessions and in expansions, consumption drop
upon job displacement, marginal propensity to consume (MPC) level and cyclicality, asset-
to-income distribution, and correlation between head and spouse displacements.
Among these data moments, I emphasize the effect of head’s job displacement on head’s
own earnings, family earnings, and spousal earnings, as these turn out to be key in under-
standing the effects of transfers on spousal labor supply as well as in correctly quantifying
the insurance benefits and incentive costs of these transfers. Thus, I will now measure these
moments from the data. The magnitude of head’s own earnings loss upon displacements
will be a calibration input, while the effects of head’s displacement on family and spouse
earnings will be validation inputs.
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1.3.1 Earnings loss upon job displacement over the business cycle
Data and methodology
In this section, I use data from Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) between 1968-2015
to study the changes in head earnings and hours, spouse earnings and hours, and family
earnings upon a family head’s job displacement over the business cycle. For this analysis,
I restrict the sample to families in which both the husband and the wife are between ages
of 20 and 60 who are not in the Latino sample. I drop families with only one year of
observation and those above the 99th percentile of family labor income distribution.26 I
create variables for involuntary job displacement using a question that asks the reason for
losing the previous job to individuals who are either without a job or have been employed
in their current job for less than a year. Following the literature, I define an involuntary
job loss as a separation due to firm closure, layoff or firing.27 This way, I only consider un-
expected separations so that I can eliminate cases in which family were informed about the
separation and spouses were already searching for a job. The resulting unbalanced sample
of families contains 86, 541 observations on 9, 383 families with 1, 204 of them experiencing
at least one displacement in a recession, and 2, 269 of them experiencing at least one dis-
placement in an expansion. The family head of 674 families have at least one displacement
event both in recessions and expansions. In this sample, there are 1, 573 displacements in
recessions, and 3, 517 displacements in expansions. Appendix A.2 provides more details
about the data and sample selection.
Table 1.1 compares the characteristics of families in which the head is never displaced
whenever family is surveyed with characteristics of families in which the head of the family
is displaced at least once. Couples of the families in which the head experiences a job
displacement are slightly younger and less educated than families in which the head is
never displaced. On average, displaced heads and their spouses work relatively lower hours
than never displaced heads and their spouses even in the year prior to displacement.
To study the effects of head’s job displacement on his individual earnings and hours, spousal
26Appendix A.2 discusses that main results of this section are robust to alternative sample selections.
27The latter category includes workers who report that they have been fired, which is typically not
considered as an exogenous job displacement event. However, Boisjoly, Duncan, and Smeeding (1994)
report that only 16% of the workers in the layoff or fired category have indeed been fired.
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earnings and hours, and family earnings, I adopt the regression specification in Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) and Stevens (1997) given as follows:28
yit = βXit +
10∑
k≥−2
ψkD
k
it + αi + γt + it (1.9)
The outcome variable yit include the real annual labor earnings of the head, spouse, and
the family (defined as the sum of head and spouse labor earnings), as well as the head’s
and spouse’s annual working hours.29 The variable Xit is a vector of time-varying family
characteristics, including a quadratic term of the head’s experience, a quadratic term of
spouse’s experience, the number of children, and the number of young children with age
less than 6. αi captures time invariant unobserved error component associated with family
i, and γt is an error component common to all families in the sample at year t. The
vector of dummy variables Dkit indicate a job displacement of the head in a future, current,
or previous year. For example, D3it = 1 if the individual i is displaced at time t − 3,
and zero otherwise. I estimate the impact a head’s job displacement on individual and
spousal earnings and hours as well as family earnings in the two years preceding job loss
(k = −2,−1), in the year of job loss (k = 0), and in every year until 10 years after job loss
(k = 1, 2, ..., 10). Thus, ψk captures the effect of job displacement on outcome variables
in families whose head were displaced k years prior/after (treatment group) relative to
families whose head has never been displaced (control group). Thus, individuals in the
control group would have Dkit = 0 for all years t. In all of the results below, the relative
change of an outcome variable means the change in the outcome variable of the treatment
group relative to the change in the outcome variable of the control group.30
In order to measure the differential effects of job displacements in recessions and in expan-
sions on outcome variables, I group displacements into those that occurred in recessions
and those that occured in expansions using NBER business cycle definitions. This means
that when a displacement occurs in a recession year t, the individual is considered to be
28Based on the definition of the head in the PSID, family head is almost always male. In my sample,
only 49 observations have female head among 86, 541 observations.
29Labor earnings include wages and salaries, bonuses, overtime, tips, commissions, professional practice
or trade, market gardening, miscellaneous labor income, and extra job income.
30Individuals who experience an unemployment spell because of reasons other than displacement (such
as quits) are part of the control group.
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part of the treatment group that is displaced in recessions. I then estimate the regression
Equation (1.9) for i) a treatment group where the head is displaced only in recessions and a
control group where the head is never displaced, and ii) a treatment group where the head
is displaced only in expansions and a control group where the head is never displaced. The
regressions are estimated with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the fam-
ily level. In the following figures I report estimated ψk as a percent of the pre-displacement
mean value of the outcome variable.
Head earnings
Figure 1.1 shows the change in relative labor earnings of the family head upon job dis-
placement in recessions and expansions. The solid blue line shows the estimated coefficeints
{ψk}10k=−2 as a percent of pre-displacement mean labor earnings of displaced heads, and
the dashed light blue line shows the 90 percent confidence interval. I compare these results
that I obtain from the PSID to the estimates of Davis and von Wachter (2011) who use
Social Security Administration (SSA) data between 1974-2008.31 I find that the magnitude
of the average drop in head’s relative labor earnings is larger when the head is displaced
in recessions. In the year following the job displacement, the relative earnings drop by 39
percent in recessions and only 22 percent in expansions.32 These results are consistent with
the findings of Davis and von Wachter (2011) as they also document larger earnings losses
upon displacements that occur in recessions (39 percent) than in expansions (25 percent).
Furthermore, I find that these earnings losses upon job displacement over the business
31My econometric model is slightly different than the model that Davis and von Wachter (2011) use. In
their analysis, they regress equation (1.9) for every year, obtain δk for each of these years, and then report
the average values of δk across these years. Given that my sample size is smaller in PSID, I follow the
baseline specification applied by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) and Stevens (1997) who also use
PSID. However, I still compare my results to Davis and von Wachter (2011) results because they provide
the only empirical baseline for cyclicality of the magnitude of earnings drop upon job displacement.
32This finding is similar to results in the previous literature that estimates the earnings loss upon job
displacement without conditioning the timing of displacement. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993)
find 25 percent, Stevens (1997) finds 30 percent, Stephens (2002) finds 30 percent, and Huckfeldt (2016)
finds 32.5 percent drop in individual earnings upon displacement using annual data from PSID (until 1997
survey). Moreover, Saporta-Eksten (2014) shows that relative hourly wages of laid-off workers drops by
around 30 percent in the year following job loss.
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Figure 1.1: Relative labor earnings of family head upon job displacement
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Note: This figure plots the changes in relative labor earnings of the family head upon his job displacement in recessions
(left panel) and expansions (right panel). I estimate the changes in relative labor earnings from a distributed lag-
recession model using PSID. The solid blue line shows the point estimates and the dashed light blue line shows the
90 percent confidence interval. I compare these results to the estimates of Davis and von Wachter (2011) given by
the orange line.
cycle are persistent. Labor earnings of the head recover after 5 years upon displacements
in recessions and expansions. A notable difference between my results and Davis and von
Wachter (2011) is that, according to my results, the persistence of earnings losses is not as
prolonged as their findings wherein individual earnings do not recover even 10 after years
following displacements in recessions and expansions. This difference is partly because my
sample is restricted to married or cohabiting households. The labor earnings of married
men is typically larger than single men, given that they have higher education levels on
average.
Figure A.1 in Appendix A.2 measures the effect of a head’s job displacement over the
business cycle on his annual hours. I find that hours recover relatively quickly. Moreover,
results suggest that both the cyclical gap in earnings loss upon displacements over the
business cycle and the persistence of earnings losses are largely explained by a drop in
wages rather than a drop in hours.
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Family earnings and spousal earnings
The main focus of this section of the paper is to measure the effects of a head’s job
displacement in recessions and expansions on family earnings (defined as the sum of head
and spouse labor earnings), and spousal earnings and hours. Figure 1.2 shows the change in
relative labor earnings of the family upon job displacement of the family head in recessions
and expansions, and compares it to the changes in relative head earnings as obtained above.
I will highlight three results. First, I find that family earnings drop by 28 percent when the
head’s displacement occurs in recessions and by 15 percent when it occurs in expansions in
the year following displacement. This implies that families enjoy some insurance from the
presence of a second earner who was simultaneously employed with the head prior to his
displacement. Having the spouse retain employment results in family earnings dropping by
one-third less than individual earnings.33 Second, the initial cyclical gap of family earnings
loss upon head’s job displacement between recessions and expansions (28 − 15 = 13 pp)
is not very different from the initial cyclical gap of heads earnings loss (39− 22 = 17 pp).
Finally, the statistical significance of the coefficients based on the 90th percent confidence
intervals plotted as blue dashed-lines in Figure 1.2 suggests that family earnings recovers 4
years after displacements in recessions (1 year earlier than head’s earnings recovery), and
3 years after displacements in expansions (2 year earlier than head’s earnings recovery).
However, it is important to notice from the figure that the slopes of the recovery of head’s
earnings and family earnings look similar to each other. This hints us that earlier recoveries
of family earnings are mostly due to a smaller initial drop coming from already working
spouses rather than behavioral responses of, say, non-employed spouses who may enter the
labor force to increase earnings.
The small behavioral response of spouses is confirmed by Figure 1.3 which shows the
change in relative spousal earnings upon the head’s displacement in recessions and in
expansions. I find that the relative spousal earnings upon the head’s displacement in
recessions fluctuates around 0 and that these behavioral responses are always insignificant
across years after the head’s displacement in recessions. Moreover, the mean of the post
displacement coefficients is only −0.8 percent for displacements in recessions. Hence, the
33The presence of a second-earner reduces the initial earnings loss by 100× ((39− 28)/39) = 28 percent
in recessions and 100× ((22− 15)/22) = 32 percent in expansions.
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Figure 1.2: Relative labor earnings of the head and family upon job displacement
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Note: This figure plots the changes in relative labor earnings of the head (blue line) and relative labor earnings of the
family (red line) - defined as the sum of head and spouse labor earnings - upon head’s job displacement in recessions
(left panel) and expansions (right panel). The dashed light blue line shows the 90 percent confidence interval for
family earnings. I estimate the changes in relative labor earnings of the head and the family from a distributed
lag-recession model using PSID.
insignificance of the post displacement coefficients is not only explained by larger error
bands around the point estimates in the recession regression due to a comparably smaller
sample size, but also because of the small average behavioral spousal response to head’s
displacement in recessions. On the other hand, in expansions, there is a slight positive trend
in spousal earnings upon head’s displacement, but coefficients are also insignificant until
year 6. Similarly, the mean of the post displacement coefficients is 8 percent in expansions.
Furthermore, the p-values of a statistical test on joint significance of post displacement
coefficients allow us to reject the hypothesis that they are jointly significant (p = 0.35 in
recession and p = 0.11 in expansion).34
Figure A.2 in Appendix A.2 measures the effect of the head’s job displacement over the
business cycle on annual spouse hours. I also find that the change in spousal hours upon the
head’s displacement in recessions is very small in recessions, with a mean post displacement
coefficient of only −0.1 percent. On the other hand, spousal hours in expansions becomes
34Small initial response of relative hours both in recessions and expansions is consistent with previous
“added worker effect” literature that studies the contemporaneous change in spousal hours upon husband’s
unemployment (Heckman and MaCurdy 1980, 1982, Cullen and Gruber 2000).
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Figure 1.3: Relative labor earnings of the spouse upon job displacement
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Note: This figure plots the changes in relative labor earnings of the spouse upon family head’s job displacement in
recessions (left panel) and expansions. I estimate the changes in relative spousal labor earnings from a distributed
lag-recession model using PSID. The solid blue line shows the point estimates and the dashed light blue line shows
the 90 percent confidence interval.
significantly positive 3 years after the head’s displacement and later increases by up to 15
percent. The mean of post displacement coefficients in expansions is 10.1 percent and the
p-value of joint significance test is p = 0.02.
As a result, I find no evidence for significantly positive spousal earnings and hours response
to head’s displacements in recessions, during when the drop in head’s earnings is much
larger. On the other hand, spousal earnings and hours response to a head’s displacement
in expansions are small during the early years following displacement, and if anything, they
become significantly positive at least 3 years after the displacement with a later increase
by as much as 15 percent.
In Appendix A.2, I discuss that these results are robust to many different sample selec-
tions, including using combinations of alternative PSID samples (SRC, SEO, Immigrant,
Latino), using alternative age limits, incorporating singles, keeping outliers of the labor
income distribution, or keeping families when the head is displaced both in recessions and
expansions in the treatment group.
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Summary of empirical results
It is useful to summarize important empirical findings of this section, all of which except
the first one are novel contributions to the literature. First, I find that there are large
negative and persistent effects of head’s displacement on his own labor earnings and that
the magnitude of the earnings loss is larger when the displacement occurs in recessions, as
in Davis and von Wachter (2011). Second, the mere presence of a second earner already
mitigates close to one-third of the head’s earnings losses upon job displacements both in
recessions and in expansions. Third, there is no evidence for significantly positive spousal
earnings and hours response to head’s displacements in recessions, during when the drop
in head’s earnings is much larger. On the other hand, spousal earnings and hours response
to head’s displacement in expansions becomes significantly positive at least 3 years after
the displacement with a later increase by as much as 15 percent.
The last empirical result is particularly interesting because one could expect a stronger
spousal earnings and hours response during times when the head experiences larger earnings
losses. Hence, it motivates an investigation of potential reasons behind the small change in
spousal earnings upon head’s displacement in recessions. In the next section, I am going
to calibrate the model to match the first empirical result above. Then, I am going to use
the second and the third empirical findings to validate my model against. Next, using
the model, I will investigate the role of countercyclical generosity of current government
transfers on small labor earnings response to head’s displacement in recessions.
1.3.2 Calibration
Functional forms
The model period is set to be a quarter. Utility function over consumption is u (ct) =
c1−σt
1−σ with risk aversion parameter σ. The labor market matching function is M (v, u) =
uv
[uγ+vγ ]1/γ
as in den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000). This functional form implies that
job finding rate p (θ) = θ (1 + θγ)−1/γ and vacancy filling rate q (θ) = (1 + θγ)−1/γ are
between 0 and 1.
As in Shimer (2005), I use a process for the job displacement rate that depends on labor
productivity, which is extended to incorporate that displacement rates across jobs with
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various skill levels may be different: δ (h, z) = δ¯×exp (ωδz × (z − z¯))×exp (ωδh × (h− h¯)),
where δ¯ is mean of the displacement rate over time, ωδz captures the volatility of job
displacement rate over time, and ωδh captures the variation of job displacement rate across
skills, and z¯ and h¯ are average labor productivity and human capital levels respectively. In
general, these separation shocks can be interpreted as idiosyncratic match quality shocks
that drive down the productivity of a match to a low enough level so that the match
endogenously finds it optimal to dissolve, as in Lise and Robin (2017). Finally, production
function is set to be g (h, z) = hz.
The generosity of means-tested transfers φ and employment-tested transfers b vary with
aggregate state. I set φ (z) = φ¯ − ωφ (z − z¯) and b (z) = b¯ − ωb (z − z¯). This implies that
if, for example, ωφ > 0, then means-tested policy is countercyclical.
The logarithm of the aggregate labor productivity zt follows an AR(1) process:
lnzt+1 = ρlnzt + σt+1
where 0 ≤ ρ < 1, σ > 0, and  are independent and identically distributed standard
normal random variables. I take zt as the average seasonally adjusted quarterly real output
per person in the non-farm business sector, which is constructed by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). The data for the time period 1948:I-2007:IV is logged and HP filtered to
obtain deviations from trend.35 In the model, I use five grid points for the process and set
z¯ = 1. Estimation of this process yields ρ = 0.7612 and σ = 0.0086.
External calibration
Having specified functional forms and the law of motion of the productivity process, I now
calibrate several parameters outside of the model. Table 1.2 summarizes these parameters
and their values.
I choose a coefficient of relative risk aversion σ = 2. I set the value of leisure for male to
be 0, implying that males are always searching for the job. Hence, changes in government
35I choose to exclude Great Recession period from this data due to the increase in the value of this
measure of productivity, since the reconciliation of this is beyond the scope of my paper. Standard deviations
of quarterly time series are computed as log deviations from an HP-trend with parameter 1600. For standard
deviations of annual times series, I use the same object with parameter 100.
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transfers do not affect the search behavior of the household’s primary earner in the model.
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Next, I set r = 0.005, which generates an annual return on assets of around 2 percent. I
set ζR to 0.00625, which implies 40 years of average working lifetime, and ζD to 0.01666,
which implies 15 years of retirement.
I use data from National Income and Product Account (NIPA) tables and calculate the
ratio of total wages and salaries to GDP between 1948-2007. I find that the average ratio
across these years is 0.477. I then set worker’s share of output α to this value.
I use 20 equally-spaced grid points for human capital, h ∈ {hL, ..., hH}. I set hL = 0.2
and hH = 1.8. I assume that the human capital increases by one step with probability
piE when employed. This implies ∆E = 0.084. Moreover, I set the probability of human
capital depreciation when unemployed piU to be 0.75.37
I also calibrate the asset and income thresholds a and y for means-tested transfers as
well as the benefit expiration rate e (·) for employment-tested transfers outside of the
model. In the baseline calibration, I consider three means-tested transfers: Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).38
Asset threshold of eligibility for SNAP has been $2000 between 1997 and 2007 according
to the program reports published by U.S. Department of Agriculture.39 Asset threshold
36The average labor force participation rate of married men is 92 percent, implying that ηm would be
small if any. Moreover, this assumption allows me to focus on the effects of government transfers on spousal
labor supply.
37Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) set piU = 0.2 in the calibration of their model, where the model period
is taken to be 2 weeks. For a quarterly calibration (i.e. around 6 period long unemployment spell), this
implies that the probability of experiencing human capital loss is around 0.75.
38Another quantitatively large means-tested transfer paid to households in the working age population
is Medicaid. However, I do not incorporate insurance provided by Medicaid transfers into the calibration
of the means-tested transfer policy instruments given that the baseline model does not incorporate extra
eligibility risk such as health status or presence of a young children rules. In Section 1.6, I incorporate
Medicare to the calibration of total-means tested transfers in an extension of baseline model with these
eligibility risks, and study the effects of it on the main conclusions of this paper.
39These reports are titled “Characteristics of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
Households” and published for every fiscal year since 1997. Reports are available at
https://www.fns.usda.gov/ops/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap-research.
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of eligibility for EITC was $2350 in 1995 and $2900 in 2007 according to the program
reports published by U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).40 Finally, in 2007, while the
asset limit for TANF eligibility varied across different states, most of states applied $2000
as the asset limit according to the program report published by U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services.41 In order to convert these values into model units, I calculate the
ratio of the weighted-average of these asset limit values in the data to quarterly minimum
labor earnings.42 I find that this is around 0.73 in the data. Then, I set a in the model so
that the ratio of asset limit a to quarterly minimum labor earnings, αhLzL, in the model
is the same as its counterpart in the data.43 As a result, I set a to be 0.068.
Using the same program reports, I first calculate the weighted-average of income limits
for these three programs in 2007. I find that the average gross quarterly income limit is
around $7000. Similarly, I calculate the ratio this value to the same quarterly minimum
labor earnings in the data, and find that this ratio is around 2.58. Then, I set y in the
model so that the ratio of income limit y to quarterly minimum labor earnings in the model
is the same as its counterpart in the data. As a result, I set y to be 0.24.
Finally, the average duration of UI payments is around 26 weeks (i.e. 2 quarters), while
this duration is typically extended during recessions. For example, during the Great Re-
cession, UI payment duration was extended up to 99 weeks (i.e. 7.6 quarters). Hence,
I set expiration rate of employment-tested transfers to be 0.5 (i.e. 1/2) when the labor
productivity is greater or equal to its mean, and set it to be 0.13 (i.e. 1/7.6) when the
labor productivity is at its lowest level.44
40These reports are available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior.
41This report is available at https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/wel rules07.pdf
42Between 2000 and 2006, the federal minimum hourly wage was $5.15, and in 2007, it was $5.85. For
these years, I calculate the total quarterly minimum labor earnings as min hourly wage× 40 hours/week×
13 weeks/quarter. Next, I divide the average of asset limit to the average of quarterly minimum labor
earnings in the data.
43Notice that the quarterly minimum labor earnings in the model is invariant to policy changes. This
allows me to calibrate both a and y outside of the model.
44Specifically, the grid for e is set to be [1/ (99/13) , 1/ (75/13) , 1/ (26/13) , 1/ (26/13) , 1/ (26/13)], where
75 weeks reflect the intermediary extensions of UI transfers.
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Internal calibration
I jointly estimate the remaining fifteen parameters using the model to match the moments
of the U.S. economy. Table 1.3 summarizes the results of this estimation.
I choose two paremeters, the discount factor β and borrowing limit aL, to match two data
moments of the asset-to-income distribution from Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
2007: the fraction of households with non-positive liquid wealth, and the median ratio of
credit limit to quarterly labor income. Section 1.3.3 and Appendix A.2 provide the details
of calculating these moments from the data.
Utility value of leisure for female ηf controls the level of opportunity cost of searching for
a job for female. I choose ηf to match the female labor force participation rate (LFPR)
relative to male LFPR in the data. I use monthly data from Current Population Survey
(CPS) 2000-2007 to compute the average LFPR of males and females separately for a
sample of married or cohabiting couples of ages between 20 and 60, i.e. a similar sample
to the PSID sample used in Section 1.3.1. I find that the average LFPR is 71 percent for
female and 92 for male, which implies a relative female LFPR of 77 percent.
The next five parameters are calibrated to discipline five labor market moments of the
model. I obtain the average unemployment rate from quarterly data provided by the
BLS between 1948 and 2007, and choose the cost of posting a vacancy κ to match the
same level in the model.45 Next, I target the volatility of job finding rate in the data by
choosing the elasticity of matching function γ. I use quarterly data from CPS between
1948 - 2007 and compute standard deviation as log deviations from an HP-trend with
parameter 1600.46 Finally, I use three parameters δ¯, ωδz , and ω
δ
h of the job displacement
process in the model to match three moments in the data: the average job displacement
rate, its volatility over time, and its variation across the earnings distribution.47 According
45I use the data provided by FRED - Federal Reserve Economic Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis, which is constructed from the BLS data.
46Job finding rate data was constructed by Robert Shimer. For additional details, please see Shimer
(2012). The data from June 1967 and December 1975 were tabulated by Joe Ritter and made available by
Hoyt Bleakley.
47The model-implied Beveridge curve, which plots the relationship between unemployment and vacancies,
exhibits a negative slope as in the data. This is because when labor productivity declines, firms cut back
on vacancies, which translates to lower job finding rates and higher unemployment. Moreover, the rise in
separation shocks further amplifies the increase in unemployment. As a result, unemployment and vacancies
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to the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) data between 2008 and 2018,
average quarterly total separation rate is around 9 percent of total employment, and that
an average of 38 percent of all separations are due to layoff or discharge. This implies a
quarterly average job displacement rate of 3.4 percent.48 I find a standard deviation of job
displacement rate as 0.06. Finally, I calculate the ratio of median predisplacement labor
earnings of displaced household heads (i.e. labor earnings one year prior to displacement)
to median labor earnings of never displaced heads using the PSID data under the sample
created in Section 1.3.1. I find that this ratio in the data is 76 percent, which implies that
displacement risk is relatively higher for the lower paying jobs. In the model, ωδh controls
the heterogeneity in job displacement risk across jobs with different human capital, and as
a result different wages given that skill level directly affects wages in the model. Hence, I
choose ωδh to match the same earnings ratio in the model.
I choose two parameters of the human capital process to discipline the cyclicality of the
initial drop in head earnings upon job loss, and the labor earnings distribution across
employed individuals. Recall that, in the model, the magnitude of the decline in human
capital ∆U varies across displacements that occur in recessions and expansions, so that the
model is constructed to generate the cyclicality of the initial drop in head earnings upon
job loss. I set ∆U = 0.59 for relaziations of z that are lower than its mean value z¯, and
∆U = 0.34 for realizations of z that are greater than or equal to z¯.49 Figure 1.4 compares
move in the opposite direction.
48This value is larger than estimates based on annual data. Davis and von Wachter (2011) report annual
job displacement rate of around 4 percent using SSA data, which is accordance with job displacement rates
reported by Stevens (1997) using the PSID data and Farber (1997) using the Displaced Worker Supplement.
However, these estimates are likely to be underestimated of the true dusplacement probabilities because of
recall bias (Topel 1991).
49Notice that these values of ∆U are quite large. Given that the human capital levels are in between 0.2
and 1.8, a drop of 0.59 implies that when a worker with a mean human capital level of h¯ = 1 loses his job in
a recession, he would lose 60 percent of his skill with probability piU in the quarter following displacement.
However, it is well known in this literature that generating large and persistent earnings losses upon job
displacement with a more reasonable calibration of the human capital process is quite unsuccessful. Hence,
for example, Huckfeldt (2016) use a model of two different types of occupations (skill-intensive and skill-
neutral) with a more reasonable parametrization of the human capital process to explain the cyclicality of
earnings loss. In this paper, I do not aim to endogenously generate the cyclicality of earnings loss, but
rather take this as a calibration target and anaylze its effects on spousal behavior. Moreover, one could
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Figure 1.4: Relative labor earnings of the head upon job displacement: Model vs data
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Note: This figure plots the changes in relative labor earnings of the family head upon his job displacement in
recessions (left panel) and expansions (right panel) both in the model and in the data. I estimate the changes
in relative labor earnings from a distributed lag-recession model using PSID. The solid blue line shows the point
estimates and the dashed light blue line shows the 90 percent confidence interval. I compare these results to the
estimates obtained from the same regression using the model simulated data, which is aggregated up to yearly period.
Earnings drop one year after displacements both in recessions and expansions are targeted in the model calibration.
head’s earnings loss upon his job displacement in recessions and in expansions between
the model and the data, where the latter was obtained in Section 1.3.1. While the model
generates the same magnitude of earnings losses one year after displacements in recessions
and expansions, as they are targeted in calibration, the recovery of head’s earnings loss is
slightly later in the model than in the data.
Next, the probability of human capital accumulation piE controls the skill distribution, and
thus labor earnings distribution in the model. For example, if piE is very large, then workers
would quickly accumulate their human capital, and resulting dispersion of labor earnings
would be small. I calculate the ratio of 90th to 10th value of labor earnings distribution of
employed individuals from the PSID 2007 survey as 7.6. I choose piE to match the same
ratio in the model.
Finally, I choose remaining five parameters of the model related to government transfers.
I measure the average generosity of means-tested transfers by the ratio of total quarterly
interpret a relatively larger loss of human capital in recessions as “occupational displacement” similar to
Huckfeldt (2016).
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means-tested transfers per recipient individual to the minimum quarterly labor earnings
using data from NIPA 1976 - 2007 and program reports.50 The average ratio across these
years in the data is 0.74. I choose the average level of means-tested transfers φ¯ so that this
statistic in the model is the same as its data counterpart. Similarly, I calculate the average
ratio of total quarterly UI transfers per unemployed individual to the minimum quarterly
labor earnings using data on UI transfer amount from NIPA and data on total number of
unemployed from BLS between 1948 - 2007, and find 0.36. Again, I choose the average
level of employment-tested transfers b¯ so that this statistic in the model is the same as
its data counterpart. Using micro data from SIPP between 1996 and 2014, I find that, on
average, around 35 percent of all means-tested transfers and 60 percent of total UI transfers
are paid to married households. Also, married households constitute around 33 percent of
all means-tested transfer recipients and 58 percent of all UI recipients. Finally, around 60
percent of all transfers received by the married households are means-tested transfers. I
present detailed results in Appendix A.2.
Next, I measure the cyclicality of means-tested transfers by the standard deviation of
total means-tested transfers per recipient individual. The standard deviation of this value
across years in the data is 0.06. In the model, I choose ωφ to generate the same value
for the standard deviation of means-tested transfers per recipient individual.51 Similarly, I
measure the cyclicality of employment-tested transfers by the standard deviation of total
UI transfers per unemployed individual. In the data, this value is 0.15, implying that UI
transfers are much more cyclical than means-tested transfers. In the model, I set ωb to
match the same value for this statistic. Last, I choose retirement transfers bR to match the
average ratio of total social security payments to GDP between 1976 - 2007 in NIPA.52
50For each program, the program reports published by the government agencies provide information on
the number of recipient individuals for each year. Using this data together with data from NIPA, I calculate
the total transfer amount per recipient for each program at a given year and then sum these amounts to
obtain the total means-tested transfer amount per recipient for that year. 1976 is the year that we observe
positive transfer amounts paid under each of the three programs in NIPA. I divide annual amounts of total
means-tested transfers per recipient by 4 to obtain the quarterly amounts. Then, I divide this amount
by the minimum quarterly labor income to obtain the ratio of total quarterly means-tested transfers per
recipient to minimum labor earnings in the data.
51Standard deviation of this annual time series is computed as log deviations from an HP-trend with
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1.3.3 Validation
In this section, I will compare model outcomes with a list of important untargeted data
moments. I will emphasize that the model endogenously generates reasonable changes in
family earnings and spousal earnings upon head’s displacement over the business cycle.
This is important for two reasons. First, it later allows me to quantify the crowding-out ef-
fects of government transfers (incentive costs) on spousal earnings response to displacement
by comparing the change in spousal earnings under counterfactual government policies.
Second, it helps the model to correctly quantify the magnitude and cyclicality of available
spousal insurance, which in turn determines the insurance benefits of government transfers
over the business cycle. The other untargeted moments presented below are also related
to either insurance benefits or incentive costs of government transfers, and thus relevant
for optimal policy analysis.
Family and spouse earnings upon head’s job displacement over the business
cycle
Figure 1.5 compares the change in family earnings upon head’s job displacement in reces-
sions and in expansions between the model and the data. In the model, the magnitudes
of drops in family earnings one year after head’s displacements both in recessions and in
expansions are slightly larger than their respective counterparts in the data. Moreover,
family earnings in the model fully recover around 2 years later than full recovery of family
earnings in the data both in recessions and in expansions.
Next, Figure 1.6 compares the change in spouse earnings upon head’s job displacement in
recessions and in expansions between the model and the data. In the model, changes in
spousal earnings upon head’s displacements both in recessions and expansions are limited
as in the data. However, the model fails to capture the slight positive trend in the change
in spousal earnings in expansions that we observe in the data. In recessions (expansions),
the mean of the post displacement coefficients is 3.2 (5.2) percent in the model compared
parameter 100.
52There is a large increase in social security transfers between 1948 - 1975, but this increase mostly
disappeared since then. Given that I do not model any trend in social security transfers, I calculate the
social security to GDP ratio starting from 1976 in the data.
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Figure 1.5: Relative labor earnings of the family upon job displacement: Model vs data
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Note: This figure plots the changes in relative labor earnings of the family upon head’s job displacement in recessions
(left panel) and expansions (right panel) both in the model and in the data. I estimate the changes in relative family
earnings from a distributed lag-recession model using PSID. The solid blue line shows the point estimates and the
dashed light blue line shows the 90 percent confidence interval. I compare these results to the estimates obtained
from the same regression using the model simulated data, which is aggregated up to yearly period.
to −0.8 (8) percent in the data.
This comparison shows that when the model is calibrated to match level and cyclicality of
i) head’s earnings drop upon job loss, ii) government transfers, and iii) job finding rates
and job separation rates, it is able to generate small change in spousal earnings upon head’s
displacement especially in recessions, as I have documented in the data.
Consumption upon job loss
I now compare the average drop in family consumption in the year following head’s job
displacement in the model and in the data. This is another way to assess the insurance
benefits of transfers in the model. For example, if the magnitude of consumption drop is
very low in the model, then the insurance benefits would be understated in the model.
Several papers in the literature estimated the average consumption drop upon job loss from
various data sources. Gruber (1997) estimates a decline in food expenditure of 6.8 percent
using the PSID for the period up to 1987. Saporta-Eksten (2014) uses cross-sectional
variation in the PSID and measures an 8 percent decline in consumption expenditure
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Figure 1.6: Relative labor earnings of the spouse upon job displacement: Model vs data
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Note: This figure plots the changes in relative labor earnings of the spouse upon head’s job displacement in recessions
(left panel) and expansions (right panel) both in the model and in the data. I estimate the changes in relative spouse
earnings from a distributed lag-recession model using PSID. The solid blue line shows the point estimates and the
dashed light blue line shows the 90 percent confidence interval. I compare these results to the estimates obtained
from the same regression using the model simulated data, which is aggregated up to yearly period.
in the year during which a job loss happens.53 Stephens (2004) estimates the average
decline in food expenditure upon job loss in the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS)
and the PSID and finds that the decline is between 12 percent (PSID) and 15 percent
(HRS). Browning and Crossley (2001) report a 14 percent decline using Canadian Out
of Employment Panel (COEP) survey data. Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016)
conduct an analysis of the effects of job loss on consumption both in the PSID and the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) and find that the decline in total food expenditure is
between 14 percent (PSID) and 21 percent (CE). Finally, Aguiar and Hurst (2005) measure
a 19 percent decline in food expenditure among the unemployed using scanner data.
I estimate the consumption drop upon job displacement in the model using Equation (1.9).
I find that family consumption drops on average by 14 percent in the year following head’s
displacement, which is in line with available empirical estimates discussed above.
53However, this estimate does not condition on the fraction of the year spent as unemployed. When
we assume an average unemployment duration of 17 weeks, this would imply a decline in consumption of
around 24 percent.
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Marginal propensity to consume: average, cyclicality, and heterogeneity
Insurance benefits of transfers can directly be measured by the fraction of an unexpected
transfer that families spend on consumption.
The empirical literature documents two aggregate marginal propensity to consume (MPC)
data moments that I can use to validate the model. First, Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and
McClelland (2013) measure that households, under different specifications, spend between
12 and 30 percent of unexpected tax rebates in the quarter that they are received. Second,
Gross, Notowidigdo, and Wang (2016) measure the cyclicality of the MPC by exploiting
the unexpected changes in credit card borrowing limits of previously bankrupt individuals
and find that the MPC is countercyclical over the Great Recession. In particular, they
show that the average semiannual MPC difference of borrowing-constrained individuals
between 2008 and 2011 is 8 percent.
In the model, I compute the MPC of a family by calculating the fraction of an unexpected
transfer, scaled such that it is equivalent to $500, that the family spends on consumption.
This transfer can be interpreted as a one time unexpected deposit to family’s bank account.
As in Kaplan and Violante (2014), I implement a $500 rebate in order to ensure consistency
with the above available empirical estimates.
Table 2.4 compares the average economy-wide quarterly MPC and the magnitude of MPC
increase for borrowing-constrained families in recessions in the model to available empirical
estimates discussed above.54 The results show that the model generated average quarterly
MPC lies in the middle of range of estimates provided by Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and
McClelland (2013). However, the cyclicality of MPC for borrowing-constrained individuals
is slightly larger in the model than in the data. This means that the insurance benefits in
recessions would probably be slightly overestimated in the model.55
In order to quantitatively understand how MPCs differ across heterogeneous families in the
economy, Table 1.5 presents the average quarterly MPC of different employment, wealth,
and skill level of the head groups based on the stationary distribution of the economy.
54I group families with non-positive wealth as borrowing-constrained families. Then, I report the differ-
ence in average semiannual MPC for such families between when labor productivity is strictly below the
mean and it is equal to or above the mean.
55Nevertheless, the optimal policy is less generous in recessions, implying that even if insurance benefits
would be overestimated in recessions, incentive costs still exceed the insurance benefits in recessions.
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Noticeably, wealth-poor families with unskilled head exhibit highest MPC given the absence
of self-insurance through savings and low labor earnings of the head. On the other hand,
wealth-rich families spend only 2 percent of the tax rebate on consumption regardless of
the head’s skill and employment status of their members.
Asset-to-income distribution
Wealth distribution of the economy is also relevant for both insurance benefits and incentive
costs of transfers. Both insurance benefits and incentive costs are larger for wealth-poor
families, implying that the model would overstate benefits and costs of transfers if the
fraction of such families is much larger in the model than its data counterpart. For this
reason, fraction of families with non-positive liquid wealth is taken as a calibration target
in Table 1.3, while the percentiles of the distribution presented below are not targeted in
the calibration.
To normalize wealth and better capture the level of self-insurance available to families,
I compute asset-to-income ratio by dividing net liquid assets to quarterly family labor
income both in the PSID 2015 and SCF 2007.56 I use net liquid asset holdings as the
primary measure of wealth because of its immediate availability as a means to smooth
consumption in the event of job loss. The net liquid asset holdings of a family are calculated
by adding transaction accounts (checking, saving, money market accounts) and tradable
assets (mutual funds, certificates of deposits, stocks, bonds), and then deducting unsecured
debt. Furthermore, countable assets for asset eligibility threshold of means-tested transfers
often include vehicles across many states in the United States. For this reason, I incorporate
vehicle equity to the liquid assets calculation. Appendix A.2 provides more details on the
calculation of the liquid asset to quarterly labor income distributions from the PSID and
SCF.
I compute the same distribution using the model simulated data and compare it to empirical
estimates, as shown in Table 2.2. In the model, the median family holds net liquid wealth
equivalent to 1.1 quarter of family labor earnings, while it is 1.2 quarter of family labor
56PSID collects information for the amount of credit card debt starting from 2011 survey. Since this
information is needed to calculate net liquid wealth, we can only calculate the asset-to-income distribution
after 2011. Here, I choose to present data from the latest survey.
42
earnings both in the PSID and the SCF. However, the model misses both the amount of
wealth owned by richest and the dispersion of wealth among the rich families, given that
75th and 90th percentiles are much closer in the model than in the data.
Correlated spells of family members
Finally, imagine that there are two types of families in which the head is displaced: i) the
spouses are also displaced around the year of their husband’s displacement and they also
experience earnings losses, and ii) the spouses start working and contributing significantly
to the family income. If this is the case, then these two opposite changes in spousal earnings
among families with displaced heads may cancel out each other, and we would see small
changes in spousal earnings on average. Moreover, if this is the case, the government policy
should be targeted toward the former type of families.
In order to test whether this is the case, I estimate the same regression given in Equation
(1.9) in which the outcome variable is now a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if
the spouse is also displaced, and 0 otherwise. Figure 1.7 compares the percentage point
change in spousal displacement probability upon head’s displacement both in the model
and in the data. It shows that there is at most 2 percentage point increase in spousal
displacement probability upon head’s displacement in the data. The model successfully
generates a similar pattern given that there is no such correlation of unemployment spells
across family members present in it.
1.4 Effects of Transfers on Spousal Earnings Response
In this section, I will present two main results. First, I will implement a counterfactual
experiment to discuss the role of more generous government transfers during recessions in
explaining the small change of spousal earnings upon the head’s displacement in recessions.
Second, I will compare the model implied spousal labor supply elasticities to existing
microeconomic estimates to provide external validation for the model’s predictions from
the counterfactual experiment.
43
Figure 1.7: Change in spousal displacement probability upon head’s displacement: Model
vs data
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Note: This figure plots the changes relative displacement probability of spouses upon head’s job displacement both
in the model and in the data. I estimate the percentage point change in relative spousal displacement probability in
the data from a distributed lag-recession model using PSID. The solid blue line shows the point estimates and the
dashed light blue line shows the 90 percent confidence interval. I compare these results to the estimates obtained
from the same regression using the model simulated data, which is aggregated up to yearly period.
1.4.1 Counterfactual experiment
When the model is calibrated to match the level and cyclicality of i) head’s earnings drop
upon job loss, ii) government transfers, and iii) job finding rates and job separation rates,
it is able to generate small changes in spousal earnings upon the head’s displacement
especially in recessions, as I have documented in the data.
I will now analyze the change in spousal earnings in response to head’s displacement over
the business cycle under alternative government policies. The calibrated model is designed
to isolate the effect of varying transfers on spousal earnings. I do this in two steps. First, I
normalize the value of leisure for male ηm as 0 to make male workers inelastic to changes in
government policy. Second, I assume that the wage paid in each human capital submarket
is a fraction of the period aggregate labor productivity. This implies that wages and firm
vacancy posting decisions are invariant to government policy in the baseline model.57 These
two features of the model allow me to focus on changes in spousal earnings response to
57In Section 1.6, I explore the implications of allowing for endogenous wage choices by households to
capture the effects of transfers on labor demand.
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Figure 1.8: Relative labor earnings of the spouse upon job displacement under different
policies
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Note: This figure plots the changes in relative labor earnings of the spouse upon head’s job displacement in recessions
(left panel) and expansions (right panel) in the model under the countercyclical baseline policy and a procyclical
policy, which later will be shown as the optimal policy. I estimate the changes in relative spouse earnings from a
distributed lag-recession model using model simulated data, which is aggregated up to yearly period.
displacements under different government policies.
Figure 1.8 compares the change in spousal earnings upon the head’s job displacement in
recessions and in expansions in the model under the countercyclical baseline policy and a
procyclical policy, which later will turn out to be the optimal policy. It shows that under
the procyclical policy, relative spousal earnings increase by up to 15 percent in recessions,
but remains below 5 percent in expansions. In particular, I find that the mean of the
post-displacement coefficients in recessions is 14 percent under the procyclical policy as
opposed to 3.2 percent under the current policy. For expansions, it is 2.9 percent under
the procyclical policy and 5.2 percent under the current policy.
This result is driven by the fact that in recessions, the large earnings losses incurred by
the head of the family are mitigated by generous transfers from government in the current
policy. This lowers the marginal utility of consumption of the family and thus lowers
spousal incentives to increase earnings during recessions. When transfers are less generous
in recessions, a high marginal utility of consumption induces spouses to increase earnings
to raise family consumption. In contrast, expansions are periods when earnings losses are
small and the marginal utility of consumption is low regardless of the generosity of transfers.
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As such, spousal response is small and inelastic to government transfer generosity.
1.4.2 Spousal labor supply elasticities: Data vs model
I now implement an external validation exercise to test whether the model implied spousal
labor supply response to changes in government policies is reasonable. This is important
because, for example, if the magnitude of this elasticity is much larger in the model than in
the data, then the crowding-out effects of transfers would be overestimated in recessions,
during when transfer generosity increases. As a result, the model would overstate the role
of government transfers in explaining the small change of spousal earnings in response to
the head’s displacement in recessions. Furthermore, in the optimal policy analysis, the
model would also overestimate the incentive costs of transfers, which would bias results
toward less generous transfers.
The first panel of Table 1.7 compares female participation elasticity with respect to net
wages in the data and in the model. Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2012) summarize
the magnitude of female participation elasticity estimates identified from permanent wage
changes resulting from tax reforms across seven different studies.58 They report female
participation elasticity as the change in log employment rates divided by the change in
log net-of-tax wages. Employment rate is typically defined as positive work hours in a
year. The magnitude of these empirical estimates on the female participation elasticity
with respect to net earnings lie between 0.15 and 0.43.
In order to calculate magnitude of the female participation elasticity with respect to net-
of-tax wages in the model, I implement an unexpected and permanent decline in τ so that
the average net wages of the employed in the model, i.e. (1− τ) w¯ where w¯ is the average
wage in the model prior to change in tax rate, increases by 10 percent. This way, the
model generates permanent changes in wages resulting from an income tax reform, which
is similar to the identification used in the microeconomic studies. I then calculate the
model implied female participation elasticity with respect to net wages as the ratio of the
change in log female employment rates to the change in log average wages of the employed.
58Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2012) summarize results from nine different papers in total.
However, two of these papers focus on men in their sample. Hence, I consider the remaining seven papers
as my comparable benchmark.
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I find that the magnitude of female participation elasticity with respect to net wages is
0.31 in the model, which lies in between the range of values found in the literature.
Moreover, it is possible to divide a subset of these empirical estimates summarized by
Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2012) into two groups based on the demographics and
characteristics of their sample. On one hand, we can group estimates by Eissa and Lieb-
man (1996), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), and Eissa and Hoynes (2004) as participation
elasticities of female who are living in low income households. This is because these three
studies focus on either married women living in low income households or single women
receiving government transfers, both of which can be interpreted as spouses in low income
households from the lens of my model. In these papers, the magnitude of female participa-
tion elasticities with respect to net-of-tax wages are 0.30, 0.43, and 0.27 respectively. On
the other hand, Liebman and Saez (2006) estimate the participation elasticity of women
who are married to high income men as 0.15. As a result, the participation elasticity is
much larger for females living in low income households than in high income households.
This allows me to compare the heterogeneity of female participation elasticity across fami-
lies with different income levels in the model with that of the data. I compute the magnitude
of female participation elasticity with respect to net wages separately for women in low
income households and high income households using the same calculations as before.59 I
find that the magnitudes of participation elasticities are 0.38 for spouses living in low in-
come households and 0.21 for spouses living in high income households. Hence, the model
also generates a quantitatively reasonable difference between the participation elasticities
of females across different household income groups. However, the model overestimates
the magnitude of the female participation elasticity for high income households. This is
because as shown in Section 1.3, the model does not fully capture households in the right
59Eissa and Hoynes (2004) report the gross hourly wage of husband and wife as $12.09 and $7.56 in
1995 dollars respectively for their entire sample. This implies that the ratio of total gross hourly wage
of the household ($19.65) to the hourly minimum wage in 1995 ($4.25) is equal to 4.62 in their sample.
To discipline the model sample of low income households, I consider households whose total gross labor
earnings are less than or equal to 4.62 times of the model’s minimum wage as low income households. On
the other hand, the data sample in Liebman and Saez (2006) that is used to calculate elasticities for high
income families include heads whose earnings are above 75th percentile of earnings. Hence, in the model, I
group households as high income households in the model if the head’s gross wage is greater than or equal
to 75th percentile of the wage distribution of the employed prior to the policy change.
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tail of the asset and income distribution for whom these elasticities are very low.
The second panel of Table 1.7 compares female labor earnings elasticity with respect to
transfers in the data and in the model. The goal here is to provide external evidence
for the effect of transfer generosity on spousal labor supply response to the head’s job
displacement. In order to do so, I will compare the change in spousal earnings upon
the head’s job displacement for households living in either U.S. states providing the most
generous transfer payments or states providing the least generous transfer payments. Using
the PSID, I group the sample of households into these two groups and run the regression
Equation (1.9) separately for spousal earnings and transfer receipts as dependent variables,
also controlling for state fixed effects and state level employment rates to account for labor
market differences.60 As a result, I obtain post-displacement dollar amount changes of
spousal earnings and transfer receipts of households upon the head’s job displacement
relative to non-displaced households separately for these two samples. Then, I calculate
the ratio of the difference in log spousal earnings to the difference in log transfer receipts
of displaced households between the sample in the most generous states and in the least
generous states. I find that this ratio is 0.44, and I take this as the magnitude female labor
earnings elasticity with respect to transfers in the data.61
I perform a similar exercise in the model by separately implementing a permanent 10 per-
cent decline in i) average generosity of means-tested transfers φ¯, and ii) average generosity
of employment-tested transfers b¯. I find that female labor earnings elasticity with respect
to φ¯ is 0.36 and with respect to b¯ is 0.01. The combined elasticity of these transfers is
60U.S. states with most generous safety net programs are taken as Vermont, District of Columbia, North
Dakota, Massachusetts, and Minnesota. U.S. states with the least generous safety net programs are taken
as Alabama, South Carolina, Florida, Nevada, and Georgia. I have 421 displacements in the former sample
and 647 displacements in the latter sample. Given this small sample size, it is unfortunately not possible
to further divide these samples into displacements in recessions and in expansions, or displacements that
occur in low income or high income families. One valid concern in this estimation is selection of households
with frequently displaced heads into states with more generous transfers. I acknowledge this concern and
view the estimates in this exercise as suggestive correlational evidence.
61This result implies a higher spousal labor supply response when government transfers are less generous.
Similarly, Bredtmann, Otten, and Rulff (2017) use data from 28 European countries between 2004 and 2013,
and document that spousal labor supply to their husband’s unemployment is strongest in less generous
welfare states (i.e. the Mediterranean, Central, and Eastern European countries), while it is weakest in
more generous welfare states (i.e. the Continental European and Nordic countries).
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close but lower than the elasticity of 0.44 in the data. Interestingly, in the model, most
of the response is driven by changes in means-tested transfers while female earnings are
inelastic to the generosity of employment-tested transfers. This is because eligibility for
employment-tested transfers require job search and such transfers pay only low amounts
for a short duration.
Finally, I calculate female labor earnings elasticity with respect to these two types of
transfers separately for low income and high income households in the model. In particular,
I find that the earnings elasticity with respect to φ¯ is 0.47 for females in low income
households and 0.23 for females in high income households. In recessions, the head’s job
displacement causes a larger drop in the household income. For this reason, spousal labor
supply is more responsive to changes in government transfers in recessions. Hence, reducing
the generosity of transfers in recessions increases spousal earnings response to the head’s
displacement in recessions significantly, as shown in Figure 1.8.
1.5 Optimal Policy
The results in the previous section show that the incentive costs of transfers on spousal
labor supply are larger in recessions and smaller in expansions. Since the existing trans-
fers are more generous in recessions, it implies that there may be potential welfare gains
from changing the generosity of government transfers over the business cycle. Motivated
by this observation, in this section, I will study the optimal design of means-tested and
employment-tested transfers over the business cycle.
1.5.1 Welfare calculation
The ex-ante welfare gains or losses of any proposed government policy is measured by
answering the following question: how much additional lifetime consumption must be en-
dowed to all families in an economy where the baseline countercyclical policy is being
implemented so that average welfare will be equal to an economy where the proposed pol-
icy is implemented? This criterion evaluates whether an alternate policy will be welfare
improving when compared the baseline countercyclical policy.
Let o denote the baseline (old) policy and n denote the new/proposed policy. Using a
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utilitarian social welfare function, I compute the additional percent lifetime consumption x¯
that makes the average ex-ante welfare equal across these two economies using the following
equation: ∫
j
[
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∞∑
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subject to the government budget constraint given in Equation (2.7). Here, ckjt, l
k
i,jt, and
ski,jt denote household consumption, employment status, and participation decision of in-
dividual i ∈ {m, f} of family j at time t under government policy k ∈ {o, n}, and Γss is
the stationary distribution at the stochastic steady state of the economy.
The welfare exercise in Equation (2.15) can be interpreted as follows. Consider two coun-
tries populated by people with the same type-distribution under transfer policy o. The only
difference between both countries is that the government of the first country continues to
implement policy o, while the second introduces policy n unexpectedly and permanently.62
The welfare effects of a proposed policy is measured by how much additional lifetime con-
sumption x¯ should the first government compensate a family who is behind the veil of
ignorance (i.e., does not know initial type in the stationary distribution) in order to make
the family indifferent between being part of one of these two countries? Thus, the best
policy n that the second government can implement is the one that makes the first govern-
ment pay the highest compensation x¯max to weakly attract this prospective citizen. This
policy will be the optimal transfer policy.
In my main optimal policy analysis in this section, I restrict policy instruments to take
the form of the means-tested transfer amount and employment-tested transfer amount as
linear functions of current aggregate labor productivity. I set φ (z) = φ¯ − ωφ (z − z¯) and
b (z) = b¯−ωb (z − z¯), where z¯ is the average level of labor productivity z. This implies that
if, for example, ωφ > 0, then means-tested policy is countercyclical. Under this restriction
of policy instruments, I search over five policy parameters
(
φ¯, ωφ, b¯, ωb, τ
)
to solve for the
62Hence, the economy of the second country will transition to its new steady state under policy n. Thus,
the welfare exercise already incorporates the welfare gains or losses from the transitional dynamics.
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optimal transfer policy.63
1.5.2 Optimal policy in the baseline model
Table 1.8 compares per recipient transfer amount as a multiple of minimum wage in the
model paid under the means-tested and employment-tested transfers in the current policy
and the optimal policy. Separate comparisons are presented for when the aggregate labor
productivity z is at its average level z¯, and its minimum level, i.e. deep recession. Minimum
wage in the model is exogeneous to changes in policy as discussed previously in Section
1.3. Thus, reporting transfer amounts as a multiple of minimum wage presents a useful
interpretation.
The optimal level of transfers on average is determined by the tradeoff between insurance
benefits vis-a-vis incentive costs. When labor productivity is at its average level, the opti-
mal policy features a lower level of means-tested transfers and higher level of employment-
tested transfers when compared to the current policy under the average labor productivity.
This way, the optimal policy induces larger spousal labor force participation. Nevertheless,
total transfers under the optimal policy is 2.58 times the minimum wage which is close
to 2.48 under the current policy. This is because, given that the model well accounts for
important sources of private insurance channels (e.g. assets and spousal earnings), there
is little redistributive role of government transfers.
The optimal cyclicality is determined by how insurance benefits net of incentive costs
vary over the business cycle. The most striking difference between the optimal policy
and current policy is that optimal means-tested transfers provides less generous transfers
in recessions (procyclical) while the current policy expands benefits (countercyclical). In
recessions, optimal means-tested transfers reduce the amount paid per recipient household
from 1.40 to 0.40 times the minimum wage, whereas current policy increases it from 1.61
63This means that for any values of
(
φ¯n, ωnφ , b¯
n, ωnb
)
, I first solve for the income tax rate τn that balances
the government budget in the long-run. Then, using these policy parameters, I numerically compute the
welfare gains/losses relative to the baseline values of
(
φ¯b, ωbφ, b¯
b, ωbb , τ
b
)
, i.e. the baseline countercyclical
policy, using Equation (2.15). Given any guess of x¯, I can compute for both sides of this equation over the
stationary distribution for any values of
(
φ¯n, ωnφ , b¯
n, ωnb , τ
n
)
. I then solve for the x¯ that equates both sides
of Equation (2.15). Finally, I select the policy that yields the highest welfare gain x¯max as the optimal
transfer policy.
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to 1.90. Less generous transfers in recessions alleviates large incentive costs of public
insurance on the labor supply of spouses and induce female participation as a response to
a head’s displacement due to a larger increase in marginal utility of consumption as a result
of head’s larger earnings losses upon his displacements in recessions. On the other hand,
optimal employment-tested transfers is more generous in recessions (countercyclical) and is
of comparable cyclicality with the current policy. In particular, the amount paid per eligible
individual increases from 1.18 to 1.34 times the minimum wage under the optimal policy,
while it increases from 0.86 to 1.04 under the current policy. The provision of insurance
benefits in recessions is better accomplished through employment-tested transfers because
these are small payments and more importantly, limited in duration. This dampens its
crowding-out effects on the labor supply of family members. This is corroborated by
results of Section 1.4.2, where I show that the magnitude of the elasticity of female labor
supply elasticity with respect to changes in b¯ is small. Overall, total government transfers
under the optimal policy is procyclical, while it is countercyclical under the current policy.
The optimal policy yields welfare gains equivalent to 0.61 percent additional lifetime con-
sumption compared to the current policy. Roughly half of this welfare gains is attributable
to optimizing over the average level of transfers, and the other half is attributable to
optimizing over the cyclicality of transfers.64
Understanding the reasons behind the optimality
In order to better understand the reasons behind the optimality of this policy, I will compare
family outcomes and macroeconomic outcomes under the optimal and current policies.
Effects of optimal policy on family outcomes upon displacement As mentioned
earlier in Section 1.4.2, Figure 1.8 compares the change in spousal earnings upon the
64Krusell, Mukoyama, S¸ahin, and Smith (2009) study the welfare effects of eliminating both aggregate
risk and its impact on idiosyncratic risk when there is a correlation between these two shocks. Their study
is an extension of Lucas (1987) into an incomplete asset markets model with heterogeneous households.
They find that the welfare gains of eliminating the cycle and its effect on idiosyncratic risk are as much
as 1 percent in consumption equivalents. Given that public and private insurance in my model can only
partially smooth the effects of business cycles, welfare gains from the optimal policy are much lower than
the upper bound provided by Krusell, Mukoyama, S¸ahin, and Smith (2009).
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Figure 1.9: Relative consumption of the family upon job displacement: Current policy vs
optimal policy
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Note: This figure plots the changes in relative family consumption upon head’s job displacement in recessions (left
panel) and expansions (right panel) in the model under the countercyclical baseline (current) policy and the optimal
policy. I estimate the changes in relative family consumption from a distributed lag-recession model using model
simulated data, which is aggregated up to yearly period.
head’s job displacement in recessions and expansions in the model under the countercyclical
baseline (current) policy and a procyclical policy which was set to be what turned out to
be the optimal policy. Thus, we know that the optimal policy induces a larger spousal
labor supply response upon the head’s job displacement in recessions, and it does not alter
the magnitude of this response much in expansions due to reasons discussed earlier.
Next, I compare the change in family consumption upon the head’s job displacement in
recessions and expansions under the current policy and the optimal policy. It shows that
families experience a smaller consumption drop upon the head’s displacement both in
recessions and in expansions under the optimal policy. Moreover, family consumption fully
recovers 6 years after displacements in recessions, and 5 years after in expansions under
the optimal policy, 2 years earlier in recessions and 1 year earlier in expansions. While
the earlier recovery in recessions under the optimal policy is explained by a larger spousal
labor earnings response, the earlier recovery in expansions is explained by larger amount
of transfer receipts during the initial years after displacement.65 Furthermore, I find that
65Figure A.4 and A.5 in Appendix A.3 provide comparisons respectively for relative changes in family
earnings and assets upon the head’s displacement in recessions and expansions under the current policy
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the difference in consumption drop upon displacement between recessions and expansion
under the optimal policy is 9 pp (0.16 − 0.07 = 0.09), which is the same as this cyclical
gap under the current policy (0.19 − 0.10 = 0.09). The reason why the optimal policy
does not narrow this gap is the offsetting effects of the increase in spousal earnings and the
decline in transfer receipts under the optimal policy in recessions. The main conclusion of
this section is that the optimal policy reduces the average drop in consumption both in
recessions and in expansions, but does not improve the cyclical gap of initial consumption
drops.
Effects of optimal policy on the macroeconomic outcomes I now discuss the
effects of the optimal policy on the macroeconomic outcomes. Table 1.9 compares the
steady state values of macroeconomic outcomes under the current policy and the optimal
policy. Compared to the economy under the current policy, the economy under the optimal
policy has a similar unemployment rate but much higher female labor force participation
rate (LFPR) at 76 percent versus 71 percent. Under the optimal policy, larger spousal
labor supply is induced by having lower means-tested transfers on average and lower total
transfers in recessions. As a result, the median skill of females is larger under the optimal
policy as they spend more time employed. The increase in employment reduces the income
tax required to finance a similar average level of government transfers from 16.2 percent to
15.6 percent. The wealth distribution of families in the labor force also shifts right under
the optimal policy, as we observe a sizeable decline in the fraction of families with non-
positive liquid wealth, and an increase in the median value of asset-to-income distribution.
These changes in the macroeconomy increases the average consumption level under the
optimal policy for the families in the labor force. I find that the mean and the median
of consumption across these families are respectively 1 and 2 pp larger under the optimal
policy compared to the current policy. While the gini of consumption distribution is the
same under these two policies, the volatility of the average consumption is only slightly
lower under the optimal policy because of the offsetting effects of the increase in spousal
earnings and the decline in transfer receipts under the optimal policy in recessions.66
and the optimal policy, both of which affect changes in family consumption.
66Volatility of average consumption is measured by the standard deviation of log deviations from an
HP-trend with parameter 1600.
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Heterogeneous welfare gains from the optimal policy
Finally, I discuss heterogeneous ex-post welfare gains/losses from the optimal policy across
different types of families. I group families by their employment status, asset level, and
skill levels of male and female based on their states on the stationary distribution of the
economy before the government changes the policy to the optimal policy. I then calculate
x¯ from Equation (2.15) for each group by only integrating over families which belong to
that group.
Table 1.10 shows the heterogeneous welfare impacts of the optimal policy on various type-
groups, where columns represent male or female skill groups across families in which only
head is employed or both are unemployed, and rows represent the asset holdings of families.
I find that most of the welfare gains are enjoyed by wealth-poor families with an unskilled
male who is married to a skilled female, both among families in which only head is employed
and among families in which the head and spouse are unemployed. Welfare gains are
highest for such family types when both members are unemployed. It is precisely for this
family for whom a spouse’s participation in the labor force can bring the largest gains in
consumption to the family especially when a displacement of the head occurs. On the
contrary, the lowest welfare gains are enjoyed by wealth-rich families with skilled male and
unskilled female for whom spouses are less likely to enter into labor force and the need for
any insurance is the least.
1.5.3 Optimal policy in the exogenous spousal labor supply model
I now explore the implications of assuming that spousal labor supply is exogenous to
changes in government policy. In particular, I consider an alternative environment in
which female labor force participation decisions are invariant to changes in government
policy. In order to do so, I fix spousal labor supply decisions to be those under the current
(old) policy for any new (proposed) policy n, i.e. snf (· ) = sof (· ) ∀n. Then, I solve for the
optimal policy of this model using the same methodology as before. Table 1.11 compares
per recipient transfer amounts as a multiple of minimum wage under the optimal policy of
the baseline model with endogenous female labor supply and under the optimal policy in
the exogenous spousal labor supply model.
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When labor productivity is at its average level, total transfers paid under the optimal pol-
icy of the alternative model is more generous than the optimal policy under the baseline
model. Recall that, in Table 1.7, I have documented that spousal labor supply elasticity
to government policy is large, especially among low income households. When we abstract
from the responsiveness of spousal labor supply to changes in government policy, we dis-
regard the policy’s crowding-out effect on spousal labor supply. As a result, the optimal
policy features more generous transfers on average in this alternative model. Moreover,
according to this optimal policy, around 90 percent of total transfers are paid under means-
tested transfers in the exogenous spousal labor supply model since means-tested transfers
better target insurance toward families who need it the most and their incentive costs are
now small.
Furthermore, the optimal policy in this case features countercyclical means-tested and
employment-tested transfers. This is because the optimal cyclicality of government trans-
fers is mostly determined by the cyclicality of insurance benefits, which is larger in re-
cessions during when more families experience unemployment and get closer to borrowing
limits. Meanwhile, the incentive costs of transfers are now unaccounted for.
Overall, this exercise shows that endogenizing the spousal labor supply response to changes
in government policy is a critical determinant of both the optimal level and cyclicality of
transfers.
1.6 Extensions and Robustness
In this section, I provide a list of extensions and robustness checks of the optimal policy
analysis. In my main welfare analysis in Section 1.5.2, I have searched for the optimal level
and cyclicality of means-tested and employment-tested transfers as well as the implied tax
rate that balances the government budget. In Section 1.6.1, I now optimize over the level of
asset and income thresholds a and y of eligibility for means-tested transfers as well as the
level and cyclicality of employment-tested transfer expiration rate e (·). In Section 1.6.2, I
relax a list of assumptions in the baseline model and compute the welfare gains from the
optimal policy of the baseline model. 67
67I also check the implications of these exercises on results of Section 1.4. Sizeable welfare gains from the
baseline optimal policy in these cases imply that less generous transfers in recessions still induce spouses
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1.6.1 Extensions
Due to computational reasons, in Section 1.5.2, I solved for the optimal policy only by
searching over the optimal level and cyclicality of means-tested and employment-tested
transfers as well as the implied tax rate that balances the government budget. There are
three other policy instruments in this model: the level of asset and income thresholds a
and y of eligibility for means-tested transfers, and employment-tested transfer expiration
rate e (·). In this section, I search for the optimal a, y, and e (·) in steps, taking as given
the optimal level and cyclicality of means-tested and employment-tested transfers obtained
in Section 1.5.2.68
Table 1.12 first shows the welfare gains from the baseline optimal policy calculated in
Section 1.5.2, through optimizing over transfer level and cyclicality of both means-tested
and employment-tested transfers (first row). Then, on top of this optimal policy (i.e. under
the optimal level and cyclicality of means-tested and employment-tested transfers obtained
in Section 1.5.2), it shows welfare gains from optimizing over i) both levels of asset and
income thresholds a and y of eligibility for means-tested transfers (second row), ii) only
level of asset threshold a (third row), iii) only level of income threshold y (fourth row), and
finally iv) only level and cyclicality of employment-tested transfer expiration rate e (·) (fifth
row). In all of these cases, I solve for the income tax that balances government budget.
Welfare gains are in percent lifetime equivalent consumption terms and they are computed
relative to the baseline countercyclical policy.
I find that, on top of the baseline optimal policy, jointly optimizing over asset and income
thresholds yields welfare gains of 0.81 percent additional lifetime consumption relative
to the current policy. In this case, optimal asset and income thresholds are 0.028 and
0.275 respectively. Under the current policy, asset and income thresholds are 0.068 and
0.240. This means that the optimal policy allows families with slightly higher total labor
income to be eligible for means-tested transfers, while it makes asset eligibility criteria
more restrictive, when compared to the current policy.
In order to understand which of these two instruments are more powerful in increasing
to supplement family earnings by working.
68Again due to computational reasons, it is not feasible to solve for full set of optimal policy instruments
at the same time. Thus, I solve for optimal a , y , and e (·) one at a time.
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welfare gains, I next search for only optimal asset threshold and only optimal income
threshold separately, again taking as given the baseline optimal policy. In the former
case, welfare gains are 0.63, with an optimal asset threshold of 0.049. In the latter case,
welfare gains are 0.77, with an optimal income threshold of 0.272. These results show that
optimizing over the income threshold provides higher welfare gains.
Finally, I solve for the optimal level and cyclicality of employment-tested transfer expiration
rate e (·), again taking as given the baseline optimal policy. According to the optimal e (·),
employment-tested transfers should expire on average in 1.7 quarters, and that the duration
should be extended to 1.8 quarters in recessions, implying that the optimal duration is only
slightly countercyclical. Under the current policy, the duration is 2 quarters on average,
and 7.6 quarters in recessions. Even if there is significant difference between the degree
of countercyclicality of the current and optimal policies, this change provides only little
welfare gains. Welfare gains from the optimal policy of this case are 0.63, which is only
slightly higher than the welfare gains of 0.61 under the baseline optimal policy that does
not optimize over e (·).
1.6.2 Robustness
In this section, I relax a list of assumptions in the baseline model and compute the wel-
fare gains from the baseline optimal policy. Specifically, I show welfare gains from the
optimal policy in Section 1.5.2, when an assumption of the baseline model is changed.69
Results are summarized in Table 1.13, where welfare gains are in percent lifetime equivalent
consumption terms, and they are computed relative to the baseline countercyclical policy.
Incorporating Medicaid to means-tested transfers In the calibration of the model,
I did not incorporate Medicaid transfers into the calibration of the means-tested transfer
policy instruments given that the baseline model does not incorporate extra eligibility risk
such as health status or presence of a young children requirements. Now, I incorporate
Medicaid transfers into the calibration of parameters of means-tested transfers and a new
69I acknowledge that the optimal policy of the baseline model may not be the optimal policy of a model
when some of the assumptions of the baseline model are different. However, this exercise at least shows us
if there is a large quantitative effect of an assumption on welfare results.
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eligibility indicator for all means-tested transfers. Means-tested transfers are now given as
follows:
φ (z; a, y, χ) =

φ (z) if y < y, a < a, χ = 1
ιφ (z) if y < y, a < a, χ = 0
0 otherwise
where χ is a non-financial eligibility indicator for all means-tested transfers, which can be
interpreted as health status or presence of a young children requirements. In the above
specification, if a family is financially eligible but non-financially ineligible (i.e. y < y, a <
a, χ = 0), then I assume that family receives only SNAP transfers, which typically does
not have any non-financial eligibility requirements, and SNAP is ι fraction of total means-
tested transfers. χ is a state variable of family, and a random variable is drawn from a
uniform distribution each period to determine the value of χ.
I assume that 60 percent of families are non-financially eligible for means-tested transfers. I
externally calibrate ι = 0.107 because total SNAP transfers is around 10.7 percent of total
means-tested transfers on average across years. I then recalibrate this model and calculate
the welfare gains from the optimal policy obtained in Section 5.2 under this model.70 Here,
I implement this exercise in two different ways given the large difference between the levels
of φ¯ in the baseline model and in this model. First, I compute welfare gains directly from
the baseline optimal policy, in which φ¯ = 0.13. In this case, I find welfare gains of the
baseline optimal policy, relative to the new calibration of the current policy under this
model (i.e. φ¯ = 0.51, ωφ = 2.8, and so on), as much as 1.84 percent in consumption
equivalent. In the second way, I replaced the average generosity of means-tested transfers
in the optimal policy from φ¯ = 0.13 to φ¯ = 0.51 to understand the effects of only changing
the cyclicality of means-tested transfers (from ωφ = 2.8 in the current policy to ωφ = −3.54
in the optimal policy, together with the changes in other policy parameters except φ¯). In
70Among the changes to the parameter values, important ones to mention here are as follows. Average
generosity of means-tested transfers φ¯ = 0.51 instead of φ¯ = 0.15 in the baseline calibration given the
inclusion of generous Medicaid transfers. Moreover, the cyclicality of means-tested transfers now becomes
ωφ = 2.8 instead of ωφ = 0.96 in the baseline model. In fact, the standard deviation of detrended means-
tested transfers per recipient is still 0.06, as in the baseline calibration, but the increase in level of means-
tested transfers requires adjustments in ωφ as well to match the same value. Finally, income tax rate that
balances the budget τ = 20.6 percent instead of τ = 16.2 percent.
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this case, welfare gains are 0.51 in consumption equivalent, which is the value I report in
Table 1.13. Both of these exercises show that less generous and procyclical means-tested
transfer policy is welfare improving, which is consistent with my main results.
Removing job search requirements for employment-tested transfers In the base-
line model, I assume that government can observe the search behavior of the unemployed.
Here, I remove that assumption and check the implications on welfare gains from the
baseline optimal policy.
In this case, employment-tested transfers are now given as follows:
b (z; li) =
b (z) if li = Ub0 otherwise .
Then, I recalibrate the model and calculate welfare gains from the baseline optimal policy.
I find that the optimal policy yields 0.48 percent additional lifetime consumption relative
to the current policy in this model. Thus, I find smaller welfare gains in this model. This
is possibly because of the increase in incentive costs of employment-tested transfers due to
removal of job search requirement for eligibility.
Progressive taxation In the baseline model, I assume that government levies a flat
income tax τ to finance the transfer programs. Now, I change this assumption and study
the effects of progressive income taxation on the welfare gains from the optimal policy of
the baseline model.
Let x be the total taxable income of family. For families in the labor force, x includes
total labor income and income from employment-tested transfers. For retired families, x
includes only retirement income.71 Then, following Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
(2014), after tax income of family is given by x˜ = λx1−ν where λ determines the level of
taxation and ν ≥ 0 determines the rate of progressivity built into the tax system. Then,
tax revenues of the government from a family with total taxable income x is given by
T (x) = x− λx1−ν .
71For a better comparison of results with the baseline model, I assume that x does not include capital
(savings) income, which is also not taxed in the baseline model.
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In this case, I recalibrate the parameters of the model, where I set ν = 0.151 as in Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2014), and search for λ that balance the government budget in
the long-run and find λ = 0.834. Then, I calculate welfare gains from the optimal policy
of the baseline model, where tax policy is also progressive at the same degree, and level
parameter under the optimal policy becomes λ = 0.844 in equilibrium. I find that the
optimal policy yields 0.95 percent additional lifetime consumption relative to the current
policy in this model. Thus, I find larger welfare gains when taxation is progressive. This
is intuitive given that most of the welfare gains are enjoyed by poor families as shown in
Section 1.5.2. When the tax system is progressive, it is this group of families whose spouses
are induced to work more under the optimal policy and they receive higher net earnings
since they have low marginal tax rates.
Non-separable preferences I consider a utility function in which consumption and
leisure are non-separable, following Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1994) and Attanasio
and Weber (1995). I now define preferences as follows:
U (c, lm, lf , sm, sf ) =
[
c×∏i∈{m, f} exp (ηi × 1 (li 6= E, and si = 0))]1−σ
1− σ
This is similar to functional form used in Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010). Then,
I recalibrate the model under this preference. Next, I calculate welfare gains from the
baseline optimal policy and find that it yields 0.68 percent additional lifetime consumption
relative to the current policy in this model. This implies that welfare gains from the
baseline optimal policy are not much affected when we change the preferences.
Model with endogenous wages Finally, in the baseline model, I assume that the
wage for each human capital level is a fraction of period aggregate labor productivity.
This assumption implies that wages and firm vacancy posting decisions are exogenous to
changes in government policy in the baseline model, which allowed me to isolate the effects
of transfers on labor supply.
To analyze the quantitative effects of this assumption on the welfare gains from the opti-
mal policy, I now consider a directed search model in which wage choices of unemployed
individuals are endogeneous. In this model, submarkets in the labor market are indexed
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by the wage offer w of the firms and human capital level h of the job. This means that
unemployed individuals now direct their search effort toward a specific wage offered by a
job that is compatible with their own skill level. In this case, wage levels of the employed
members of the household become extra state variables. Household and firm optimization
problems as well as a discussion on the equilibrium of this model are given in Appendix
A.4.
I recalibrate the parameters of this model and find that the baseline optimal policy yields
0.66 percent additional lifetime consumption relative to the current policy. Changes in gov-
ernment transfer generosity now affect the wage choice of the unemployed endogeneously.
Less generous public insurance in recessions induces unemployed individuals to look for
low paying jobs for which job finding rates are higher. Thus, under the baseline optimal
policy, reemployment wages are lower but unemployment duration is shorter compared to
the baseline model. While the former channel reduces the welfare gains from the baseline
optimal policy, the latter channel increases welfare gains. As a result, welfare gains from
the baseline optimal policy in this model are similar to the welfare gains in the baseline
model.
1.7 Conclusion
Previous literature has documented that a large negative and persistent effect of job dis-
placement on individual labor earnings. Moreover, these effects are more pronounced when
the displacement happens in recessions. In this paper, I first analyze the change in spousal
earnings upon the head’s job displacement both in recessions and in expansions using PSID
data. I show that the change in spousal earnings in response to the head’s job displace-
ment is small. The response is even smaller upon displacements that occur in recessions.
This result is particularly interesting because one might expect a stronger spousal earnings
response during times when the head experiences larger earnings losses.
I investigate whether this small response is an outcome of the crowding-out effects of ex-
isting government transfers. To achieve this, I use an incomplete asset markets model with
family labor supply and aggregate fluctuations. I first show that the model implied female
labor supply elasticities with respect to transfers are in line with microeconomic estimates
both in aggregate and across subpopulations. Then, in a model counterfactual, I find
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that existing generous transfers in recessions discourage spousal labor supply significantly
after the head’s job displacement. The results of this counterfactual experiment imply
that the incentive costs of transfers in the form of reduced spousal labor supply are larger
in recessions and smaller in expansions. Given that existing transfers are more generous
in recessions, this motivates an analysis of redesigning the government transfers over the
business cycle.
Next, I solve for optimal means-tested transfers paid to low-income and low-wealth families
and employment-tested transfers paid to the unemployed. Unlike the existing policy that
maintains generous transfers of both types in recessions, I find that the optimal policy
features procyclical means-tested and countercyclical employment-tested transfers. Over-
all, the optimal policy is procyclical because there are welfare gains of reducing transfers
in recessions to induce spouses to work more when the head experiences larger earnings
losses. This is a direct implication of the model’s result that spousal labor supply is more
elastic to transfers in recessions, which is in line with the data.
In an alternative environment in which spousal labor supply were invariant to transfer
generosity, I show that the average transfer generosity of the optimal policy increases.
Moreover, the optimal policy in this case would instead feature countercyclical transfers of
both types since the insurance benefits are larger in recessions and the incentive costs in on
spousal labor supply would be unaccounted for. As a result, I argue that endogenizing the
spousal labor supply response to changes in government policy is critical in determining
both the optimal level and cyclicality of government transfers.
In this paper, I focus on the macroeconomic implications of how public insurance programs
interact with private insurance for married households. Hence, policy implications of this
study may not apply to singles. Importantly, when we consider an environment with
married and single households, government transfers would affect incentives to marry, and
thus the amount and the distribution of private insurance in the economy. I will pursue
this in future research.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics for families with and without job displacement
Never Displaced∗ Displaced◦
Head’s age 36.49 32.90
Spouse’s age 34.38 30.99
Head’s education 15.49 13.19
Spouse’s education 15.02 13.07
White (%) 67.96 57.03
Number of children 1.30 1.52
Number of young children 0.51 0.65
Head’s annual hours 2, 154 1, 851
Spouse’s annual hours 1, 288 1, 142
Head’s industry - Manufacturing (%) 18.38 19.76
Number of families 6, 584 2, 799
Note: This table shows unweighted averages of selected characteristics for never displaced families (i.e. families in
which the head of the family is never displaced during all times the family is observed in the survey), and displaced
families (i.e. families in which the head of the family is displaced at least once). Data is obtained from PSID 1968-
2015 surveys for families in which both the husband and the wife are between the ages of 20 and 60 and are not in
the Latino sample.
∗ Averages are obtained using all observations for families with never-displaced head.
◦ Averages are obtained from the survey year prior to the displacement year of the head.
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Table 1.2: Externally calibrated parameters
Parameter Explanation Value
ρ Autocorrelation of productivity process 0.7612
σ Standard deviation of productivity process 0.0086
σ Risk aversion 2
ηm Value of leisure for male 0
r Interest rate 0.005
ζR Retirement probability 0.00625
ζD Death probability 0.01666
α Worker’s share of output 0.477
hL Lowest human capital 0.2
hH Highest human capital 1.8
∆E Human capital increase when employed 0.084
piU Prob. of human capital depreciation when unemployed 0.75
a Asset threshold of means-tested transfers 0.068
y Income threshold of means-tested transfers 0.240
e Mean expiration rate of employment-tested transfers 0.5
Note: This table summarizes the parameters that are calibrated outside of the model. Please refer to the main text
for the interpretation of the values.
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Table 1.3: Internally calibrated parameters
Parameter Explanation Value Target Data Model
β Discount factor 0.983
Frac. of households with
0.097 0.13
non-positive liquid wealth
aL Borrowing limit −0.67
Median ratio of credit limit
0.64 0.65
to quarterly labor income
ηf Leisure value (female) 0.51 Relative female LFPR 0.77 0.77
Labor Market
κ Vacancy posting cost 2.9 Unemployment rate 0.056 0.051
γ Matching function 1.43 Std. dev of job finding rate 0.08 0.08
δ¯ Average job sep. rate 0.053 Employment exit rate 0.034 0.034
ωδz Separation rate vol. −5.8 Std. dev. of emp. exit rate 0.06 0.06
ωδh
Separation rate
−0.52
Ratio of median earnings
0.76 0.77
across h displaced to nondisplaced
Human Capital Process
∆U
Human capital
[0.59, 0.34]
Cyclicality of head’s initial
[0.39, 0.22] [0.39, 0.22]
decrease (unemp.) earnings loss upon disp.
piE
Prob. of human capital
0.04 Labor earnings p90/p10 7.60 6.20
increase (emp.)
Government Transfers
φ¯
Average means-
0.15
Ratio of total means-tested
0.74 0.76
tested transfers trans. per rec. to min. wage
b¯
Average emp.-
0.08
Ratio of total UI trans. per
0.36 0.37
tested transfers unemployed to min. wage
ωφ
Cyclicality of means-
0.96
Std. dev of means-tested
0.06 0.08
tested transfers transfers per recipient
ωb
Cyclicality of emp.-
0.64
Std. dev of total UI
0.15 0.14
tested transfers per unemployed
bR Retirement transfers 0.36
Ratio of social security
0.041 0.04
transfers to GDP
Note: This table summarizes internally calibrated parameters. Please refer to the main text for the interpretation
of the values.
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Table 1.4: Average MPCs: Model vs data
Model Data
Average economy-wide quarterly MPC 0.22 0.12− 0.30
Semiannual MPC increase for borrowing-constrained in recessions 0.10 0.08
Note: This table shows the average quarterly economy-wide MPC, and the average increase in semiannual MPC
of borrowing-constrained individuals in a recession implied by the model’s simulation. I group families with non-
positive wealth as borrowing-constrained families. MPC of each family type are calculated by computing the fraction
consumed out of an unexpected $500 worth transfer. These model-generated average values are then compared to
available empirical estimates in the literature.
Table 1.5: MPCs across heteregeneous families in the model
Family employment: Only head employed
Head skill
≤ p50 > p50
Asset
≤ p50 0.58 0.07
> p50 0.02 0.02
Family employment: Both unemployed
Head skill
≤ p50 > p50
Asset
≤ p50 0.67 0.17
> p50 0.02 0.02
Note: This table shows the average quarterly MPCs across families grouped by their employment status, assets hold-
ings, and skill level of the head. Cutoffs for the asset and skill groups are obtained from the respective distributions
under the stationary distribution of the economy. MPC of each family type are calculated by computing the fraction
consumed out of an unexpected $500 worth transfer.
67
Table 1.6: Distribution of liquid asset holdings relative to quarterly family labor earnings
Percentiles Fraction of population
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th with non-positive wealth
PSID 2015 0.05 0.48 1.20 2.88 14.38 0.091
SCF 2007 0.02 0.48 1.20 2.71 6.45 0.097
Model −0.18 0.37 1.10 4.23 4.86 0.13
Note: This table shows the liquid asset to quarterly family labor earnings distribution in both the model and in the
data. The empirical distributions are separately calculated from the PSID 2015 and the SCF 2007. The main text
provides the details of these calculations.
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Table 1.7: Magnitudes of female labor supply elasticities: Data vs model
All households Low income households High income households
Female participation elasticity with respect to net wages
Data 0.15− 0.43 0.27− 0.43 0.15
Model 0.31 0.38 0.21
Female labor earnings elasticity with respect to transfers
Data 0.44
Model φ¯ 0.36 0.47 0.23
Model b¯ 0.01 0.03 0.002
Note: This table compares female participation elasticity with respect to net wages and female labor earnings
elasticity with respect to transfers both in the data and in the model. Comparisons are made for all females, females
in low income households, and females in high income households. Empirical estimates of participation elasticities
are summarized by Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2012), and the empirical estimate of earnings elasticity is
obtained by the author from the PSID. Participation elasticity is calculated as the change in log female employment
rates divided by the change in log net-of-tax wage rates, while earnings elasticity is calculated as the change in log
female labor earnings divided by the change in log transfer amounts.
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Table 1.8: Current policy vs optimal policy in the baseline model
Labor Productivity Means-tested Employment-tested Total
Current Policy
Average 1.61 0.86 2.48
Recession 1.90 1.04 2.94
Optimal Policy
Average 1.40 1.18 2.58
Recession 0.40 1.34 1.74
Note: This table compares per recipient transfer amount as a multiple of minimum wage in the model paid under the
means-tested and employment-tested transfers in the current policy and the optimal policy. Separate comparisons
are presented for when the aggregate labor productivity z is at its average level z¯, and its minimum level, i.e. deep
recession. Minimum wage in the model is exogeneous to changes in policy and thus reporting transfer amounts as a
multiple of minimum wage presents a useful interpretation.
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Table 1.9: Macroeconomic effects of the optimal policy
Current Policy Optimal Policy
Labor market and taxation
Unemployment rate (%) 5.05 5.08
Female LFPR (%) 71 76
Median skill of female 0.98 1.1
Income tax (%) 16.2 15.6
Asset-to-income distribution
Median asset-to-income ratio 1.1 1.45
Fraction with non. pos. wealth (%) 13 9.1
Consumption
Mean 0.85 0.86
Median 0.77 0.79
Std. dev. of mean 0.0181 0.0178
Gini 0.41 0.41
Note: This table compares the stochastic steady state values of macroeconomic outcomes under the current policy
and the optimal policy. These values are obtained by using model simulated data under these two policies. Moments
related to asset-to-income distribution and consumption are calculated for families who are in the labor force.
Volatility of average consumption is measured by the standard deviation of log deviations from an HP-trend with
parameter 1600.
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Table 1.10: Heterogeneous welfare gains from the optimal policy
Family employment: Only head employed
Female skill
≤ p50 > p50
Asset
≤ p50 0.50 1.09
> p50 0.29 0.38
Family employment: Only head employed
Male skill
≤ p50 > p50
Asset
≤ p50 0.73 0.42
> p50 0.35 0.25
Family employment: Both unemployed
Female skill
≤ p50 > p50
Asset
≤ p50 1.21 1.66
> p50 0.28 0.78
Family employment: Both unemployed
Male skill
≤ p50 > p50
Asset
≤ p50 1.31 0.91
> p50 0.76 0.41
Note: This table shows the heterogeneous welfare gains from the optimal policy on various type-groups. Cutoffs
for the asset and skill groups are obtained from the respective distributions under the stationary distribution of
the economy before the government changes the policy to the optimal policy. Welfare gains are in percent lifetime
equivalent consumption terms and they are computed relative to the baseline countercyclical policy.
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Table 1.11: Optimal policy in the baseline vs exogeneous spousal labor supply model
Labor Productivity Means-tested Employment-tested Total
Optimal Policy in the Baseline Model
Average 1.40 1.18 2.58
Recession 0.40 1.34 1.74
Optimal Policy in the Exogeneous Spousal Labor Supply Model
Average 2.58 0.32 2.90
Recession 2.69 0.40 3.09
Note: This table compares per recipient transfer amounts as a multiple of minimum wage under the optimal policy of
the baseline model and under the optimal policy in the exogenous spousal labor supply model. Separate comparisons
are presented for when the aggregate labor productivity z is at its average level z¯, and its minimum level, i.e. deep
recession. Minimum wage in the model is exogeneous to changes in policy and thus reporting transfer amounts as a
multiple of minimum wage presents a useful interpretation.
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Table 1.12: Welfare gains under optimality of other policy instruments
Welfare gains
Baseline optimal 0.61
Optimal a, y 0.81
Optimal a 0.63
Optimal y 0.77
Optimal e 0.63
Note: This table first shows the welfare gains from the baseline optimal policy calculated in Section 5.2, through
optimizing over transfer level and cyclicality of both means-tested and employment-tested transfers (first row). Then,
on top of this optimal policy, it shows welfare gains from optimizing over i) both levels of asset and income thresholds
a and y of eligibility for means-tested transfers (second row), ii) only level of asset threshold a (third row), iii) only
level of income threshold y (fourth row), and finally iv) only level and cyclicality of employment-tested transfer
expiration rate e (·) (fifth row). In all of these cases, I solve for the income tax that balances government budget.
Welfare gains are in percent lifetime equivalent consumption terms and they are computed relative to the baseline
countercyclical policy.
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Table 1.13: Welfare gains from the baseline optimal policy under alternative assumptions
Welfare gains
Baseline optimal 0.61
Incorporating Medicaid to means-tested transfers 0.51
Removing job search requirements for employment-tested transfers 0.48
Progressive taxation 0.95
Non-separable preferences 0.68
Endogenous wages 0.66
Note: This table provides a list of robustness checks for the optimal policy analysis. It first shows the welfare gains
from the optimal policy for the baseline model (first row). Then, it shows welfare gains from the same optimal policy,
when an assumption of the baseline model is changed. Welfare gains are in percent lifetime equivalent consumption
terms and they are computed relative to the baseline countercyclical policy.
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Chapter 2
How Should Unemployment
Insurance Vary Over the Business
Cycle?
2.1 Introduction
The sharp increase in unemployment during the Great Recession was associated with dra-
matic expansions to the unemployment insurance (UI) program. While intended to provide
adequate insurance to the large pool of jobless individuals, the question of whether UI pol-
icy played a quantitatively significant role in slowing the recovery of employment remains
at the center of discussion.1 Alongside this positive debate, an equally important policy
question emerges: how then should UI policy vary over the business cycle? Addressing this
question will shed light on how UI policy must adjust to economic fluctuations, especially
during economic downturns.
Our main contribution to the growing literature on optimal UI over the business cycle is to
study the endogeneous interaction between precautionary savings and changes in UI policy
1For example, Hagedorn et al. (2016) find that a generous UI policy during the recession is partly
responsible for the drastic and sustained rise in unemployment that followed. On the other hand, Chodorow-
Reich and Karabarbounis (2017) show that the extensions have had limited influence on macroeconomic
outcomes.
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over recessions and expansions, a mechanism that we show is crucial to correctly measure
the welfare benefits and costs of any proposed policy. This is because the level of wealth
determines not only the insurance value of any public transfer but also its incentive costs,
since the labor market behavior of individuals holding different levels of assets responds
in varying degrees to changes in the level of generosity of these programs. Moreover, as
wealth holdings and the strength of precautionary saving motives vary over the business
cycle, they inevitably influence the cyclicality of the insurance benefits and incentive costs
of UI payments. It is precisely the cyclicality of the net benefits of UI that will determine
how benefit generosity should vary over the business cycle.
We address this question using a heterogeneous agent job search model that incorporates
labor productivity driven business cycles and incomplete asset markets. To overcome the
computational difficulties encountered in models of this nature, we show that the model’s
market structure admits a block recursive equilibrium, a subset of recursive equilibria
where the endogenous distributions generated by the model are not part of the state space
(Menzio and Shi 2010, 2011). This allows us to compute the optimal UI policy in a model
with aggregate shocks and saving decisions.
We find that the optimal UI policy is countercyclical. In particular, when the aggregate
labor productivity is at its mean, it features a 30 percent replacement rate for 4 quarters.
When aggregate labor productivity is depressed by 3.5 percent, however, it offers more
generous benefits of a 54 percent replacement rate for 10 quarters, financed by higher
labor income taxes. Compared to a UI policy that mimics the policy implemented by
the U.S. government during the Great Recession, the optimal policy represents an ex-ante
welfare gain of 0.58 percent additional lifetime consumption.
The countercyclicality of the optimal policy is explained by how the insurance benefits of
extra UI payments expand during recessions relative to expansions while relative incentive
costs contract. Two important insurance benefit channels expand during recessions: (1)
consumption insurance against unemployment risk and (2) consumption insurance against
aggregate labor productivity risk. First, generous benefits insure against unemployment
risk by alleviating the consumption drop experienced by job losers. This is especially
important in recessions when unemployment rises and spells are prolonged. Second, it also
insures against aggregate risk since it reduces the burden of having to engage in (costly)
77
precautionary savings during economic downturns. Recessions trigger a strong need to
accumulate a buffer stock of savings, which in turn entails a concomitant reduction in
consumption. In the absence of public insurance, this makes consumption fluctuate heavily
with the business cycle. However, this effect is mitigated when individuals are promised
more generous payments for future unemployment spells.2 Remarkably, this results in
sizeable welfare gains not only for job losers but also for those who are employed.
Insurance benefits come with a trade-off: generous UI payments during recessions decrease
the job finding rates of the unemployed through a decline in job search effort and an increase
in the wages that they seek. This results in longer unemployment durations. However, we
show that these costs are relatively lower in recessions for two reasons: (1) the value of
job search is low during recessions, and (2) borrowing constraints impose discipline on the
unemployed’s job search behavior. First, the value of job search during recessions is low
because, to begin with, jobs are difficult to find and available jobs offer relatively lower
wages. Hence, even if generous benefits were to discourage job search during a recession,
the forgone search effort would not have been very productive anyway. Second, a reduction
in wealth holdings during recessions induces the unemployed to find a job more quickly as
they get closer to becoming borrowing constrained. In this sense, the presence of borrowing
constraints is a device to discipline the job search behavior of the unemployed. For both
of these reasons, the incentive costs associated with generous benefits are partially offset
in recessions.3
These channels remain active even under a high level of the opportunity cost of employment
calibration. In this case, we find that while the mean replacement rate and duration of
the optimal policy reduce to a 19 percent replacement rate for one quarter, the degree
of countercyclicality remains roughly similar. As fluctuations in consumption are less
pronounced under this calibration, the government implements a low replacement rate for
short durations when aggregate labor productivity is at its mean value. Still, insurance
benefits expand and incentive costs contract in recessions. Thus, the government finds it
optimal to transfer funds from expansions toward recessions. The resulting optimal policy
2This channel is consistent with Engen and Gruber’s (2001) empirical finding that UI payments crowd
out private savings.
3This result is consistent with Kroft and Notowidigdo (2016), who empirically find that the moral
hazard cost of UI is procyclical.
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in this case provides ex-ante welfare gains of 0.25 percent lifetime consumption, which
is less than half of the welfare gains provided by the optimal policy under the baseline
calibration of the opportunity cost of employment.
We quantify various sources of ex-ante welfare gains of the optimal policy and find that
most of them are attributable to changes in consumption patterns, whereas the welfare
gains from economizing on relatively unproductive search during recessions are negligible.
These changes in consumption patterns can potentially increase ex-ante welfare for three
reasons: (1) an increase in consumption levels, (2) a decrease in consumption volatility,
and (3) a reduction in consumption inequality across individuals. We find large welfare
gains due to an increase in the average consumption level along the transition path after
the implementation of the optimal UI policy. This is because agents decumulate savings
and consume more of their labor income when public insurance is generous, and this effect
dominates the increase in labor income taxes. Steady state welfare decomposition reveals
that long-run welfare gains are attributable mostly to reduced consumption uncertainty,
but at the cost of lower consumption levels. The reduction in the consumption level is due
to higher taxes and lower wealth holdings once the economy converges to a new steady
state, although this change is not large enough to overturn uncertainty gains. Finally,
welfare gains due to a reduction in consumption inequality are small because the optimal
policy has two offsetting effects on consumption inequality. On the one hand, the redistri-
bution of labor income from workers to the unemployed creates more equal consumption
paths across heterogeneous agents. On the other hand, the optimal policy increases wealth
inequality in the stationary distribution. This is because while most of the individuals in
the economy under the optimal policy reduce their savings, the response of the agents in
the top percentiles of the distribution is very small. The rise in wealth inequality, in turn,
increases consumption inequality among heterogeneous agents. We find that these two
opposing effects quantitatively cancel each other out and thus result in negligible welfare
gains attributable to a decline in consumption inequality.
Next, we analyze the heterogeneous welfare effects of the optimal policy. Unsurprisingly,
the unemployed who are eligible for UI benefits gain significantly, with the poor within
this group enjoying the largest welfare gains, since each additional dollar of benefit pay-
ments is more valuable to them. Workers also enjoy a sizeable welfare gain, albeit to a
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smaller degree due to two opposing effects. Although they are the primary financers of the
increased government expenditures because of the generous policy, they also experience
large consumption smoothing benefits over the business cycle. Similarly, gains are also
much larger among poor workers for whom a reduction in precautionary savings diverted
toward consumption is most beneficial. Finally, the unemployed who are ineligible for UI
gain the least because they will enjoy benefits only if they find a job and become eligible
through the loss of that job. They are also adversely affected by lower job finding rates
during recessions without the insurance that UI provides.
When solving for the optimal UI policy, we follow a large strand of literature that uses
calibrated models to study the optimal policy for a restricted class of policy instruments.4
The model simultaneously matches the liquid asset-to-income distribution and salient fea-
tures of the labor market prior to the Great Recession. The policy instruments in our
welfare analysis are restricted to take the form of the UI replacement rate and UI payment
duration as functions of current aggregate labor productivity, and a constant labor income
tax used to balance the government’s budget for any proposed UI program.
Related Literature Our paper contributes to the growing literature on optimal UI over
the business cycle. Recent papers in this literature are Landais et al. (2017), Jung and
Kuester (2015), Mitman and Rabinovich (2015). However, in these models, risk-averse
agents do not have access to asset markets for self-insurance purposes.5 This assumption
has several important implications for the level and cyclicality of the insurance benefits
and incentive costs of any proposed UI policy. First, the insurance value of UI payments
for job losers is overstated because public insurance is the only way of smoothing con-
sumption upon job loss. Second, since the elasticity of search effort and the wage choice
of the unemployed are both decreasing in wealth holdings, a model that abstracts from
self-insurance altogether also overestimates the level of the moral hazard costs associated
4See Hansen and Imrohorog˘lu (1992), Acemoglu and Shimer (2000), Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2002), Wang
and Williamson (2002), Krusell et al. (2010), Koehne and Kuhn (2015), and Eeckhout and Sepahsalari
(2015).
5In addition to this difference, there are other important modeling differences between our paper and
these papers. For example, Jung and Kuester (2015) and Landais et al. (2017) do not consider UI expiration.
See Mitman and Rabinovich (2015) for a discussion on the implications of these assumptions.
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with introducing a more generous UI policy. Third, disregarding asset markets completely
eliminates the interaction between self-insurance and public insurance. Importantly, the
decline in precautionary saving motives as a response to a generous UI policy contributes
to the expansion of insurance benefits of UI in recessions because it also provides con-
sumption insurance against aggregate risk. The novelty of our analysis is to study this
endogenous response of the asset distribution to changes in UI policy over the business
cycle, which is crucial for the true measurement of the cyclicality of insurance benefits
of UI. Among these papers, our model is closest to Mitman and Rabinovich (2015) with
two differences: our model 1) allows for self-insurance through incomplete asset markets,
and 2) features directed search, making the model still tractable due to block recursivity
even under the presence of incomplete asset markets, whereas job search is random in their
model. In terms of welfare exercise, Mitman and Rabinovich (2015) are able to solve a
Ramsey problem to obtain the optimal UI policy as a function of the entire history of past
aggregate shocks, whereas we use our calibrated model to study the optimal policy for a
restricted class of policy instruments that only depend on the current period realization of
the aggregate shock in order to maintain tractability.
Another strand of literature studies the optimal design of UI policy under the presence
of asset markets. However, these papers use models that do not incorporate either unem-
ployment risk (Kroft and Notowidigdo 2016) or aggregate risk (Hansen and Imrohorog˘lu
1992, Acemoglu and Shimer 2000, Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. 2002, Wang and Williamson 2002,
Lentz 2009, Krusell et al. 2010, Koehne and Kuhn 2015, and Eeckhout and Sepahsalari
2015) or both features (Shimer and Werning 2008, Chetty 2008).6 Absent unemployment
risk, assets have no role for precautionary savings purposes, and they are simply used for
consumption smoothing until the single spell ends and a permanent job is found.7 Im-
portantly, we show in our model that saving decisions interact with the changes in UI
policy because wealth is a substitute for UI payments for self-insurance purposes. The
6Although the baseline model in Krusell et al. (2010) incorporates aggregate fluctuations, they study
the welfare effects of changes in UI policy in a steady-state experiment. The baseline model in Chetty
(2008) has no unemployment risk, but he presents an extension to incorporate it, and he shows that his
main results hold under extra assumptions.
7Typically, in these models, all agents are initially unemployed, and they decide when to accept a
permanent employment offer. These models are often called single-spell models.
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changes in saving decisions in turn significantly affect the search effort and wage choices
of the unemployed as well as the consumption patterns of everyone in the economy. On
the other hand, a model in which aggregate risk is absent makes the insurance value of
UI time-invariant. In our framework with aggregate risk, the strength of precautionary
saving motives significantly varies with the level of unemployment risk over the business
cycle. Incorporating this feature is especially important to understand the optimality of
time-varying UI policy.8
Finally, other papers investigate the impact of the Great Recession extensions of UI du-
ration on macroeconomic outcomes.9 Pei and Xie (2016) relax the perfect commitment
assumption and analyze the effects of time-consistent policy over the business cycle in a
model with search frictions but risk averse agents are not allowed to save or borrow. They
find that while benefit extensions resulted in higher unemployment, it provided welfare
gains ex post compared to a no-extensions policy. We show that even when government
can commit perfectly to its UI policy, the optimal policy is countercyclical when we account
for changes in precautionary saving motives over the cycle. Two recent papers study this
question in a framework with search frictions and incomplete markets. First, Nakajima
(2012) carefully models UI extensions during the Great Recession and its subsequent re-
covery using a model with business cycle dynamics and then measures the effect of these
extensions on the unemployment rate. He does not, however, study the welfare effects of
these changes in UI policy. We extend his model to a general equilibrium model in which
the government finances the UI benefits and use the model to study how UI policy must
vary over the business cycle. Second, Kekre (2017) studies the macroeconomic and welfare
effects of UI extensions during the Great Recession in a model with nominal rigidities and
8Our paper has other important features compared to these papers in the literature. In terms of
modeling, previous papers (except for Krusell et al. 2010 and Eeckhout and Sepahsalari 2015) use partial
equlibrium models of the labor market. In these models, the changes in aggregate conditions of the economy
or in UI policy do not affect firm hiring decisions and offered wages. In terms of welfare analysis, Shimer
and Werning (2008) use an optimal contracting approach to study the optimal variation of UI over the
unemployment duration. Chetty (2008) and Kroft and Notowidigdo (2016) find a locally optimal UI policy
in a welfare exercise that can be used only to calculate the marginal welfare effects of small changes in the
UI benefit level, relative to the observed UI benefit level in the data.
9See Hagedorn et al. (2016), Mitman and Rabinovich (2014), and Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis
(2017), among many others.
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constraints on monetary policy but without business cycle dynamics in the real business
cycle tradition. In his model, when the unemployed have a higher marginal propensity
to consume than the employed, generous UI policy increases the aggregate demand for
consumption both in the current period and in the previous period because individuals
endogenously reduce precautionary savings when they expect generous public transfers in
the future. As a result, he finds that UI extensions reduced the unemployment rate and
provided welfare gains during the Great Recession. Rather than only focusing on discre-
tionary UI policy changes during the Great Recession, we solve for the optimal UI policy
over the business cycle and find that it should be countercyclical even when business cycles
are completely exogenous and that UI policy has no role on smoothing these fluctuations
through its impact on aggregate demand. Complementary to his findings, we also show
that the endogenous response of precautionary savings to changes in UI generosity is key
to understanding the true welfare benefits and costs of UI benefits.
On the theoretical side, our model is a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium directed
search model of the labor market with aggregate labor productivity driven business cycles
as in Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011). The market structure enables us to overcome the
computational difficulties of solving a model of this type by utilizing the block recursive
equilibrium. We extend their framework by incorporating asset markets as in Herkenhoff
(2017) to study the optimal UI over the business cycle with endogenous wealth distribution.
To the best of our knowledge, our model is the first to study this question in a model
with endogenous wage determination, search frictions, incomplete markets, and aggregate
fluctuations.
This paper is organized as follows. We present our model in Section 2.2. Then, Section
2.3 describes the calibration strategy and model fit. Section 2.4 explains the calculation
of the welfare effects of various UI policies. Section 2.5 contains the main results. In
Section 2.6, we provide a detailed discussion on our results and conduct robustness checks.
Section 2.7 provides preliminary evidence from the micro-data that support the model’s
main mechanism. Finally, Section 2.8 concludes.
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2.2 Model
This section first introduces the environment of the model in Section 2.2.1. We then lay
out the problem of the household and firm in Section 2.2.2 and Section 2.2.3, respectively.
Next, we explain the government’s UI policy in Section 2.2.4. Finally, Section 2.2.5 defines
the equilibrium of the model and characterizes the job search behavior of the unemployed.
2.2.1 Environment
Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, .... Individuals are infinitely lived and ex-ante
identical, with preferences given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u (ct)− 1U
[
ν (st)
]]
where u (· ) is a strictly increasing and strictly concave utility function over consumption
level c that satisfies Inada conditions, 1U is an indicator function that takes the value of
one if the agent is unemployed, and ν (· ) represents the disutility associated with search
effort of the unemployed and is a strictly increasing and strictly convex function of search
intensity s. Moreover, βt is a stochastic variable that is idiosyncratic - i.i.d. across agents
- and describes the cumulative discounting between period 0 and period t. In particular,
βt+1 = β˜βt, where β˜ is a five-state, first-order Markov process as in Krusell et al. (2009).
The heterogeneity in discount rates allows us to match important features of the empirical
asset distribution, as we will discuss in Section 2.3.1.
In the model, individuals are heterogeneous in terms of their labor market status, asset
holdings, labor market earnings, and stochastic discount rate. An agent can be classified
into one of the following labor market statuses: a worker W , an unemployed individual
who is eligible for unemployment insurance benefits UE, or an unemployed individual who
is ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits UI.10
10Farber et al. (2015) find that UI extensions reduced the labor force exits by 20 to 30 percent during
2008-2011 and 2012-2014 respectively. Notice that even if our model does not incorporate a labor force
participation margin, we find that the optimal policy is countercyclical. As a result, given that UI genorosity
increases labor force participation, the welfare gains from the optimal policy actually constitute a lower
bound in our model.
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The labor market features directed search. Unemployed individuals direct their search
effort s ∈ [0, 1] toward wage submarkets indexed by w. Once matched with a firm within
submarket w, the household is paid a fixed wage w every period until the match exogenously
dissolves, as in Menzio and Shi (2010).11 Unemployed individuals who are eligible for
UI benefits receive a fraction of the wage they received during their last employment,
whereas the unemployed ineligible do not receive any benefits. In order to finance the
unemployment insurance program, the worker and unemployed eligible pay a fraction τ
of their wages/benefits to the government every period. In addition to labor earnings,
all households have access to incomplete asset markets where they can save/borrow at an
exogenous interest rate r.12 On the other side of the labor market, firms decide the wage
submarket in which to post a vacancy. Once matched with a worker, the firm-worker pair
operates a constant returns to scale technology that converts one indivisible unit of labor
into final consumption goods. All firm-worker pairs are assumed to be identical in terms
of their production efficiency; that is, the amount of production only depends on aggregate
labor productivity.
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of each time period t, aggregate
labor productivity p and the idiosyncratic discount rate β for each agent realize. The period
labor productivity level p completely determines 1) the UI replacement rate φ (p) ∈ [0, 1]
and the stochastic UI expiration rate e (p) ∈ [0, 1], and 2) the exogenous job separation
rate δ (p) ∈ [0, 1]. This implies that δ (p) fraction of those who were workers in t − 1 lose
their jobs and must spend at least one period being unemployed. Among those who lose
their job, e (p) fraction become ineligible for unemployment benefits. After the realization
of the exogenous shocks, there are two stages in each time period t where agents make
endogenous decisions.
First, in the labor market stage, firms decide the wage submarket in which to post a
11In Section 2.6.1, we extend our baseline model to endogenize the quit decisions of workers and explore
the quantitative implications of this assumption on our main results.
12We could endogenize the interest rate by modeling an asset market in which financial intermediaries
post asset returns in different locations and individuals look for saving/borrowing opportunities in these
different locations depending on their state variables. This is similar to Herkenhoff (2017). In our baseline
model, we abstract from this and assume a constant and exogenous interest rate. In Section 2.6.1, we
explore the quantitative implications of this assumption.
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vacancy, while the unemployed choose a wage submarket w within which to look for a job.
Second, the production and consumption stage of time t open where each firm-worker pair
produces p units of consumption goods, wages are paid to workers, UI benefits are paid
to eligible unemployed as a fraction φ (p) of their previous wages, and any unemployed
receive the monetized value of non market activities h.13 The households then make their
saving/borrowing decision. Finally, prior to time t+ 1, unemployed households decide the
search effort level s they will exert in the labor market stage of time t+ 1 where the utility
cost of that search effort is incurred at time t.
It is important to discuss the reasons why this environment is useful in answering our
question. Beyond the obvious features of the presence of incomplete markets, a UI pro-
gram, and equilibrium unemployment, we would like to consider an equilibrium model of
the labor market in which firm and household decisions are affected by both aggregate
fluctuations and changes in UI policy. This way, we are able to incorporate the moral
hazard costs of generous UI policies on the job search intensity and wage choice behavior
of the unemployed, as well as changes in the vacancy creation incentives of firms over the
business cycle. Moreover, directed search is useful not only because of tractability reasons
but also because of its implications for equilibrium efficiency. In particular, under some
conditions, the equilibrium is efficient in the directed search model but not in a random
search model with Nash bargaining.14 Hence, in our framework, the government insurance
program aims to fix the inefficiencies caused by incomplete asset markets.
2.2.2 Household problem
A household’s state vector consists of current employment status l ∈ {W,UE,UI}, net
asset level a ∈ A ≡ [a, a¯] ⊆ R, the current wage level w ∈ W ≡ [w, w¯] ⊆ R+ if the
13The variable h encompasses both the value of leisure/home production and other income such as
spousal and family income and other transfers. Our results would be similar if h is a utility value instead
of a monetary value.
14See Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001), Shi (2001), and Menzio and Shi
(2011) for the efficiency of directed search equilibrium. As discussed by Menzio and Shi (2011), however, the
equilibrium of our baseline model does not maximize the joint value of a match (and thus it is not bilaterally
efficient) because of the limitations in the contract space. In Section 2.6.1, we extend our baseline model
to a model with endogenous quit decisions and show that the effects of inefficiencies present in the labor
market of the baseline model on our main results are negligible.
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employment status is W or the wage level from the previous job if the employment status
is UE, and the current discount rate β ∈ B ≡ [β, β¯] ⊂ (0, 1).
The aggregate state is denoted by µ = (p,Γ), where p ∈ P ⊆ R+ denotes the current aggre-
gate labor productivity and Γ : {W,UE,UI}×A×W×B → [0, 1] denotes the distribution
of agents across employment status, asset level, current/previous wage level, and discount
rate. The law of motion for the aggregate states is given by Γ′ = H (µ, p′) and p′ ∼
F (p′ | p).
The recursive problem of the worker is given by
V W (a,w, β;µ) = max
c,a′
u (c) + βE
[
δ
(
p′
) (
1− e (p′))V UE (a′, w, β′;µ′)
+δ
(
p′
)
e
(
p′
)
V UI
(
a′, β′;µ′
)
+
(
1− δ (p′))V W (a′, w, β′;µ′) ∣∣∣β, µ] (2.1)
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ w (1− τ)
a′ ≥ −a
Γ′ = H
(
µ, p′
)
and p′ ∼ F (p′ | p) .
Notice in the above problem that the worker may not qualify for UI benefits with probability
e after losing her job due to exogenous job separation, which captures both voluntary and
involuntary reasons for job loss in our model. This feature intends to capture the fact
that according to the current UI policy in the United States, not all workers transitioning
into unemployment qualify for UI benefits. In particular, individuals do not qualify for
benefits if they voluntarily quit their job or if they do not meet certain work/earnings
requirements.15
The unemployed directs her job search effort toward a wage submarket indexed by w with
an associated market tightness given by θ (w;µ), which is an equilibrium object defined
later. Let f (θ (w;µ)) be the job finding probability for the unemployed who visits sub-
market w when the aggregate state is µ. Then, we lay out the recursive problem of eligible
15The unemployed must meet requirements for wages earned or time worked during an established period
of time referred to as the base period. In most states of the United States, this is usually the first four out
of the last five completed calendar quarters prior to the time that a UI application is filed.
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unemployed as follows:
V UE(a,w, β;µ) = max
c,a′,s
u (c)− ν (s) + βE
[
max
w˜
{
sf
(
θ
(
w˜;µ′
))
V W
(
a′, w˜, β′;µ′
)
+
(
1− sf (θ (w˜;µ′))) (1− e (p′))V UE (a′, w, β′;µ′)
+
(
1− sf (θ (w˜;µ′))) e (p′)V UI (a′, β′;µ′)]}∣∣∣β, µ] (2.2)
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ h+ φ (p)w (1− τ)
a′ ≥ −a
Γ′ = H
(
µ, p′
)
and p′ ∼ F (p′ | p) .
where the eligible unemployed receives a fraction φ of her previous wage as UI benefits and
pays τ fraction as labor income tax. As described earlier, she may lose her eligibility with
probability e if she is unable to find a job during the labor market stage of the current
period. When choosing the wage submarket to search for jobs, the unemployed individual
faces the trade-off between the level of surplus from a possible match (i.e., the wage level)
and the probability of finding a job because of the lower number of vacancies posted for
high-paying jobs.
Finally, the recursive problem of the ineligible unemployed is given by
V UI(a, β;µ) = max
c,a′,s
u (c)− ν (s) + βE
[
max
w˜
{
sf
(
θ
(
w˜;µ′
))
V W
(
a′, w˜, β′;µ′
)
+
(
1− sf (θ (w˜;µ′)))V UI (a′, β′;µ′)}∣∣∣β, µ] (2.3)
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ h
a′ ≥ −a
Γ′ = H
(
µ, p′
)
and p′ ∼ F (p′ | p) .
Notice that in the above problem, the unemployed ineligible is unable to regain eligibility
for UI benefits if job search fails. This captures the fact that according to current UI
policy in the United States, the unemployed receive UI benefits only for a certain number
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of weeks - which varies over the business cycle - and once that threshold is reached, the
unemployed cannot continue to collect UI benefits.
2.2.3 Firm problem
Firms post vacancies offering fixed wage contracts in certain wage submarkets. The labor
market tightness of submarket w is defined as the ratio of vacancies v posted in the submar-
ket to the aggregate search effort S exerted by all the unemployed searching for a job within
that submarket. It is denoted as θ (w;µ) = v(w;µ)S(w;µ) . Let M (v, u) be a constant returns to
scale matching function that determines the number of matches in a submarket with S level
of aggregate search effort and v vacancies. We can then define q (w;µ) = M(v(w;µ),S(w;µ))v(w;µ)
to be the vacancy filling rate and f (w;µ) = M(v(w;µ),S(w;µ))S(w;µ) to be the job finding rate in
submarket w when aggregate state is µ. The constant returns to scale assumption on the
matching function guarantees that the equilibrium object θ suffices to determine job finding
and vacancy filling rates since q (θ) = M(v,S)v = M
(
1, 1θ
)
while f (θ) = M(v,S)S = M (θ, 1).
First, consider a firm that is matched with a worker in submarket w when the aggregate
state is µ. The pair operates under a linear production technology and produces p units
of output, and there is no capital in the economy. The worker is paid a fixed wage of w
and with some probability δ (p), the match dissolves. Hence, the value of a matched firm
is given by
J (w;µ) = p− w + 1
1 + r
E
[(
1− δ (p′)) J (w;µ′) ∣∣∣µ] (2.4)
subject to
Γ′ = H
(
µ, p′
)
and p′ ∼ F (p′ | p) .
Meanwhile, the value of a firm that posts a vacancy in submarket w under aggregate state
µ is given by
V (w;µ) = −κ+ q (θ (w;µ)) J (w;µ) , (2.5)
where κ is a fixed cost of posting a vacancy that is financed by risk-neutral foreign en-
trepreneurs who own the firms.
When firms decide the submarket in which to post vacancies to maximize profits, they face
the trade-off between the probability of filling a vacancy and the level of surplus from a
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possible match. This is because if a firm posts a vacancy in a low (high) wage submarket,
then the level of the surplus from the match in that submarket will be higher (lower) for
the firm, but the probability of filling the vacancy will be lower (higher) as less (more)
unemployed individuals visit that submarket to search for a job.
The free entry condition implies that profits are just enough to cover the cost of filling a
vacancy in expectation. As a result, the owner of the firm makes zero profits in expectation.
Thus, we have V (w;µ) = 0 for any submarket w such that θ (w;µ) > 0. Then, we impose
the free entry condition to Equation (2.5) and obtain the equilibrium market tightness:
θ (w;µ) =
q
−1
(
κ
J(w;µ)
)
if w ∈ W (µ)
0 otherwise.
(2.6)
The equilibrium market tightness contains all the relevant information needed by house-
holds to evaluate the job finding probabilities at each submarket.
2.2.4 Government policy
The UI policy is characterized by {φ (p) , e (p) , τ}, where φ (p) is the replacement rate
and e (p) is the expiration rate, both of which may vary with current aggregate labor
productivity p.16 A labor income tax τ is levied on the labor earnings of the worker
and on the UI benefits of the eligible unemployed in order to finance the UI program.17
The benefit expiration rate e (· ) is stochastic, as in Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001),
Albrecht and Vroman (2005), Faig and Zhang (2012), and Mitman and Rabinovich (2015).
This assumption simplifies the solution of the model because we do not need to carry the
unemployment duration as another state variable for the eligible unemployed.
16We restrict the UI policy to depend on the aggregate state of the economy µ only through the cur-
rent aggregate labor productivity p and not through the distribution of individuals across states Γ. This
restriction allows our model to retain the block recursitivity, which we will explain in Section 2.2.5.
17We focus on the optimality of government policies that can be conditioned on the employment status
of the individuals so that the government policies provide insurance against unemployment risk. Also, if
the government finds it optimal to make transfers (by reducing taxes) during recessions, it can obviously
do this by increasing the UI replacement rate and duration. For these reasons, we consider time-invariant
income tax schedules in our analysis.
90
The government balances the following budget constaint in expectation:18
∞∑
t=0
∑
i
(
1
1 + r
)t
×
[
1{lit=W} × wit + 1{lit=UE} × witφ (pt)
]
× τ
=
∞∑
t=0
∑
i
(
1
1 + r
)t
× witφ (pt)× 1{lit=UE} (2.7)
where the left-hand side is the present discounted value of tax revenues collected from the
labor income of workers and the unemployed eligible, and the right-hand side is the present
discounted value of UI payments to the unemployed eligible.
2.2.5 Equilibrium
Definition of the Recursive Equilibrium: Given a UI policy
{
τ, φ (p) , e (p)
}
p∈P
, a
recursive equilibrium for this economy is a list of household policy functions for assets{
gla (a,w, β;µ)
}
l={W,UE}
and gUIa (a, β;µ), wage choices g
UE
w (a,w, β;µ) and g
UI
w (a, β;µ),
search effort gUEs (a,w, β;µ) and g
UI
s (a, β;µ), a labor market tightness function θ (w;µ),
and an aggregate law of motion µ′ = (p′,Γ′) such that
1. Given government policy, shock processes, and the aggregate law of motion, the
household’s policy functions solve their respective dynamic programming problems
(2.1), (2.2), and (2.3).
2. The labor market tightness is consistent with the free entry condition (2.6).
3. The government budget constraint (2.7) is satisfied.
4. The law of motion of the aggregate state is consistent with household policy functions.
Notice that in order to solve the recursive equilibrium defined above, one must keep track
of an infinite dimensional object Γ in the state space, making the solution of the model
infeasible. To address this issue, we utilitize the structure of the model and use the notion
of block recursive equilibrium developed by Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011).
18This assumption is motivated by the fact that according to the current UI system in the United States,
states are allowed to borrow from a federal UI trust fund when they meet certain federal requirements, and
thus they are allowed to run budget deficits during some periods.
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Definition of the Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE): A BRE for this economy is
an equilibrium in which the value functions, policy functions, and labor market tightness
depend on the aggregate state of the economy µ, only through the aggregate productivity
p, and not through the aggregate distribution of agents across states Γ.
Now, we prove that our model admits block recursitivity.
Proposition 1: If i) utility function u (· ) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and
satisfies Inada conditions; ν (· ) is strictly increasing and strictly convex, ii) choice sets W
and A, and sets of exogenous processes P and B are bounded, iii) matching function M
exhibits constant returns to scale, and iv) UI policy is restricted to be only a function of
current aggregate labor productivity, then there exists a Block Recursive Equilibrium for
this economy. If, in addition, M = min {v, S}, then the Block Recursive Equilibrium is the
only recursive equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix B.2
Proposition 1 is very useful because it allows us to solve the model numerically without
keeping track of the aggregate distribution of agents across states Γ. One should be careful
when interpreting this result. Even though we can solve for the policy functions, value
functions, and labor market tightness independent of Γ, it does not mean that the distri-
bution of agents is irrelevant for our analysis. Notice that the evolution of macroeconomic
aggregates such as the unemployment rate, average spell duration, and wealth distribution
of the economy is determined by household decision rules in the labor market and financial
market. These decisions, in turn, are functions of individual states whose distribution is
determined by Γ. Hence, the evolution of aggregate variables after a change in UI policy
will depend on the distribution of agents in the economy at the time of the policy change.
Notice that if the UI policy instruments were to depend on the unemployment rate of the
economy, then it would break the block recursivity of the model. This is because agents
would need to calculate next period’s unemployment rate to know the replacement rate
and UI duration next period. However, this requires calculating the flows in and out of
unemployment, the latter of which depends on the distribution of agents across states Γ.
Although the changes in UI policy are triggered by the changes in the unemployment rate
according to the current UI program in the United States, the assumption that UI policy
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depends on aggregate productivity is not too restrictive because of the strong correlation
between the unemployment rate and aggregate labor productivity in the model.
Job search decision rules We now characterize the job search behavior of the unem-
ployed. This will supplement our discussions of the main results of the paper in Section
2.5.
Figure 2.1 plots the labor market behavior of the eligible unemployed holding various levels
of wealth under a less generous UI policy and a generous UI policy. It shows that the search
intensity is decreasing in wealth, whereas the wage choice is increasing in wealth for any
UI policy.19
Moreover, similar to Krusell et al. (2010), the marginal effect of an increase in assets
on wage choice and search effort is relatively higher for the borrowing-constrained unem-
ployed.20 While this result is unsurprising and intuitive, it highlights the importance of
accounting for wealth heterogeneity across agents, since the aggregate search effort and
wage levels in the economy now crucially depend on the underlying wealth distribution.
An economy where agents are relatively wealthy is likely to exhibit lower levels of aggregate
search and higher wages, whereas the opposite is true when wealth levels are low. Since
business cycles induce changes in precautionary savings and thus variation in aggregate
search effort and wage choices, the optimal design of UI policy over the business cycle
must account for this channel. For instance, in a recession where many individuals deplete
their existing wealth, this channel exerts an upward pressure on search effort and downward
pressure on wage choices as agents seek to find jobs more quickly. This effect dampens the
moral hazard costs induced by introducing a more generous UI policy during recessions,
since poorer agents tend to ramp up job-finding efforts themselves.
Next, a comparison of the two policy functions across UI policies highlights two important
points. First, generous UI payments entail incentive costs because they lead the eligible
19Notice that there is little dispersion across wage choices of the unemployed holding different levels of
wealth. Hornstein et al. (2011) show that frictional wage dispersion - measured by the mean-min wage ratio
- is very small in a directed search model. When calibrated to match the empirical asset distribution and
salient features of the labor market prior to the Great Recession in the United States, our model generates
a mean-min wage ratio of 1.034, in line with their conclusion (less than 1.05).
20These patterns are also present for the ineligible unemployed.
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Figure 2.1: Search effort and wage choice policy functions of the eligible unemployed
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Note: These figures plot the search effort and wage choice policy functions of the eligible unemployed holding different
levels of wealth for average levels of labor productivity, discount rate, and previous wage under a less generous and
a more generous UI policy.
unemployed to decrease their search effort and increase their wage choices.21 The combined
effect of lower search effort and a shift toward higher-paying jobs, which are more difficult
to find, results in a lower aggregate job finding rate and prolonged unemployment spells.
Second, the unemployed holding different levels of wealth respond in varying degrees to
changes in UI policy. Similar to Chetty (2008), wealthier agents are less responsive to
changes in UI policy because the insurance value of a marginal increase in benefits is less
important to them. This implies that a model that abstracts from self-insurance altogether
overestimates the level of the moral hazard costs of introducing a more generous UI policy.
The assumption that agents have no access to asset markets effectively raises the aggregate
elasticity of search effort and wage choice to changes in UI policy, since the most responsive
agents are precisely those with the least available self-insurance. As a result, it is crucial
for the model to match the observed asset distribution in the data in order to generate the
21This result is also established in the previous literature. See Shavell and Weiss (1979), Hopenhayn and
Nicolini (1997), and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), among many others.
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true magnitude of moral hazard costs in the model.
2.3 Calibration
We calibrate the stochastic steady state of our model to match salient features of the labor
market and asset distribution of the U.S. economy prior to the Great Recession. In doing
so, we feed into the model a constant replacement rate and expiration rate, which we call
the acyclical/flat policy.
The model period is taken to be a week. We use the following separable functional form
for the period utility function:
u (ct)− 1U [ν (st)] = c
1−σ
t
1− σ − 1U
[
α
s1+χt
1 + χ
]
,
which is also used by Chetty (2008) and Nakajima (2012). We restrict the values of
discount rates to be symmetric around an average value β¯ with a difference of η between
two adjacent values. Moreover, we allow β to take five different values. In our simulations
of the model, we set 40 percent of the population to the middle discount rate value and 10
percent to each extreme point in any time period. The expected duration of being in the
extreme discount rate value is set to be 50 years, where transitions can only occur between
adjacent values.
The labor market matching function is M (v, S) = vS
[vγ+Sγ ]1/γ
as in den Haan et al. (2000).
This CES functional form of the matching function implies that both the job finding rate
f (θ) = θ (1 + θγ)−1/γ and the vacancy filling rate q (θ) = (1 + θγ)−1/γ are between 0 and
1.
Following Shimer (2005), we use a process for the job destruction rate that depends only on
labor productivity, δt = δ¯ × exp (ω (pt − 1)), where δ¯ is the average weekly exogenous job
destruction rate in the data. These separation shocks can be interpreted as idiosyncratic
match quality shocks that drive down the productivity of a match to a low enough level
so that the match endogenously finds it optimal to dissolve, as in Lise and Robin (2017).
Moreover, the probability of this idiosyncratic event is correlated with the aggregate state
of the economy. As a result, this specification allows the model to capture the cyclicality
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of employment-to-unemployment (E-U) transitions.22 We then calibrate ω so that the
volatility of quarterly E-U transitions in the model matches its data counterpart, which
we calculate using E-U transition rates measured by Fujita and Ramey (2009) for the time
period 1976:I-2005:IV.23
The logarithm of the aggregate labor productivity pt follows an AR(1) process:
lnpt+1 = ρlnpt + σt+1.
We take pt as the mean real output per person in the non-farm business sector. Using the
quarterly data constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for the time period
1951:I-2007:IV, we estimate the above process at a weekly frequency and find that ρ =
0.9720 and σ = 0.0025.
Next, we calibrate the replacement rate and expiration rate of the acyclical/flat policy by
matching the long-run empirical averages of U.S. government policy. First, we discuss the
calibration of the replacement rate. Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) measure
the mean of pretax benefits per recipient as 21.5 percent of pretax marginal product.24
Under a mean take-up rate of UI benefits among the eligible unemployed of 65 percent,
this implies setting the mean of pretax benefits per recipient to 14 percent, since we do not
model UI take-up decisions given the completixity of our framework.25 Second, we take
the UI benefit duration as 26 weeks (2 quarters), which is the standard benefit duration
22Empirically, Elsby et al. (2009), Fujita and Ramey (2006, 2009), Yashiv (2007), and Fujita (2011a)
show that the separation rate into unemployment is countercyclical.
23The model-implied Beveridge curve, which plots the relationship between unemployment and vacancies,
exhibits a negative slope as in the data. This is because when labor productivity declines, firms cut back
on vacancies, which translates to lower job finding rates and higher unemployment. Moreover, the rise in
separation shocks further amplifies the increase in unemployment. As a result, unemployment and vacancies
move in the opposite direction.
24This value is consistent with a replacement rate level that accounts for the difference between wage
and total compensation, the difference between compensation and the marginal product, and the gap in
productivity and compensation between those receiving UI and the economywide average. In our model,
wages are not exactly equal to marginal product because of frictions, but the difference between the two is
small.
25Estimates in the literature for the fraction of all eligibles who receive UI range from 50 to 77 percent
using Current Population Survey (CPS) data for different samples. Fuller, Ravikumar, and Zhang (2013)
find that during the Great Recession, only about 50 percent of those eligible collected their benefits. Vroman
(1991) uses CPS supplements from 1989 and 1990 and finds 53 percent. Blank and Card (1991) estimate
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without extensions. Under the stochastic steady state calibration of our model, these two
numbers require us to set φt = 0.14 and et = 1/26 ∀t as the acyclical/flat policy.26 Then, a
labor income tax rate of τ = 0.36 percent balances the government budget in equilibrium
when the unemployment rate is 4.8 percent.
Having specified functional forms, the law of motion of the productivity process, and UI
policy, we now calibrate several parameters outside of our model. We choose a coefficient of
relative risk aversion σ = 2 and set r = 0.095 percent, which generates an annual return on
assets of around 5 percent. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) estimate the combined capital
and labor costs of vacancy creation as 58 percent of weekly labor productivity. Following
their estimate, we set the cost of vacancy creation as κ = 0.58.
We measure the average weekly job separation rate δ¯ using data from the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP) for the time period between 2005 and 2007. The SIPP
comprises individual level longitudinal data in which each respondent provides information
on monthly income and government transfers as well as weekly labor force status. We
restrict our sample to individuals between the ages of 24 and 65 who do not own a business
or derive income from self-employment. We classify the individual as employed (E) if
he/she reports having a job and either working or not on layoff, but absent without pay.
We classify the individual as unemployed (U) if he/she reports either having no job and
actively looking for work or having a job but currently laid off. We then calculate the
average E-U transition rate in the data where we account for seasonality by removing
weekly fixed effects and obtain δ¯ = 0.0022.
This leaves us eight parameters to be calibrated: i) the average value of discount rates β¯,
ii) the difference between two adjacent discount rates η, iii) the borrowing limit a, iv) the
the take-up rate as 71 percent for the period 1977–1987. Auray, Fuller, and Lkhagvasuren (2013) estimate
the average take-up rate as 77 percent from 1989 to 2012 using detailed state-level eligibility criteria.
Meanwhile, Anderson and Meyer (1997) use administrative data between the late 1970s and early 1980s
and find that the take-up rate is 54 percent for a subsample that represents mainly separations from mass
layoffs. In our baseline calibration, we set the take-up rate as 65 percent, which is around the mean of the
above estimates in the literature.
26In Section 6.1, we also calculate the welfare gains from the optimal policy under 40 percent of the
replacement rate (i.e., φ = 0.4 ∀t), which is the unadjusted replacement rate value calculated by the
Department of Labor. We show that the optimal UI policy still yields significant welfare gains relative to
the benchmark policy under this alternative high calibration of the replacement rate.
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level parameter of the search cost function α, v) the curvature parameter of the search
cost function χ, vi) the matching function parameter γ, vii) the separation rate parameter
ω, and viii) the monetized value of non-market activity h. We jointly calibrate these
parameters to match the following eight data moments, respectively: i) the median value
of liquid asset holdings relative to weekly after-tax labor income distribution, ii) fraction
of the population with non-positive liquid wealth, iii) the median value of the credit limit
to labor income ratio, iv) the average unemployment rate, v) the response of the average
unemployment duration to changes in the replacement rate, vi) the standard deviation of
the unemployment rate, vii) the standard deviation of the job separation rate, and viii)
the level of the opportunity cost of employment.
The first two moments related to the asset-to-income distribution is calculated from SIPP
2004 data and details are given in Section 2.3.1. Kaplan and Violante (2014) calculate the
median value of the credit limit to quarterly labor income ratio for households aged 22 to
59 as 74 percent using Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data. We choose the borrowing
limit parameter a so that the median value of the ratio of a to after-tax quarterly labor
income in the model is 0.74.
The average unemployment rate and its standard deviation are calculated from U.S. data.
In our baseline calibration, we choose the curvature parameter of the search cost function χ
so that a 10 percentage point increase in the replacement rate generates an increase of 0.5
week in average unemployment duration among the UI eligible, which is within the range
of available empirical estimates.27 Hence, this parameter is important because it controls
the magnitude of the incentive costs associated with the increase in UI payments.
Finally, Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) use a complete markets model and
estimate the level of the opportunity cost of employment as 47 percent of the marginal
product of employment under separable preferences. We choose the monetized value of non-
market activity h so that the opportunity cost of employment generated by our model is
0.47. Given the incomplete markets model we have, to make the calibration comparable, we
only simulate agents from the top 1 percent of the stationary asset-to-income distribution
27See Nakajima (2012) for the summary of empirical estimates. We evaluate the welfare gains from the
optimal policy under different values of χ that match other levels of the available estimates in the literature.
We find that the welfare gains from the optimal policy remain similar for different values of χ. These results
are available upon request.
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Table 2.1: Internally calibrated parameters
Parameter Explanation Value Target Model Data
β¯ Average discount rate 0.9986 Median asset-to-income ratio 6.17 6.22
η Deviation from β¯ 0.0005 Frac. of pop. with non-positive wealth 0.27 0.27
a Borrowing limit −8.25 Median credit-limit-to-income ratio 0.74 0.74
α Level of search cost 5.02 Average unemployment rate 0.048 0.048
χ Curvature of search cost 1.49
Response of average unemp. duration
0.5 0.5
to changes in replacement rate
γ Matching function parameter 0.217 Std. dev. of unemployment rate 0.10 0.12
ω Separation rate parameter −14.3 Std. dev. of separation rate 0.18 0.16
h Value of nonmarket activity 0.342 Level of opportunity cost of emp. 0.47 0.47
Note: The average unemployment rate is calculated using monthly data between January 2005 and December 2007
provided by FRED - Federal Reserve Economic Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The average
standard deviation of the unemployment rate is reported in logs as quarterly deviations from an HP-filtered trend
with a smoothing parameter of 1600, using quarterly data between 1951:I–2007:IV provided by FRED. The same
procedure is applied to obtain the volatility of separation rates using data from Fujita and Ramey (2009) from
1976:I–2005:IV. The rest of the data moments are discussed in the main text.
when calculating the opportunity cost of employment using our model. This is because
the behavior of the very rich agents in the incomplete markets model converges to the
behavior of agents in the complete markets model. Section 2.3.2 explains how we calculate
the opportunity cost of employment in our model. Later in Section 2.6.2, we target 0.955
as an alternative level of the opportunity cost of employment, which is the value calibrated
by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), and discuss its implications for our main results.
Table 2.1 summarizes these calibrated parameters and compares the model’s match to
these data moments.
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2.3.1 Asset distribution
In addition to monthly data on income and government transfers as well as weekly data on
employment status, the SIPP also contains data on respondents’ asset holdings. In each
SIPP panel, respondents provide information on various types of asset holdings during
two or three waves within the panel, usually one year or, equivalently, three waves apart.
We use Wave 6 of the 2004 panel of SIPP, which covers interview months October 2005 -
January 2006 and is the wave closest to the Great Recession that provides wealth holding
information. We restrict our sample to individuals ages 24-65 and to those who neither
own a business nor derive income from self-employment.
We use individual net liquid asset holdings as our primary measure of wealth because of
its immediate availability as a means to smooth consumption in the event of job loss. The
net liquid asset holdings of an individual are calculated by adding transaction accounts
(checking, saving, money market, call accounts) and tradable assets (mutual funds, stocks,
bonds), and then deducting unsecured debt. We follow Koehne and Khun (2015) and
include net vehicle equity when calculating net liquid asset holdings. The reason is that
income can decrease substantially upon unemployment, and some unemployed could resort
to liquidating other forms of assets (i.e., the sale of vehicles) to smooth consumption upon
job loss.
To normalize wealth and better capture the level of self-insurance, we compute respondents’
asset-to-income ratio by dividing net liquid assets by weekly after-tax labor income.28
We determine after-tax income using the statutory income tax codes. Table 2.2 shows
the computed quantiles of the asset distribution in the data and model. The calibrated
model comes close to matching the empirical asset distribution. In particular, our model
reasonably captures the left tail of the distribution and at the same time exactly matches
the fraction of the population holding non-positive liquid wealth. Matching the left tail of
the distribution matters for our analysis because agents in this region of the distribution
are the most affected by changes in UI policy. Job losers with low wealth have little to no
28We use weekly employment status information to obtain weekly labor earnings from monthly labor
earnings data. We simply divide the monthly labor earnings by the number of weeks with a job for that
month to obtain weekly labor earnings. Appendix B.1 provides more details on the calculation of the asset
holdings and after-tax labor income.
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Table 2.2: Percentiles of the distribution of liquid asset holdings relative to weekly after-tax
labor income
Quantiles Fraction of population
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th with non-positive wealth
Data −8.59 0.00 6.22 20.23 56.57 0.27
Model −3.84 −0.85 6.17 33.32 42.46 0.27
Note: This table shows the liquid asset to after-tax labor income distribution in both the data and the model. The
empirical distribution is calculated by the authors using the SIPP 2004 Panel. The main text provides the details of
the calculation.
capacity to self-insure or smooth consumption using their own liquid assets and are thus
very sensitive to changes in unemployment insurance generosity.
2.3.2 Opportunity cost of employment
To calculate the opportunity cost of employment across individual and aggregate states, we
first derive surpluses obtained from moving from eligible unemployment to employment,
and from ineligible unemployment to employment separately. Let SUE
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
be
the surplus derived by an unemployed eligible with state
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
who transitions
into employment in a job that pays her optimal wage choice w˜
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
. Similary,
let SUI (a, β; p) be the surplus associated with moving from ineligible unemployment with
state (a, β; p) to a job that pays the optimal wage choice w˜ (a, β; p). We can then write
SUE
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
= V W
(
a, w˜
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
, β; p
)− V UE (a,wUE , β; p) (2.8)
and
SUI (a, β; p) = V W (a, w˜ (a, β; p) , β; p)− V UI (a, β; p) . (2.9)
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Now consider the same individual who loses the aforementioned job that pays w˜
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
.
We can define the next period surplus of an eligible unemployed as
S
(
a′W , w˜
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
, β′; p′
)
= V W
(
a′W , w˜
(
a′W , w˜
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
, β′; p′
)
, β′; p′
)
− V UE (a′W , w˜ (a,wUE , β; p) , β′; p′) , (2.10)
where the right-hand side is the difference in the value of again finding a job that pays
optimal wage choice w˜
(
a′W , w˜
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
, β′; p′
)
and remaining as unemployed eligible.
Similarly, the next period surplus for the ineligible unemployed is given by
SUI
(
a′W , β′; p′
)
= V W
(
a′W , w˜
(
a′W , β′; p′
)
, β′; p′
)− V UI (a′W , β′; p′) (2.11)
Evaluating V W , V UE , and V UI at a′W in Equations (2.10) and (2.11) restricts the contin-
uation surpluses to only that part associated with entering next period in the employed
state. Next, substituting (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) into (2.8) and (2.9), we obtain
SUE
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
λW
= w˜
(
a,wUE , β; p
)× (1− τ)− (zUEflow + zUEa + zUEw + zUEelg )︸ ︷︷ ︸
zUE
(2.12)
+ βE
[
λ′W
λW
× (1− δ (p
′)− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′)))SUE (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)
λ′W
]
and
SUI (a, β; p)
λW
= w˜ (a, β; p)× (1− τ)− (zUIflow + zUIa + zUIw + zUIelg)︸ ︷︷ ︸
zUI
(2.13)
+ βE
[
λ′W
λW
×
(
1− δ (p′)− sf (θ (w˜ (a′UI , β′; p′) ; p′)))SUI (a′W , β′; p′)
λ′W
]
,
where λW is the the marginal utility of consumption for the worker. The opportunity cost
of employment zl for each unemployed type l = {UE,UI} consists of four components:
zlf low is simply the flow utility difference between a worker and an unemployed type l, z
l
a is
the change in value due to differential asset accumulation between the employed and the
unemployed type l, zlw measures the change in value due to wage differences that result
from the possibility of losing a job the next period and finding another job with a different
wage as opposed to keeping the same job, and finally, zlelg represents the difference in
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value due to changes in the likelihood of ineligibility. Appendix B.2 provides derivations
of these terms in detail.29 This calculation yields the opportunity cost of employment
zUE
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
and zUI (a, β; p) for each state. As discussed above, we then simulate
agents from the top 1 percent of the stationary asset-to-income distribution and calculate
a weighted average of the opportunity cost of employment among this group. We then
choose the monetized value of non-market activity h so that the average opportunity cost
of employment for the richest agents in our model is 0.47.
The derivations above show that the opportunity cost of employment in our model is
beyond the flow utility difference between the employed and unemployed. Importantly, our
calculation takes into account the dynamic effects of one period of additional employment
on the opportunity cost of employment. Intuitively, one period of additional employment
causes a relative decline in the budget, since the employed typically accumulate more assets.
However, entering next period with higher levels of wealth creates an offsetting gain in the
continuation value. Moreover, higher wealth holdings encourage the unemployed to search
for higher wages and thus increase the possibility of higher labor income. Finally, one
extra period of employment decreases the probability of ineligibility because the worker
must separate from his job first before being subject to eligibility risk, as opposed to an
unemployed eligible who constantly faces the risk of losing benefits. As a result, these
dynamic benefits of employment measured respectively by zla, z
l
w, and z
l
elg jointly dampen
the flow opportunity cost of employment zlf low.
30
29Our calculation extends the opportunity cost of employment derivation in Chodorow-Reich and
Karabarbounis (2016). In addition to the asset differential za in the incomplete markets version of their
model, we account for the wage differential zlw and ineligibility probability differential z
l
elg in our opportunity
cost of employment formula for each unemployment type l. In addition, za varies for each unemployment
type l in our setup.
30In our model, zla + z
l
w + z
l
elg is small for the richest agents, and thus z
l approaches zlflow in the
calibration. This is because the dynamic benefits of one period of extra employment have little value for
this group of agents. While disregarding these benefits does not affect the calibration of value of non-market
activity h, zla+z
l
w+z
l
elg is relatively large for poorer agents. Thus, it is crucial to account for these dynamic
benefits when calculating the opportunity cost of employment across different agents in the economy so
that the insurance benefits and the incentive costs of any proposed UI policy are correctly measured.
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2.3.3 Testable implications
In this section, we discuss our model’s implications for several important untargeted mo-
ments of the data. First, we measure the economy wide size and cyclicality of marginal
propensity to consume (MPC) as well as the average consumption drop upon job loss pre-
dicted by the model. These are then compared to available empirical estimates in the
literature. It is important for the model to generate a reasonable level and cyclicality of
MPCs and average consumption drop in order to properly measure the insurance benefits
of any proposed UI policy. For example, if the consumption drop were very low, then the
insurance benefit of UI would be understated. Second, we present how the model com-
pares to the data on labor market transitions, survival probabilities into unemployment,
and the aggregate impact of UI extensions on the unemployment rate. Generating transi-
tion rates and unemployment survival functions, that are in line with the data is crucial
to understanding the individual labor market response (incentive costs) of the unemployed
to changes in UI policy, and generating a reasonable response of the unemployment rate
ensures that the aggregate effects of UI are well accounted for. The following sections
present the results of these exercises.
Marginal propensity to consume
Figure 2.2 qualitatively demonstrates the consumption choices of agents across different
asset holdings and employment states. The unemployed not only consume less than workers
but also exhibit higher marginal propensities to consume. The differences in MPCs between
workers and the unemployed is most evident for agents holding little wealth, but this
differential eventually diminishes as wealth increases.
In order to quantitatively understand how MPCs differ across heterogeneous agents in the
economy, Table 2.3 presents the average quarterly MPC of different asset-to-income and
employment groups based on the stationary distribution of the economy. We compute
the MPC of an agent by calculating the fraction of an unexpected transfer, scaled such
that it is equivalent to $500, that an agent spends on consumption. As in Kaplan and
Violante (2014), we implement a $500 rebate in order to ensure consistency with available
empirical estimates that study the impact of tax rebates on consumption. Noticeably, the
poor unemployed ineligible exhibit the highest MPC given the absence of both public and
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Figure 2.2: Consumption policy function
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Note: This figure plots the consumption choices of agents with different employment statuses and asset holdings.
The wages of workers and the unemployed eligible are set to be the economy’s mean wage. Productivity and discount
rates are also set to their means.
private insurance. Across employment states, the unemployed have significantly higher
MPCs than workers, especially for agents in the lower end of the wealth distribution.
Meanwhile, for any given employment status, the MPC is decreasing in wealth holdings.
The empirical literature documents two aggregate MPC data moments that we can use to
validate our model. To do so, we calculate two untargeted average quarterly MPC moments
in our model using the stationary distribution of agents across states and compare it to
these available empirical estimates. Results are summarized in Table 2.4.
First, we find that the average quarterly economy wide MPC is 8 percent in our model.
On the empirical side, Parker et al. (2013) measure that households, under different
specifications, spend between 12 and 30 percent of unexpected tax rebates in the quarter
that they are received. Thus, the fraction of borrowing-constrained individuals who have
large MPCs as shown in Table 2.3 is too small to generate a sizeable response in the
aggregate in our model.31 Second, Gross et al. (2016) measure the cyclicality of the
31Notice that since our model generates a lower average MPC than its empirical counterpart, the house-
holds spend a relatively lower fraction of UI receipt on consumption. However, even if this is the case, we
still find that the optimal policy is countercyclical. Thus, welfare gains provided by the optimal policy can
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Table 2.3: Heterogeneous MPCs
Asset-to-Income Groups
Employment a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
Worker 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.04
Unemployed Eligible 0.34 0.18 0.12 0.07 0.04
Unemployed Ineligible 0.64 0.20 0.12 0.06 0.04
Note: This table shows the average quarterly MPCs of various type-groups, where columns represent agents with
varying asset-to-income ratios and rows represent agents of differing employment statuses. Individual MPCs are
calculated by computing the fraction consumed out of an unexpected $500 transfer. Asset-to-income groups are
a1 < p (10), a2 ∈ [p (10) , p (25)), a3 ∈ [p (25) , p (50)), a4 ∈ [p (50) , p (75)), and a5 ≥ p (75), where percentiles are
from the stationary asset-to-income distribution.
Table 2.4: Model fit of average MPCs
Model Data
Economy wide MPC 0.08 0.12− 0.30
MPC difference of borrowing-constrained between 2008 and 2011 0.08 0.08
Note: This table shows the average quarterly economy wide MPC, and the average semiannual MPC of borrowing-
constrained individuals between 2008 and 2011 implied by the model’s simulations. Individual MPCs are calculated
by computing the fraction consumed out of an unexpected $500 transfer. These model-generated average values are
then compared to available empirical estimates in the literature.
MPC by exploiting the unexpected changes in credit card borrowing limits of previously
bankrupt individuals and find that the MPC is countercyclical over the Great Recession. In
particular, they show that the average semiannual MPC difference of borrowing-constrained
individuals between 2008 and 2011 is 8 percent. Using the Great Recession simulation of
our model, we calculate the same moment and find that it is also 8 percent.32 Hence, while
the economy wide average MPC in our model is lower than its empirical counterpart, our
model replicates the observed variation in the average MPC over the business cycle. This
implies that our model successfully generates cyclical variation in the insurance value of
be considered as a lower bound.
32Section 2.5.1 explains the details on how we simulate the Great Recession using the model.
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Figure 2.3: Model fit
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Note: This figure shows our model’s implications for several important untargeted moments of the data. The main
text discusses the details of this comparison.
UI, which is crucial when studying the optimal design of UI policy over the business cycle.
Average consumption drop upon job loss
First, we compare the model-implied value of the average drop in consumption upon ex-
periencing a job loss to the available empirical estimates in the literature. To do so, we
estimate the following distributed-lag regression using the simulation data:
log (cit) = αi + γt + βait +
36∑
k=−4
δkD
k,
it + it, (2.14)
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where the outcome variable log (cit) is the logarithm of consumption of individual i in week
t, αi are coefficients on individual fixed effects, γt are coefficients on week fixed effects, ait
is the net asset level of individual i in week t, and the error it represents random factors.
The indicator variables Dkit identify all individuals k weeks prior to or after a job loss,
where k = 0 is the week of job loss. For instance, D4it = 1 for individual i who experiences
job loss at time t− 4, and zero otherwise.
Our treatment group consists of individuals who experience at least one job loss during the
simulation period. Thus, the control group consists of individuals who never lost their jobs.
Thus, Dkit = 0 for all weeks t for individuals who belong to the control group.
33 Thus, the
coefficients {δk}k∈{−4,...,36} measure the effect of job loss on consumption k weeks prior-to
or after the incident relative to individuals who do not experience any job loss. Panel A of
Figure 2.3 plots the estimated values for {δk}k∈{−4,...,36}. It shows that in the week of job
loss, consumption drops 14 percent on average and then slowly recovers over time.
Several papers in the literature estimated the average consumption drop upon job loss from
various data sources. Gruber (1997) finds a decline in food expenditure of 6.8 percent using
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the period up to 1987. Saporta-Eksten
(2014) uses cross-sectional variation in the PSID and estimates an 8 percent decline in
consumption expenditure in the year during which a job loss occurs.34 Stephens (2004) es-
timates the average decline in food expenditure upon job loss in the Health and Retirement
Survey (HRS) and the PSID and finds that the decline is between 12 percent (PSID) and
15 percent (HRS) when an individual experiences a job loss between interviews. Browning
and Crossley (2001) report a 14 percent decline using Canadian Out of Employment Panel
(COEP) survey data. Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) conduct an analysis of
the effects of job loss on consumption in both the PSID and the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CE) and find that the decline in total food expenditure is between 14 percent
(PSID) and 21 percent (CE). Finally, Aguiar and Hurst (2005) report a 19 percent decline
in food expenditure among the unemployed using scanner data.
33Notice that since the job loss event is exogenous in our model, simulated groups should not exhibit
any selection bias.
34However, this estimate does not condition on the fraction of the year spent as unemployed. When
we assume an average unemployment duration of 17 weeks, this would imply a decline in consumption of
around 24 percent.
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In summary, our model generates an estimate for the average decline in consumption upon
job loss that is in line with available empirical estimates in the literature.35
Labor market transitions
We focus on the employment-to-unemployment (E-U) and unemployment-to-employment
(U-E) transition rates implied by the model during the Great Recession and how they
compare with the data. This way, we are able to evaluate the model’s implications for
the cyclical patterns of labor market transition rates. Since the timing of SIPP panels
misses the rise in the E-U rate and the decline in the U-E rate during the first months of
the Great Recession, the transition rates in Panel B and C of Figure 2.3 are taken from
Current Population Survey (CPS) data as calculated by Kroft et al. (2016).36 First, Panel
B shows that the model is able to generate the initial rise in the E-U rate due to the rise
in exogenous job separations in the model. It is also able to match the observed slow
decline throughout the recovery, although the model-implied E-U rate decreases relatively
earlier due to the recovery of aggregate labor productivity and the resulting decline in job
separation shocks. Second, Panel C reveals that the model generates a smaller decline
in job finding rates at the start of the Great Recession relative to the drastic decline in
the data, but the levels of the model and the data become similar afterward. This is
because in the model, when labor productivity decreases and firms do not post vacancies
in submarkets offering high wages, the unemployed optimally direct their search effort
toward submarkets offering lower wages where job-finding rates are relatively higher. As
a result, the magnitude of the drop in the average job finding rate of the model during
economic downturns is relatively smaller than its data counterpart. This, however, does
35Notice that the magnitude of the average consumption drop upon job loss in our model is largely
controlled by the value of non-market activity h, which is calibrated to match the level of the opportunity
cost of employment. Hence, the result that our model generates a similar magnitude of the average con-
sumption drop upon job loss to the data lends support to our baseline calibration of the level of the value
of non-market activity h.
36Kroft et al. (2016) report that CPS transition rates are not consistent with the stock levels of unem-
ployment, employment, and non-participation. Then, they describe a procedure to adjust these rates so
that the transition rates become consistent with observed changes in stocks between months. The data also
account for seasonality by residualizing out month fixed effects and are smoothed by taking three-month
moving averages.
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not mean that the model underestimates the costs of recessions. While not as drastic as
the Great Recession, the drop in the job finding rate is still sizeable and is accompanied by
a significant decline in offered wages. Furthermore, even if the model generates a smaller
drop in job finding rates in response to changes in aggregate productivity, it generates
the observed elasticity of average unemployment duration with respect to changes in UI
generosity, as this is one of the data moments in our calibration. This is also evident in
Figure 2.8, where we show the impact of a countercyclical UI policy on the job finding rate.
Unemployment survival function
In the model, the likelihood of exiting from an unemployment spell depends on the aggre-
gate labor productivity as well as the unemployed agent’s choice of search intensity and
wage submarket. A useful summary of how long individuals spend unemployed is given
by the unemployment survival function, which shows the probability that an agent will
remain unemployed beyond a given unemployment duration.
First, we use the SIPP 2008 panel to measure the survival function in the data. We
restrict our sample to working-aged individuals age 24 to 65 who do not own a business
or derive income from self-employment. As in Rothstein and Valletta (2017), we require
at least one quarter of employment prior to the spell in order to focus on individuals
who have sufficient attachment to the labor market. Spells that are left-truncated and
spells with missing information for which we cannot ascertain the employment status of
the respondents are dropped. Finally, we define spells to be uninterrupted months of
unemployment and thus do not consider time spent out of the labor force, since we do not
model the non-participation margin. Panel D of Figure 2.3 shows that the unemployment
survival function generated by the model under the baseline calibration is close to its data
counterpart. While survival data exhibit sharp drops during early months, the model
survival function decays in a smooth fashion given the probabilistic nature of eligibility
and job-finding rates in the model.
Impact of UI extensions on aggregate unemployment
In order to understand the model’s predictions about the aggregate effect of benefit exten-
sions on the labor market during the Great Recession, we simulate the model for the Great
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Recession period with and without UI benefit extensions and measure the time path of the
unemployment rate. Panel E of Figure 2.3 shows that during the depth of the recession,
the model-implied unemployment rate would have been 0.6 percentage points lower in the
absence of benefit extensions.
The body of work that studies the impact of UI on macroeconomic aggregates has found
mixed results. Rothstein (2011) exploits variation in UI benefits across states with similar
economic conditions, the behavior of UI ineligible as a control group, and several other
strategies to address endogeneity problems in measuring the impact of UI on labor market
conditions. Using CPS data, he finds that UI extensions raised the unemployment rate
in early 2011 by only about 0.1 to 0.5 percentage points. Consistent with this finding,
Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2017) implement a novel empirical strategy by using
exogenous variation coming from measurement error in real-time state unemployment rates
and find that benefit extensions increased the unemployment rate by at most 0.3 percentage
points. Coglianese (2015) uses a similar strategy and also finds small effects. Meanwhile,
Farber and Valletta (2015) use variation in individuals’ time-to-exhaustion and find that
extended benefits account for an increase of around 0.4 percentage points in the 9 percent
unemployment rate in 2010. Valletta and Kuang (2010) find that in the absence of extended
benefits, the unemployment rate would have been about 0.4 percentage points lower at the
end of 2009, while Marinescu (2017) also finds small effects due to the reduced congestion
resulting in a higher job-finding rate of any given job application.
On the other hand, Hagedorn et al. (2016) highlight that benefit extensions lead to higher
equilibrium wages and thus lower vacancies. They also emphasize the role of firm expec-
tations on future UI policies when making vacancy or hiring decisions. Accounting for
this additional channel, they find that UI generosity increased the unemployment rate by
2.0 to 2.7 percentage points. This result is consistent with the findings of Johnston and
Mas (2016), who find large effects of reductions in UI duration on unemployment. Fujita
(2011b) also finds that extensions led to a substantial 1.2 percentage points increase in
male workers’ unemployment rate.
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2.4 Welfare Calculation
We measure the welfare effects of any proposed UI policy by answering the following ques-
tion: how much additional lifetime consumption must be endowed to all agents in an
economy where some benchmark policy is being implemented so that average welfare will
be equal to an economy where the proposed policy is implemented? In effect, we are
evaluating whether an alternate UI policy will be welfare improving when compared to
a benchmark policy, a natural choice being the actual UI policy implemented during the
recession. Henceforth, we will refer to the UI policy implemented by the U.S. government
during the Great Recession as the benchmark policy.37
Let b denote the benchmark policy and n denote the new/proposed policy. We can compute
the additional percent lifetime consumption p¯i that makes the average welfare equal across
these two economies using the following equation:∫
i
[
E0
∞∑
t=0
βitU
(
cbit (1 + p¯i) , s
b
it
)]
dΓss (i) =
∫
i
[
E0
∞∑
t=0
βitU (c
n
it, s
n
it)
]
dΓss (i) (2.15)
where cjit and s
j
it denote the consumption and search effort levels of agent i at time t under
UI policy j ∈ {b, n}, and Γss is the stationary distribution of the economy.
One can interpret the welfare exercise in Equation (2.15) as follows. Consider two countries
populated by people with the same type-distribution. The only difference between both
countries is that the government of the first country changes UI policy to policy b, while
the second changes UI policy to policy n. The question is how much additional lifetime
consumption p¯i should the first government compensate an individual who is behind the
veil of ignorance (i.e., does not know her initial type in the stationary distribution) in order
to make her indifferent between being part of one of these two countries? Thus, the best
UI policy n that the second government can implement is the one that makes the first
37During the Great Recession, the U.S. government increased the duration of UI payments to as much
as 99 weeks in some states but kept replacement rates almost constant. We set a duration of UI payments
that increases from 26 weeks (2 quarters) to up to 90 weeks (7 quarters) over the decline in aggregate
productivity p, while the replacement rate of UI payments is kept fixed at its long-run average of 14 percent
for all levels of p. This policy closely mimics the UI policy in the United States during the Great Recession
and its recovery, assuming the United States as a single state.
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government pay the highest compensation p¯imax to weakly attract this prospective citizen.
This policy will be the optimal UI policy.
We restrict the class of candidate UI policies to be linear in current productivity level p
such that φ (p) = qφ + mφp and e (p) = qe + mep. Under this restriction of UI policy
instruments, we search over five UI policy parameters (qφ, mφ, qe, me, τ) to solve for the
optimal UI policy.
In order to obtain ex-ante welfare gains/losses p¯i for each policy n, we begin from the sta-
tionary distribution of our calibrated economy Γss where (1) aggregate labor productivity
is constant at its mean level and (2) the unemployment benefit policy is fixed at a 14 per-
cent replacement rate and 26 weeks expiration, which we call the acyclical/flat UI policy f .
In each economy, an unanticipated but permanent policy change toward benchmark policy
b and proposed policy n, respectively, is implemented. Given any guess of p¯i, we can now
compute for both sides of Equation (2.15) by integrating over the stationary distribution.
We then solve for the p¯i that equates both sides of Equation (2.15) and select the UI policy
that yields the highest welfare gain p¯imax as the optimal UI policy.
38
2.5 Main Results
We find that mφ = −6.44, qφ = 6.75, me = 0.34, qe = −0.32, and τ = 1.06 percent,
implying that the optimal UI policy should be countercyclical in both replacement rate
and duration. These values imply that the optimal policy offers a 30 percent replacement
rate for 4 quarters when aggregate labor productivity is at its mean value, and a 54 percent
replacement rate for 10 quarters when aggregate labor productivity is depressed by 3.5
percent. This means that the optimal policy offers a more generous replacement rate for a
longer duration compared to the U.S. government’s UI policy during the Great Recession,
which provided 14 percent of the replacement rate for around 7 quarters of payments for
the same drop in labor productivity. Compared to this benchmark policy, the optimal
policy increases welfare by 0.58 percent additional lifetime consumption for all agents.
Meanwhile, compared to an acyclical policy that offers 14 percent of the replacement rate
for 2 quarters for all levels of aggregate labor productivity, the optimal policy yields a
38Given the functional form of the utility function, there is no closed-form solution for p¯i.
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welfare gain equivalent to 0.74 percent additional lifetime consumption.39
These welfare gains from the optimal UI policy are much larger when compared to welfare
gains of eliminating the business cycle obtained by Lucas (1987), who finds that the welfare
of an infinitely lived representative agent increases by only 0.008 percent in consumption
equivalents for logarithmic preferences if cycles are removed. A more relevant comparison
to our model is Krusell et al. (2009), who extend this analysis in an incomplete asset
markets model with heterogeneous households and study the welfare effects of eliminating
both aggregate risk and its impact on idiosyncratic risk when there is a correlation between
these two shocks. They find that the welfare gains of eliminating the cycle and its effect on
idiosyncratic risk are as much as 1 percent in consumption equivalents for the same period
utility function. Importantly, they show that the effect of business cycles on idiosyncratic
risk has great quantitative consequences. Specifically, if one does not correctly integrate
out the effect of cycles on idiosyncratic risk, then the welfare gains of eliminating cycles are
only slightly larger than those calculated by Lucas (1987). Similar to Krusell et al. (2009),
our model features aggregate shocks and incomplete asset markets in which aggregate risk
significantly affects the magnitude of idiosyncratic risk, as job finding and job separation
rates are functions of aggregate labor productivity. Both models are also similar in that
households are heterogeneous in terms of their employment status, discount rates, and
wealth holdings. These similarities suggest that welfare results in their study are a useful
benchmark against our model. In our model, optimal UI smooths aggregate shocks by
introducing cyclicality into the generosity of benefits and also attenuates idiosyncratic
unemployment risk by providing higher benefit levels on average. Nonetheless, as the
optimal UI policy in our framework can only partially smooth the effect of cycles on
consumption, welfare gains are much lower than the upper bound provided by Krusell et
al. (2009).
The following discussions elucidate on the sources and distribution of welfare gains brought
about by the countercyclical policy. First, we simulate the Great Recession using our model
and compare how consumption patterns and labor market aggregates differ between the
optimal policy and an acyclical policy. This will provide useful insight about the insurance
39To obtain this number, we repeat the welfare calculation procedure in Section 2.4 where we set the
benchmark policy b as the acyclical/flat policy f . In this case, the first country continues to implement UI
policy f , while the second country changes it to the optimal UI policy.
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benefits and incentive costs of the countercyclical optimal policy, especially when a recession
triggers more generous benefits. We then proceed to quantitatively decompose ex-ante
welfare gains of the optimal policy attributable either to changes in consumption patterns
resulting from altered saving and wage choices, or to changes in the search intensity exerted
by the unemployed. Finally, we look at ex-post welfare outcomes among heterogeneous
agents in order to understand how welfare gains are distributed across agents with different
employment statuses and wealth holdings.
2.5.1 Great Recession exercise
We now use the Great Recession as an interesting test case that allows us to understand the
insurance benefits and incentive costs associated with the countercyclical optimal policy. In
order to discipline this exercise, we take as given the U.S. government’s UI extension policy
during the Great Recession and then pick the realizations of aggregate labor productivity
to match the unemployment rate from December 2007 to December 2013 – the period that
spans the beginning of the recession until the time when the Emergency Unemployment
Compensation Act of 2008 (EUC08) was no longer renewed. Matching the realized unem-
ployment rate by imposing that government policy mimics benefit extensions during the
Great Recession is important, since using the model’s aggregate labor productivity alone
to match the unemployment rate disregards the fact that more generous UI policies im-
plemented during the recession and recovery may have contributed to the heightened level
of unemployment. Thus, in this exercise, the drop in labor productivity triggers lower job
finding rates, higher separation rates, and longer benefit durations, all of which contribute
to the rise in unemployment. Figure 2.4A shows the realizations of the labor productivity
process that we obtain from this procedure, while Figure 2.4B compares the unemployment
rate generated by the model to its counterpart in the data.40
In this exericse, we consider two economies that both experience the Great Recession
between December 2007 and December 2013 but differ in the UI policy that is implemented.
40We acknowledge that labor productivity in the data during the Great Recession did not decline in a
similar way. However, given that labor productivity in our model is the only source of aggregate fluctuations,
we place more emphasis on matching the observed unemployment rate and less on the manner by which we
do it. While we call the decline in p “labor productivity shock”, it can stand in for other forms of shocks
such as TFP, aggregate demand, or financial shocks.
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Figure 2.4: Labor productivity and unemployment rate
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Note: Panel A shows the labor productivity series that we use in our model to generate the observed time series of
the unemployment rate in the data during the Great Recession. Panel B compares the paths of the unemployment
rate in the data and the model.
In both economies, the simulation begins under the stationary distribution.41 At t = 0, we
introduce a recession to both economies by feeding the labor productivity series into Figure
2.4A. It must be noted, however, that agents use the AR(1) process to take expectations on
labor productivity. One economy introduces the optimal policy o, and the other maintains
the less generous acyclical policy f . In both cases, the policy change is unanticipated by
agents. This is a reasonable assumption, as UI extensions during deep recessions (such
as the EUC08) are typically beyond the scope of pre-existing triggers that households are
aware of. This policy change is permanent and will thus apply the same UI policy to future
fluctuations of the same magnitude.
In the following sections, we separately analyze the consumption-smoothing benefits and
41We select the number of agents to simulate N to be large enough such that p¯i does not change with
further increases in N . We find that N = 120, 000 is sufficient for this goal.
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incentive costs of the optimal policy if it had been implemented during the Great Reces-
sion and compare them to that of the acyclical policy.42 We place emphasis on how the
cyclicality of these benefits and costs rationalizes a countercyclical optimal policy.
Insurance Benefits
Consumption Smoothing Upon Job Loss We first show the effect of the optimal UI
policy on the consumption drop experienced upon job loss. We ask what would happen to
the consumption profile of agents who experience a job loss in the economy that introduces
the optimal policy and the economy that remains under the acyclical policy. The compar-
ison of consumption profiles across these two economies will reveal the welfare benefits of
the generous optimal policy coming from smoothing consumption between E-U transitions.
Using model-generated data, we run the same distributed-lag regression in Equation (2.14)
for each economy.
Figure 2.5 compares the consumption drop upon job loss between an acyclical policy and
the generous optimal policy. On average, the consumption drop upon job loss is 15 percent
under the acyclical policy, and 9 percent under the optimal policy, implying that the decline
is 6 percentage points less under the optimal policy. This simply demonstrates the role
of UI in dampening large fluctuations in consumption when job loss occurs, an insurance
benefit on which the literature has traditionally focused. Moreover, this lower drop in
consumption upon job loss is enjoyed by a larger number of agents in a recession due to
the higher incidence of unemployment and longer spells during which wealth is depleted.
As a result, the insurance value of UI payments in smoothing consumption upon job loss
is larger in recessions.
Note that the reduction in the consumption drop is the net effect of two opposing forces: a
more generous UI policy (1) directly increases consumption upon job loss due to higher ben-
efits but also (2) indirectly crowds out precautionary savings. The first channel raises public
insurance and thus decreases the consumption drop, while the second channel decreases
self-insurance and thus increases the consumption drop as individuals enter unemployment
42Comparing the optimal and acyclical policies makes the illustration of the idea clear, as the acyclical
policy offers the same replacement rate and duration across different realizations of the aggregate state.
The intuition provided by the exercise also holds qualitatively when comparing the optimal policy with the
benchmark policy.
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Figure 2.5: Average consumption drop upon job loss
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Note: Panel A plots the path of the average consumption drop upon job loss between 4 weeks prior to job loss
and 36 weeks after the job loss. Two different consumption profiles are obtained from a distribution-lag regression
in Equation (2.14) using model-generated data under the acyclical policy and the optimal policy. Panels B and C
repeat this exercise for poor and rich agents experiencing job loss. “Poor” refers to agents who enter unemployment
with an asset-to-income ratio below the 75th percentile of the stationary asset-to-income distribution, while “Rich”
refers to those above the threshold.
with less wealth. In addition, notice that the recovery of consumption is slightly faster
under the acyclical policy given how agents are forced to find jobs more quickly compared
to an economy where the optimal policy is implemented.
It is also insightful to understand the effect of the optimal policy on the consumption
drop upon job loss among rich and poor households. In Figure 2.5, we group individuals
based on their asset-to-income ratio at the moment of job loss when the acyclical policy
is implemented and then plot their consumption profiles. The first group consists of those
who enter unemployment with an asset-to-income ratio below the 75th percentile of the
stationary asset-to-income distribution, while the second group consists of those above that
threshold. Using the same grouping (and the same job destruction shocks), we calculate
the consumption drop that individuals would have experienced had the optimal policy been
implemented instead. Panels B and C of Figure 2.5 demonstrate substantial heterogeneity
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in the consumption-smoothing benefits agents derive from the optimal policy. Among the
poor, the consumption drop is reduced by around 12 percent, while for the rich, it is only
around 4 percent. This result highlights the need to carefully calibrate the model’s wealth
distribution to match the data in order to correctly evaluate the true magnitude of any
proposed policy’s insurance benefits.
In summary, the optimal policy provides substantial insurance against E-U transitions, the
magnitude of which varies significantly across the wealth distribution. More importantly,
these benefits are larger during recessions simply because more agents experience job loss
and remain unemployed for longer durations during which wealth declines.
Consumption Smoothing over the Business Cycle Although the insurance benefits
of UI are traditionally seen to accrue mostly to job losers, we show in this section that in the
presence of aggregate shocks and incomplete asset markets, UI also provides consumption-
smoothing benefits even to those who do not lose their jobs. Under this framework, UI
policy plays an important role in smoothing consumption over the business cycle. In order
to demonstrate this channel, consider for the moment a worker in an economy that does
not have a UI program. When a recession occurs, the worker anticipates that there is a
higher risk of losing her job and that the unemployment spell is likely to be prolonged
given the persistence of negative shocks. In the absence of government insurance, the
worker self-insures by cutting back on consumption in order to build a buffer stock of
savings that she could use to attenuate the impact of potential job loss. This means
that consumption fluctuates heavily with aggregate fluctuations even if job loss does not
actually occur. This reaction is simply a manifestation of the inefficiencies resulting from
over-saving in an incomplete markets model, relative to its first best. The government
then uses its UI program to reduce the excessive precautionary saving behavior of workers
by promising higher public insurance during times when the unemployment risk is large
in order to bring the economy closer to the efficient allocation. When UI is generous
during recessions, individuals are relieved of the burden to reduce consumption in order
to build savings, since UI makes the prospect of losing one’s job less painful. This further
contributes to the expansion of insurance benefits during recessions because it is precisely
during this time when excessive precautionary saving behavior is triggered. While this
channel is also present in previous models with incomplete markets, the literature on the
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optimal design of UI over the business cycle has not quantified the effect, possibly because
of computational difficulties, which we are able to overcome.
Panel A of Figure 2.6 demonstrates this channel by comparing the average consumption
of the economy during the Great Recession under the optimal and acyclical UI policies.
It reveals that average consumption is much smoother under the optimal policy. The
large drop in consumption at the onset of the recession when UI is acyclical is caused
precisely by agents diverting consumption toward savings. This is corroborated by Panel
A of Figure 2.7 which plots the average wealth of job losers during the first week of entering
unemployment. At the start of the recession when labor productivity starts declining, it is
clear that workers in the economy under the acyclical policy engage in precautionary savings
due to the higher risk of losing a job and staying unemployed for longer durations. Thus,
we see that average asset holdings upon entering unemployment rise during this period and
only begin to decline during the recovery. In the case of the optimal policy, however, the
need for precautionary saving is offset by the generous UI payments, implying that agents
enter their unemployment spell with less self-insurance compared to their counterparts
under the acyclical policy. The same idea is also apparent in Panel B of Figure 2.7, which
plots the evolution of various percentiles of the asset distribution when a recession hits both
economies. It shows that the level of precautionary savings under the generous optimal
policy is markedly muted. Furthermore, similar to the consumption-smoothing benefits
upon job loss, consumption smoothing through this channel is also cyclical. It is stronger
during recessions precisely because it is during this time when precautionary saving motives
are strong and thus significant cuts in consumption occur.
Next, we analyze the consumption-smoothing benefits of the optimal policy over the busi-
ness cycle for agents with varying wealth levels. To do this, we again group agents based
on their asset-to-income level at the start of the Great Recession. The first group consists
of agents whose asset-to-income level at the start of this period is below the 75th percentile
of the stationary asset-to-income distribution, while the second group comprises of those
above this threshold. Panels B and C of Figure 2.6 then plot the average consumption paths
of these two groups over the Great Recession. Comparing average consumption paths un-
der the acyclical and optimal policies shows intuitively that the consumption-smoothing
benefits of the optimal policy over the business cycle are largely different for poor and rich
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agents. While the optimal policy improves consumption smoothing for the poor, it does
not for the rich, as they are already well insured.
Incentive Costs
While the optimal policy provides consumption-smoothing benefits to a large fraction of
agents in the economy, it also induces certain moral hazard costs. This section discusses
the magnitude of these costs associated with introducing the optimal UI policy vis-a-vis the
acyclical UI policy. First, we look at how these costs manifest through lower job-finding
probabilities and thus longer durations in unemployment. Second, we discuss how the
magnitude of these moral hazard costs varies over the business cycle.
When a more generous UI policy is implemented, the unemployed eligible reduce their
search effort and ask for higher wages because of an increase in the opportunity cost of
employment. To provide a useful summary of the combined effects of both margins, in
Figure 2.8, we look at how job finding rates and survival in unemployment change between
the two economies. Panel A demonstrates that job finding rates during the recession shift
downward when the optimal policy is introduced. Meanwhile, Panel B plots the Kaplan-
Meier estimates of the unemployment survival function under both policies, as described in
Section 2.3.3. The lower job finding rates result in the outward shift of the unemployment
survival function under the optimal policy when compared to that of the less generous
acyclical policy. This simply means that the likelihood that a duration will last beyond
t months is always higher in the economy under the optimal policy. For instance, the
probability that an unemployment spell will last beyond one month is around 40 percent
under the acyclical policy, whereas it goes up to 60 percent under the optimal policy.
It is now evident that the optimal UI policy induces nontrivial costs through lower job-
finding rates and thus longer unemployment durations. However, what is key to determin-
ing the optimal policy over the business cycle is the cyclicality of the size of these moral
hazard costs, that is, how they expand and contract over the business cycle.
First, the value of job search is cyclical. A forgone unit of search during a recession is less
costly than a forgone unit of search during a boom because jobs are difficult to find during a
recession and conditional on finding a job, wages are likely to be lower as well. This means
that while an extra dollar of benefits received during a recession induces the unemployed
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to search less, this reduction in search effort is not as costly compared to when the same
dollar is received in an expansion during which firms are posting a lot more vacancies at
higher wages. The cyclicality of the value of search effort is evident in Panel A of Figure 2.9
which shows that the consumption value of a unit of search effort is markedly lower during
a recession compared to a boom. The same message is conveyed in Panel B, which shows
that the average value of job search drops during the Great Recession and rises during the
recovery for both eligible and ineligible unemployed, although the change is larger for the
eligible unemployed, as they are the direct recipient of UI payments.
Second, wealth effects that discipline job search are more likely to manifest during reces-
sions. For any given UI policy, recessions generally lead to prolonged unemployment spells
during which agents draw down their assets to supplement consumption. Getting closer to
their borrowing constraints, the unemployed have a higher incentive to ramp up their job
finding efforts through a combination of higher search intensity and lower wage choices,
as they seek to find work more quickly. This is evident in the household decision rules in
Figure 2.1, which shows that for every unit of the decline in asset holdings at the time
of unemployment, there is a disproportionate increase in search effort and decline in wage
choices as the unemployed get closer to becoming borrowing constrained. Simply put, the
presence of borrowing constraints acts like a self-disciplining device for job search efforts
of the unemployed during recessions. As a result, the moral hazard costs are dampened
by the fact that agents are more ill-prepared in terms of their own private savings during
recessions.
In summary, while a generous UI policy decreases the job finding rate and increases the
average unemployment spell duration, these moral hazard costs are partially offset in reces-
sions because the consumption value of job search is low during recessions, and the decline
in asset holdings in recessions incentivizes the unemployed to ramp up their job search.
This result is consistent with Kroft and Notowidigdo (2016), who empirically find that the
moral hazard cost of UI is procyclical.
2.5.2 Welfare decomposition
The Great Recession exercise in the previous section demonstrates the qualitative effects
of the optimal policy on individual decision rules as well as the aggregate outcomes. We
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now proceed to quantitatively decompose the welfare contribution of the aforementioned
changes. The ex-ante welfare gains of the optimal policy can be decomposed into either
its effects on consumption coming from changes in savings and wage choices or its effects
on the search intensity exerted by the unemployed. In order to isolate the welfare gains
attributable to changes in consumption from those attributable to search effort, we shut
down endogenous search decisions in the model.43 This version of the model is then re-
calibrated and used to evaluate the welfare gains coming from the countercyclical optimal
policy. When policy has no effects on search intensity, welfare increases by 0.56 percent of
additional lifetime consumption for all agents relative to the benchmark policy. Thus, the
welfare gains of the optimal policy attributable to changes in search effort are negligible.44
As a result, we conclude that the welfare gains come largely from changes in consumption
patterns.
Having isolated the welfare gains attributable to search, we then want to understand how
the optimal policy changes consumption patterns in the model without endogenous search
effort. Our first step is to disentangle welfare gains along the transition from the long-run
(steady state) gains. To do this, we make a slight but important modification in Equation
(2.15). In particular, we change Γss to Γb (where b denotes the benchmark policy) on the
left-hand side, and Γss to Γn on the right-hand side, where n is set to be the optimal UI
policy. This implies that the first economy has implemented the benchmark policy, while
the second economy has implemented the optimal policy for a very long time so that these
two economies are in their respective steady states. We then ask an unborn agent who does
not know her type within the respective stationary distributions which economy she prefers
to live in. The ex-ante steady state welfare gains/losses from the optimal policy piss are
then given by the percentage of additional lifetime consumption that the first government
43We do this by assuming that the unemployed searches for a job full-time, (i.e., s = 1), without incurring
a disutility from search effort, (i.e., α = 0).
44The result that changes in UI policy have small effects on the job search intensity of the unemployed
is consistent with previous empirical evidence in the literature. For example, Ashenfelter et al. (2005) find
that low job search effort is not a significant source of UI overpayments using evidence from randomized
trials in four U.S. sites. Recently, Hagedorn et al. (2016) carefully analyze the effect of changes in UI policies
on both the search intensity of unemployed workers (the micro effect), and the aggregate job finding rate
per unit of search effort through vacancy posting decisions of the firms (the macro effect). They also find
a small micro effect.
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should compensate this agent in order to make her indifferent between being part of one of
these two economies. We find that piss = 0.18, which is smaller than the welfare gain with a
transition of 0.56. This result suggests sizeable welfare gains along the transition from the
economy under the acyclical policy to the economy under the optimal policy. We know from
our earlier analysis that the optimal policy reduces the precautionary saving motives, as
agents substitute away from self-insurance to public insurance for consumption-smoothing
purposes. As a result, agents decumulate savings and consume more of their labor income
along the transition path. This increase in consumption is enough to overcome any rise
in taxes brought about by the policy change, thus providing large welfare gains along the
transition.
Next, we decompose the steady state welfare gains of the optimal policy. In particular, un-
der a utilitarian equally weighted social welfare function as in Equation (2.15), the optimal
policy can increase steady state welfare for three reasons: (1) an increase in the average
consumption of the economy (the level effect), (2) a decline in the volatility of individual
consumption paths (the volatility effect), and (3) a decline in inequality across individual
consumption paths (the egalitarian effect). Following Floden (2001), the welfare gain from
the optimal policy under the steady state comparison can be decomposed approximately
into (1), (2), and (3):
piss = (1 + pilev) (1 + pivol) (1 + piegal)− 1. (2.16)
Comparing the average consumption level of economies under the optimal and benchmark
UI policies, we find that average consumption is 0.18 percent lower in the steady state of
the optimal policy, (i.e., pilev = −0.18). This is because once the economy converges to a
new steady state with lower wealth holdings and higher taxes, consumption levels decrease.
On the other hand, we find that the optimal policy significantly reduces the volatility of
average consumption and that there are sizeable welfare gains because of this channel.
On average, we find that pivol = 0.35, which implies that uncertainty gains overcome any
reduction in long-run consumption levels. This is again due to the endogenous response
of saving decisions to changes in UI policy over the business cycle. Recall from our Great
Recession exercise in the previous section that the government uses its UI program to
reduce the excessive precautionary saving behavior of workers by implementing a generous
UI during times when unemployment risk is large in order to bring the economy closer to the
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efficient allocation. Therefore, the impact of fluctuations in aggregate labor productivity
on the consumption path of individuals is lower under the optimal policy relative to that
under the benchmark policy. This smoother consumption profile over the business cycle
provides significant welfare gains. Finally, we find that piegal = 0.01, implying that there
are negligible welfare gains from the optimal policy due to equalizing the consumption
paths across heterogeneous agents. However, this result masks the two opposing effects
of the optimal policy on the inequality across individual consumption paths. On the one
hand, generous UI payments to the unemployed and higher income tax rates create more
equal consumption paths across heterogeneous agents and thus increase piegal. On the other
hand, the steady state asset distribution under the optimal policy is more unequal than
its counterpart under the benchmark policy. This is because while most of the individuals
in the economy under the optimal policy save less, the response of the agents in the top
percentiles of the distribution is very small. As a result, the Gini coefficient of the asset
distribution increases from 0.68 under the benchmark policy to 0.91 under the optimal
policy. This rise in the inequality of the steady-state wealth distribution in fact reduces
piegal, as it makes individual consumption paths across heterogeneous agents more unequal.
We find that these two opposing effects quantitatively cancel each other out, and thus on
average piegal is small.
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2.5.3 Heterogeneous welfare effects
While the previous section decomposes the average ex-ante welfare gains into various mech-
anisms at work in our model, it is also insightful in understanding which type of agents
stand to gain or lose from the optimal policy compared to the benchmark policy. In order
to measure the ex-post heterogeneous welfare gains/losses from the optimal UI policy, we
group agents by their employment status and asset level based on the stationary distribu-
tion. We then calculate p¯i from Equation (2.15) for each group by only integrating over
agents that belong to each group.
45The welfare decomposition exercise presented here can be modified to incorporate the effects of tran-
sition on pilev, piunc, and piegal. The reason why we decompose the welfare gains across two different steady
states is to isolate the long-run effects of the optimal policy as the policy change is permanent. However, we
also did this exercise with transition and find that the level gains in consumption from the optimal policy
are large because of the decline in savings along the transition.
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Table 2.5: Heterogeneous welfare impacts of optimal policy
Asset Groups
Employment a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
Worker 0.73 0.67 0.58 0.53 0.52
Unemployed Eligible 1.89 1.55 1.28 0.96 0.84
Unemployed Ineligible 0.61 0.58 0.55 0.50 0.51
Note: This table shows the heterogeneous welfare gains from the optimal policy on various type-groups, where
columns represent agents holding various levels of assets and rows represent agents of differing employment sta-
tuses. Welfare numbers are in percent lifetime equivalent consumption terms. Asset groups are a1 < p (10),
a2 ∈ [p (10) , p (25)), a3 ∈ [p (25) , p (50)), a4 ∈ [p (50) , p (75)), and a5 ≥ p (75), where percentiles are from the
stationary asset distribution. Gains are calculated relative to the benchmark policy.
Table 2.5 shows the heterogeneous welfare impacts of the optimal policy on various type-
groups, where columns represent agents holding various levels of assets (set to be the
different ranges in the asset distribution) and rows represent agents of differing employment
statuses.
It is clear that the unemployed eligible stand to gain the most from the optimal policy.
This result is unsurprising, since the unemployed eligible are the direct beneficiaries of more
generous payments and durations, and thus enjoy the largest consumption-smoothing gains.
Intuitively, among the unemployed eligible, poorer individuals also enjoy larger welfare
gains compared to their richer counterparts, given how each additional dollar of benefit
payment is more valuable to them.
Consistent with our earlier discussion, the unemployment eligible are not the sole beneficia-
ries of the optimal UI policy. Workers also enjoy a sizeable welfare gain, albeit to a smaller
degree, because of two opposing effects. On the one hand, workers maintain smoother con-
sumption over the business cycle given the weaker need to engage in precautionary savings
afforded to them by optimal UI benefits; on the other hand, they are the primary financers
of the optimal UI policy and would thus face higher taxes and lower consumption levels.
Nonetheless, the ability to maintain smoother consumption during economic fluctuations
dominates the financing effect. Note that if we had not accounted for this benefit, then we
would expect workers to experience welfare losses, as they would be paying taxes without
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enjoying the benefit of being able to smooth consumption over fluctuations in aggregate
labor productivity. Unsurprisingly, welfare gains are also much larger among poor workers
for whom savings (and the corresponding forgone consumption) is most costly.
Meanwhile, the unemployed ineligible only receive the generous UI payments in the event
that they find a job, lose it, and become eligible, which is a small probability. While they
do not contribute to financing the optimal UI policy, they incur costs because of lower
job-finding rates resulting from the generous UI payments. Having to spend longer weeks
without benefits and being forced to exert more effort in finding a job results in this group
experiencing the lowest gains from the optimal policy.
2.6 Robustness
2.6.1 Welfare under different specifications
In this section, we compute the welfare gains or losses from the optimal policy relative
to the benchmark policy under different specifications of the baseline model. In these
exercises, whenever a change in parametrization is necessary, the model is recalibrated to
match the moments found in Section 2.3 and tax rates are adjusted under each UI policy
so that the government budget constraint holds in equilibrium. The nature of the first
three exercises in this section requires us to simulate a recession in order to compute the
welfare gains. To preserve consistency within this section, we report the welfare gains of
the remaining specifications under a scenario in which a recession occurs initially as well.
The results are summarized in Table 2.6.
First, in order to quantify how welfare gains change depending on the timing of the policy
change, we evaluate the welfare gains from the optimal policy when the policy change is
introduced at the onset of a recession. This exercise follows the Great Recession simulation
discussed in Section 2.5.1 where an unanticipated UI policy change is implemented. The
only difference here is that for the first economy, the benchmark policy b is introduced at
t = 0, whereas in the alternate economy, the optimal UI policy is implemented.
We modify the welfare criterion in Section 2.4 slightly, as we now require a simulation-
based welfare calculation. Additional details regarding the computational procedure are
provided in Appendix B.3. We compute for p¯i in Equation (2.15) modified to account for
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the recession that occurs right at the same time the policy change is made and find that the
optimal policy increases ex-ante welfare by 1.25 percent additional lifetime consumption
relative to the benchmark policy. The welfare gains of the optimal policy are unsurprisingly
much higher when the policy is implemented right before a sharp drop in aggregate labor
productivity, since there is a frontloading of gains coming from large net insurance benefits
provided during the recession. At the onset of a recession, stronger precautionary motives
cause larger drops in consumption, and a larger pool of unemployed individuals experiences
the consumption drop upon job loss. This is in contrast to welfare gains of 0.58 when we
do not take a stance on the realizations of aggregate productivity.46
The second exercise we perform considers how welfare gains change if the policy were
temporary. While we study permanent changes in the UI benefit schedule, our framework
is also useful to assess the welfare effects of discretionary fiscal policies such as the one
implemented during the Great Recession. We now assume that the optimal policy is only
implemented during the period of the Great Recession, and it unexpectedly reverts back
to the acyclical policy f at the end of this period. This is to closely pattern the simulation
of the model to the events that occurred during the Great Recession where the EUC08
was completely terminated in December 2013 and UI policy returned to what it had been
prerecession. We find that the welfare gains from the optimal policy become 0.83 percent
additional lifetime consumption relative to the benchmark policy. The difference between
this value and welfare gains when the policy change is permanent (1.25 percent) reveals
that around 35 percent of the total welfare gains are attributable to the expectation of
generous UI payments during future economic downturns.
Third, we test the quantitative effects of assuming a time-invariant interest rate r on the
welfare gains from the optimal policy. In this exericse, we consider an interest rate that
varies with the state of the economy such that it is procyclical and closely mimics its data
counterpart during the Great Recession.47 Under this exercise, we find that the optimal
46Furthermore, when the government implements the optimal policy right before a boom, we find that it
increases ex-ante welfare by 0.23 percent additional lifetime consumption relative to the benchmark policy.
Given that the optimal policy raises welfare more when implemented right before a recessiom compared to
that of a boom provides strong evidence about the countercyclicality of insurance benefits net of incentive
costs.
47The weekly real interest rate reduces from its baseline value of 0.00095 to −0.0003 at the depth of the
Great Recession. This way, we are able to measure the quantitative effects of significant changes in the real
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Table 2.6: Welfare gains under different specifications
Exercise
Welfare gains (%)
from the optimal policy
Great Recession simulation 1.25
Temporary policy change 0.83
Procyclical interest rates 0.64
Endogenous quit decisions 1.10
Replacement rate φ = 0.4 0.77
UI eligibility requirements 0.94
Permanent discount factor 1.24
Note: This table shows welfare gains from the optimal policy under different specifications of the baseline model.
Welfare numbers are in percent lifetime equivalent consumption terms. Gains are calculated relative to the benchmark
policy under a labor productivity series that generates the observed unemployment rate time path during the Great
Recession.
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policy yields a welfare gain equivalent to 0.64 percent additional lifetime consumption
relative to the benchmark policy. The reason for the reduction in welfare gains from 1.25
percent to 0.64 percent is that the decline in the real interest rate reduces precautionary
saving motives during recessions, making agents’ consumption profiles relatively smoother
over the business cycle even under a less generous benchmark policy. This reduces the
welfare gains from the optimal policy. While the welfare gains under a recession are reduced
to half their original value, the countercyclical optimal policy still provides substantial
gains. Moreover, given that interest rate fluctuates drastically with the state of the economy
in this exercise, this result places an upper bound on the likely effects of endogenizing
interest rates.
Fourth, we address the feature of the baseline model where a matched worker receives the
same wage throughout her tenure within a firm. These fixed-wage contracts introduce “job
lock” since an unemployed individual who is desperate for work may land a low-paying
job during a recession but be unable to switch to a higher-paying job unless the match
exogenously dissolves. This feature of the model may be a source inefficiency that the op-
timal policy is trying to correct, since generous benefits during recessions can nudge agents
toward looking for higher-paying jobs. Hence, generous benefits during recessions not only
may be providing consumption insurance but also may serve as a means of convincing the
unemployed to look for jobs that will be paying higher even after the recession ends. In or-
der to understand whether the optimal UI policy is also correcting inefficiencies introduced
by the fixed-wage contract assumption of the baseline model, we solve for the welfare gains
of the optimal policy in an extended model that allows for endogenous quits.48 In this
extended model, workers can choose to quit their jobs in order to begin searching for a new
job. Under this setup, the artificial job lock problem is eliminated, as workers who place a
higher value on the option of becoming unemployed and looking for a higher-paying job can
actually leave their employer. The model details and a modified computational algorithm
can be found in Appendices B.4 and B.5, respectively. The welfare gains under the model
with endogenous quits is given by 1.10 percent when the optimal policy is implemented at
the onset of the Great Recession. Introducing endogenous quit decisions into the model has
interest rate.
48Without the fixed-wage contract assumption, solving for the optimal policy will be computationally
burdensome, as firms would now need to keep track of household decisions.
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a small effect because the option of quitting is not widely used by workers, given that the
value of becoming unemployed ineligible is very low. As a result, inefficiencies created by
fixed wage contracts in the baseline model have a small quantitative impact on the welfare
gains from the optimal policy.
The fifth robustness exercise considers the calibration of the replacement rate of the bench-
mark UI policy. Recall that our benchmark replacement rate of 14 percent takes into
account the effect of partial take-up among those eligible for benefits and adjusts for differ-
ences between wages and total compensation. To understand the effects of this adjustment,
we calculate the welfare gains from the optimal policy when the benchmark policy replace-
ment rate is set to 40 percent, (i.e., φ (p) = 0.4 ∀p), the (unadjusted) value calculated
by the Department of Labor. The goal of this exercise is to understand whether the
countercyclical optimal policy would still be welfare improving when compared to a new
benchmark policy that has a significantly higher but time-invariant level replacement rate.
We find that the optimal policy increases welfare by 0.77 percent relative to the new bench-
mark. This result implies that there are still sizeable welfare gains when the government
transfers funds from booms to recessions, as the insurance value of UI payments expands
and incentive costs contract during recessions. This also emphasizes that welfare gains
are not mostly driven by more generous benefits levels but by the introduction of cyclical
generosity.
The sixth exercise considers eligibility rules for workers at the moment of job loss. Ac-
cording to the UI program in the United States, workers have to satisfy some monetary
and nonmonetary requirements to be eligible for UI benefits.49 Under these requirements,
on average, around 75 percent of the workers are in fact eligible for UI benefits upon job
loss.50 When studying the optimal design of UI program, it will be interesting to consider
the welfare implications of treating these eligibility requirements as another policy instru-
ment. In our baseline setup, eligibility requirements upon job loss are controlled by the UI
expiration rate e. Thus, an extension of UI duration also implies a relaxation of UI eligi-
bility requirements for workers in our baseline model. In order to understand the effects
49For example, in terms of monetary requirements, workers must receive enough wages during the base
period to establish a claim. In terms of nonmonetary requirements, the reason for the workers’ job loss
must be through no fault of their own, and they must be actively looking for work while unemployed.
50See Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016).
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of this relationship, we change the problem of the worker in Equation (2.1) such that the
probability of being eligible upon job loss is fixed at 75 percent rather than controlled by
changes in e. We then evaluate the welfare gains from the optimal policy, and find that it
yields 0.94 percent additional lifetime consumption relative to the benchmark policy. Since
a lower fraction of workers are now eligible for UI benefits upon job loss relative to the
baseline model, the welfare gains from the optimal policy are slightly reduced under this
exercise.
Finally, we explore the implications of time-varying discount factors βt. The stochasticity of
discount factors introduces another idiosyncratic shock to households, and so one might be
concerned about the presence of an unintended role of UI payments as providing insurance
against the discount factor risk. In order to quantify this effect, we set discount factors to
be permanent and use an equally weighted social welfare function in computing the welfare
gains. We find that the optimal policy yields 1.24 percent additional lifetime consumption
relative to the benchmark policy, implying that the effect of time-varying discount factors
on welfare gains of the optimal policy is negligible. This result is expected given that
discount factors are calibrated to be highly persistent in our baseline calibration.
2.6.2 High level of opportunity cost of employment
We now explore the features of the optimal policy under a high level of opportunity cost
of employment calibration. In particular, we recalibrate our baseline economy so that the
model matches the same labor market and asset-to-income distribution moments as in our
baseline calibration, but the level of opportunity cost of employment is set to be 0.955, as
calibrated by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Next, we evaluate the welfare gains/losses
of the same set of linear policies and obtain the optimal policy for this case under the
welfare criterion in Section 2.4.
We find that the optimal policy is still countercyclical even under a high level of opportunity
cost of employment. Specifically, it features a 19 percent replacement rate for one quarter
when aggregate labor productivity is at its mean value, and a 59 percent replacement rate
for 4 quarters when aggregate labor productivity is depressed by 3.5 percent. Compared
to the U.S. government’s UI policy during the Great Recession (the benchmark policy),
this optimal policy increases welfare by 0.25 percent additional lifetime consumption for
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all agents. Relative to the optimal policy under the baseline calibration of opportunity
cost of employment, the optimal policy in this case offers a lower replacement rate for a
much shorter duration when labor productivity is at its mean, while the cyclicality of the
optimal policy remains roughly the same. This result is intuitive because when the value
of unemployment is close to the value of employment because of a high opportunity cost
of employment, the consumption drop upon job loss becomes less pronounced. Thus, the
government implements a low replacement rate for short durations under the mean level of
aggregate labor productivity. Moreover, consumption still fluctuates because of changes in
the saving behavior of agents as a response to fluctuations in aggregate labor productivity.
Hence, the government still finds it optimal to transfer funds from expansions to recessions.
However, the magnitude of these fluctuations in consumption is relatively smaller, as the
precautionary saving motives are not as strong under a high level of opportunity cost of
employment. For this reason, the welfare gains from the optimal policy in this case are less
than half of the welfare gains provided by the optimal policy under the baseline calibration
of opportunity cost of employment.
This exercise is also useful to compare our result to the findings of the previous literature.
As we discussed in Section 2.1, Mitman and Rabinovich (2015) also study the optimal
cyclicality of UI replacement rate and duration in an equilibrium search model in which
agents are not allowed to save/borrow. In their baseline calibration, the summation of
UI benefits b and the value of nonmarket activity h is equal to 0.984, implying that the
flow opportunity cost of employment is high. In this setup, they find that the optimal UI
policy is procyclical. Then, in Section 5.4 of their paper, they discuss the implications of
relaxing the no saving/borrowing assumption on their results. In this discussion, they also
acknowledge that when agents are allowed to save/borrow, fluctuations in agents’ wealth
holdings over the business cycle may create a force that has a potential to reverse the
cyclicality of their optimal UI policy. In our model, we allow agents to save/borrow through
incomplete asset markets and indeed show that this channel is strong enough to rationalize
the countercyclicality of the optimal policy even under a high level of opportunity cost of
employment.
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2.7 Evidence on the Mechanism: A First Pass
In this section, we empirically test the interaction between UI generosity and savings
decisions in order to check whether our main mechanism is also observed in the micro
data. This exercise builds on Engen and Gruber (2001), who find that UI benefits tend
to crowd out individual savings.51 We focus on the Great Recession period to understand
the impact of drastic changes in UI policy on the saving decisions of individuals. Using
the SIPP panel 2008 core data, we obtain household employment, labor income, and state
of residence information. Wealth data are once again obtained from the topical data of
the same panel, which is typically released on a yearly basis as opposed to the monthly
frequency of the core data. State-level UI duration data during the Great Recession consist
of maximum potential duration by adding up standard weeks, Extended Benefits (EB), and
EUC tiers 1-4 (when applicable).52 Meanwhile, the state-level replacement rate is defined
as either (1) the weighted average of the ratio of the weekly benefit amount and average
claimants’ wage or (2) the ratio of the weighted average of the weekly benefit amount and
the weighted average of claimants’ wage.53 To obtain the expected benefit receipt of a
worker, we compute the average weekly wage of the respondent for one quarter prior to the
wealth observation and multiply it by the replacement rate offered by her state of residence
during that time.
Our sample includes workers ages 24 to 65 who report not owning any business in part
or in full and has worked for at least one quarter prior to the first observation and are
always working in between observations. This more or less guarantees eligibility for UI
if the observed worker is displaced in the future. Moreover, focusing only on employed
individuals between observations eliminates other reasons for changes in asset holdings,
such as experiencing unemployment. We organize the data into person-time information
(where t = {2009, 2010}) and run the following regression:
ait = γbenbenefitit + γdurdurst + βXit + αi + αs + αt + ist
51While Engen and Gruber (2001) study the effect of the UI replacement rate on saving decisions, we
also include time- and state-varying UI duration in order to account for the effect of expected length of UI
receipts on wealth for the period of the Great Recession.
52We thank A. Yusuf Mercan for kindly sharing this dataset with us.
53See https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/ui replacement rates.asp for more details.
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where ait is the asset-to-income ratio of individual i at time t, benefitit is the expected
weekly benefit receipt of individual i at time t, durst is the maximum potential duration of
UI in state s during time time t, Xit is a set of controls which include education, martial
status, and age, and αj∈{i,s,t} are individual, time, and state fixed effects.54 The coefficients
of interest are the impact of the unemployment benefit level and duration on the asset-
to-income ratio given by γben and γdur. Note that a selection problem arises if there is a
systematic movement of a certain type of worker to states with high levels of UI generosity.
In order to control for this, we also expand the original regression to control for individuals
moving from one state to another.
Given that isolating the causal effect of benefit generosity on self-insurance is beyond the
scope of this exercise because of endogeneity, our intention is simply to provide correlational
evidence on this relationship. Table 2.7 shows that expected benefit receipt has a negative
and statistically significant impact on self-insurance. While the length of UI duration
has a negative coefficient, it is not statistically significant. For example, γben = −.0135
implies that a $100 increase in the expected benefit amount received each week should
unemployment occur results in a decrease in the asset-to-income ratio that is equivalent to
1.35 weeks’ worth of insurance. Alternatively, this would also imply a reduction in savings
by around $1124 for a worker earning the median weekly wage of $833. This relationship
is consistent with the crowding-out effect of UI on precautionary savings documented by
Engen and Gruber (2001). This result lends evidentiary support to the idea that the
insurance benefits of a generous UI policy during recessions are partially attributable to
the relief UI benefits provide workers who no longer need to experience sudden drops in
consumption in order to build a buffer stock of savings. Results in the second and fourth
columns also indicate that the issue of selection caused by state-to-state moves is not
consequential. Finally, comparing the first two columns with the last two reveals that the
relationship is robust to the manner by which replacement rates are calculated.
Motivated by the above empirical evidence, we revisit our welfare analysis in the model
to understand if the replacement rate is a more important instrument in providing welfare
gains relative to the UI duration. We find that a UI policy that consists of an optimal
54Notice that benefitit is affected by the replacement rate offered by the state s that individual i resides
in during time t.
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Table 2.7: Regression results
Benefit Calculation 1 Benefit Calculation 2
(1) (2) (1) (2)
benefit
−.0135*** −.0135*** −.0153*** −.0153***
(.0010) (.0010) (.0012) (.0012)
dur
−.0122 −.0123 −.0119 −.0119
(.0164) (.0164) (.0164) (.0164)
moving
−.0924 −.0933
(.2255) (.2254)
individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
state fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
observations 33, 012 33, 012 33, 012 33, 012
Note: The dependent variable is the asset-to-income ratio of individuals. “Benefit Calculation 1” uses a replacement
ratio calculated as the weighted average of the following ratio: weekly benefit amount (WBA) / weekly wage. “Benefit
Calculation 2” uses a replacement rate ratio calculated as the ratio of the weighted average of WBA and the weighted
average of the weekly wage. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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replacement rate but a UI duration of the benchmark policy, together with the tax rate
that balances the government’s budget constraint for this hybrid policy, yields an average
welfare gain that is equivalent to 0.46 percent additional lifetime consumption relative to
the benchmark policy. This implies that around 80 percent of the welfare gains from the
optimal policy are attributable to the optimality of the UI replacement rate, and the re-
maining 20 percent of the gains come from the optimality of UI duration. This is consistent
with the above empirical result that the changes in replacement rates significantly affect
the self-insurance decisions of individuals.
2.8 Conclusion
We study optimal UI over the business cycle using a tractable heterogeneous agent job
search model that features labor productivity driven business cycles and incomplete asset
markets. We find that the optimal UI policy is countercyclical. In particular, when ag-
gregate labor productivity is at its mean, it features a 30 percent replacement rate for 4
quarters, but when aggregate labor productivity is depressed by 3.5 percent, it offers more
generous benefits of a 54 percent replacement rate for a duration of 10 quarters financed
by higher labor income taxes. Compared to a UI policy that mimics the policy imple-
mented during the Great Recession by the United States government, the optimal policy
represents an average welfare increase of 0.58 percent additional lifetime consumption. We
show that incorporating the response of individual saving behavior to changes in UI policy
is quantitatively important in measuring the welfare benefits and costs of UI policy.
Insurance benefits are larger in recessions relative to expansions, while incentive costs
exhibit the opposite pattern. Insurance benefits expand during recessions because (1)
consumption insurance upon job loss is provided for a larger pool of unemployed and long
jobless spells, and (2) it attenuates the need to engage in precautionary savings by cutting
back on consumption at the onset of a recession. Meanwhile, incentive costs are also
relatively smaller in recessions because (1) jobs are difficult to find and forgone search is
not as worthwhile, and (2) borrowing constraints impose discipline on individual job search
behavior because of a wealth effect. As a result, the optimal policy is countercyclical.
A quantitative decomposition of ex-ante welfare gains reveals that in the long run, the
optimal policy provides a substantial reduction in consumption uncertainty at the cost of
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lower consumption levels. Along the transition, however, large consumption level gains are
enjoyed by agents as they decumulate savings in response to more generous public insurance
during recessions. Meanwhile, gains from reduced inequality and lower search effort are
present but limited. In addition, ex-post welfare gains are shown to be heterogeneous
across different types of agents. The unemployed eligible gain the most, but the employed
remarkably enjoy large gains as well because of the reduced precautionary motives during
recessions. Unsurprisingly, gains are largest for the poor across all employment types.
Our contribution to the existing literature lies in carefully accounting for the welfare effects
of endogenous interaction between savings and UI policy over the business cycle. The
natural extension of our analysis is to analyze how other sources of private insurance
(such as family labor supply) react to changes in UI policy and how this interaction would
affect the optimal policy. Another avenue for future research is to incorporate capital
accumulation in order to account for the effect of government programs on aggregate capital
stock. However, given the complexity of our current model, we leave these extensions to
future work.
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Figure 2.6: Average consumption over the business cycle
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Note: Panel A plots the percent deviation of average consumption’s trend during the Great Recession from its
steady-state level at the start of this period under the acyclical and optimal UI policies. Panels B and C repeat
this exercise for poor and rich agents. “Poor” refers to agents who enter unemployment with an asset-to-income
ratio below the 75th percentile of the stationary asset-to-income distribution, while “Rich” refers to those above the
threshold.
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Figure 2.7: Average assets upon job loss over the business cycle
Note: Panel A plots the trend of average asset holdings of the unemployed during the first week of entering un-
employment over the Great Recession under the acyclical and optimal UI policies. Panel B shows the evolution of
various percentiles of the asset distribution over the Great Recession under these two policies.
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Figure 2.8: Incentive costs of the optimal policy
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Note: Panel A shows the average job finding rates during the Great Recession under the acyclical and optimal UI
policies. Panel B plots the unemployment survival function under these two policies, which shows the probability
that an unemployment spell will last beyond t months.
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Figure 2.9: Value of job search
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Note: Panel A shows the consumption value of job search across different levels of asset holdings in recessions and
booms. Panel B plots the average consumption value of job search during the Great Recession for unemployed eligible
and ineligible.
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Chapter 3
What Do Survey Data Tell Us
about U.S. Businesses?
3.1 Introduction
Representative surveys of households and firms have become an important source of data
on business owners and their activities, and are now used extensively in studies of wealth
inequality and entrepreneurial choice. This paper examines the reliability of these data
for research on U.S. businesses, including pass-through entities and subchapter C corpo-
rations.1 Pass-through businesses account for roughly half of business net income in the
United States and have been a focus of recent tax reforms and debates about income
inequality.2 Subchapter C corporations account for the remaining half and include all
publicly traded firms. We document issues arising from nonrepresentative samples and
measurement errors in survey data and discuss the implications of the errors for economic
research.
1For tax purposes, pass-through entities classify themselves as sole proprietorships, S corporations, or
partnerships. They are called “pass-through” because the income earned by such businesses is taxed under
the owners’ individual income tax. In contrast, C corporations pay corporate taxes on income earned, and
individual shareholders pay dividend or capital gains taxes when profits are distributed.
2Smith et al. (2017) use tax audit data to conclude that rising business income accounts for all of the
growth in the top 1 percent income share since 2000. Furthermore, the majority of rising top business
income resulted from rising income of pass-through businesses.
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We start by examining the reliability of measures of business incomes, receipts, and val-
uations in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which is a publicly
available and widely used triennial cross-sectional survey of U.S. households. Households
with actively managed businesses are asked to report business receipts and net income
from specific lines on their tax forms.3 This aspect of the survey design makes it easy for
us to compare the household responses with administrative data from the IRS Statistics
of Income (SOI).4 Averaging across survey years, we find that the SCF overstates pass-
through business income per tax return by 400 percent and business receipts per return by
169 percent. For C corporations, net income and receipts are on average understated in
the SCF by 26 and 21 percent, respectively, but the SCF does not include publicly traded
corporations, whereas the IRS does. Since publicly traded corporations have much higher
receipts and net incomes per tax return than private corporations, including them would
result in a significant overstatement for all business entities.
The overstatement of incomes and receipts in the SCF varies in the cross section and year
by year, making it difficult, if not impossible, to systematically correct for the errors. To
demonstrate this, we provide evidence of both sampling and measurement errors. Sam-
pling errors arise from an understatement or overstatement of the reported number of tax
returns in the SCF relative to the IRS. We find that the SCF significantly understates
the number of sole proprietorships, S corporations, and C corporations and significantly
overstates the number of partnerships, with the degree of under- or overstatement varying
across the income distribution. Looking at data in the cross section, our findings suggest
a significant underrepresentation of low-income businesses driving the overstatement of
business incomes. This may be attributable to measurement error resulting from how the
questions are framed. For example, there are many IRS businesses with net losses but few
in the SCF, possibly because the respondents answered that they had no net income rather
3Sole proprietors are asked to report business gross receipts and net income from Form 1040 Schedule
C (lines 1 and 31), shareholders of partnerships from Form 1065 (lines 1c and 22), shareholders of S
corporations from Form 1120S (lines 1c and 21), and shareholders of C corporations from Form 1120 (lines
1c and 30).
4The IRS compiles the SOI based on stratified probability samples of income tax returns and other forms.
We use information from the SOI Corporation Income Tax Returns, Individual Income Tax Returns, and
Partnership Returns that are available in the historical data tables from www.irs.gov/statistics.
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than a negative net income. Another measurement issue we document is that the frequency
of referencing supporting documents is strikingly low. For example, if we condition on all
business owners in the SCF, we find that 75 percent never referenced any tax document.
The SCF survey has also been used extensively to study the level and dispersion of busi-
ness wealth. Households with actively managed businesses are asked to assess the value
of their business, net of all loans, if they were to sell it. Since there are no measures
of total valuations for ongoing businesses other than publicly traded C corporations, we
construct net income-to-value ratios in the SCF and compare them to available income
yields from brokered private business sales recorded by Pratt’s Stats and publicly traded
companies, both small and large, recorded by the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) (merged with Compustat). For virtually all subsamples and all years, the SCF
income yields are significantly higher than comparable measures from the other datasets.
The overstatement in yields is even greater than for incomes, which is suggestive of an un-
derstatement in business valuations. For example, the SCF average value-weighted income
yield is 19 percent, much higher than the Pratt’s Stats estimates of 2 percent or the CRSP
estimates of 7 percent for all businesses, and −9 percent for those in the bottom quintile
when firms are ranked by total assets. We also find that the SCF distributions are more
right-skewed than those based on Pratt’s Stats or CRSP-Compustat data.
For unincorporated businesses, we can compare the SCF estimates of business incomes
per owner and, if available, income yields to those of three other widely used surveys:
the Current Population Survey (CPS), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).5 We show that all four surveys
overstate incomes per owner relative to the IRS data, but by differing amounts. Averaging
across survey years, business income per owner for unincorporated businesses is overes-
timated by 586 percent in the SCF, 179 percent in the CPS, 185 percent in the PSID,
and 34 percent in the SIPP. Average value-weighted income yields calculated for the PSID
and SIPP are high relative to Pratt’s Stats and CRSP data in all cases but are not very
different from those in the SCF. The main differences in yields across surveys are found
5We also compare the SCF results to the results of Gurley-Calvez et al. (2016), who match responses
of new businesses in the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) with IRS tax data and find that these firms under-
state business incomes. For some other surveys of businesses, such as the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial
Dynamics (PSED), we find the response rates of business-related questions to be too low to be reliable.
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when we compare the distributional statistics.
An overstatement of business incomes in the survey data relative to the IRS could be the
result of misreporting in the IRS or miscategorization of incomes by survey respondents.
To check misreporting, we use auxiliary tax audit data to adjust the IRS data but still find
a significant mismatch with the survey data. For example, for pass-through businesses, the
SCF overstates the average income per return by 178 percent relative to the tax audit data.
To check miscategorizations, we use a broader definition of business income. For exam-
ple, business owners might confuse business incomes on Schedule C, E, and F, overstating
one category and understating another. When we combine these categories into a broader
concept of business income, we still find incomes to be significantly overstated. Respon-
dents are not miscategorizing the incomes but rather are often overstating all categories of
business income. Other adjustments, such as correcting for within-survey inconsistencies
regarding business ownership and income and correcting for the fact that the survey only
includes individual owners, do not alleviate the measurement issues.
The inconsistencies across surveys and the conceptual measurement issues that we high-
light suggest that the “facts” about business income and wealth based on current survey
data should be treated with caution. Measurement problems related to business incomes
are surmountable given that respondents are asked about specific lines on the tax forms.
Measurement problems related to business valuations and returns may be insurmount-
able without data on actual business sales transactions. First, it is difficult for owners
to estimate business valuations when one considers that businesses are heavily invested
in intangible assets.6 Second, survey business owners answer questions separately about
income and valuations. For example, if the net incomes derive from both capital and labor
inputs, while the business valuations are based on fixed assets owned by the business, then
the estimated income yields from surveys may not be comparable across owners who in-
terpret the question differently. Interpreting survey-based measures of business returns or
valuations requires a consistent framework for true returns, stocks, and valuations. Given
current measurement issues, such interpretations may not be possible.
6McGrattan and Prescott (2010a,b) and Bhandari and McGrattan (2018) both find estimates of the
value for intangible assets to be close to estimates of tangible assets used by businesses. Intangible assets
come in the form of research and development, software, advertising, brands, and investments in customer
lists, goodwill, and other forms of investments in building organizations.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the related literature and the im-
plications of our findings for theoretical and applied research on businesses. In Section 3.3,
we document that business incomes and receipts measured from the SCF survey data are
largely inconsistent, and we discuss problems regarding nonrepresentativeness and mea-
surement errors. Section 3.4 studies business valuations and rates of return. Section 3.5
presents robustness checks. Section 3.6 compares the SCF results with other widely used
surveys. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
Our findings have implications for three active areas of economic research. The first area is
the empirical literature that documents levels and trends in the dispersion of income and
wealth and emphasizes the role of entrepreneurs in wealth accumulation. The second area,
which is motivated by and builds upon the first, is the theoretical literature developing
models of entrepreneurial choice, which are specifically designed to fit the “stylized facts”
of the empirical literature. The third area includes quantitative policy analyses that use
the empirical findings and theoretical developments of the first two literatures as their
laboratory for the study of counterfactual policies. Our findings cast doubt on the facts
that have been uncovered in the empirical literature—specifically documenting that survey
data are unreliable for business-related statistics—and thus raise issues concerning the
theoretical developments and policy analyses that have been designed around them.
A large and burgeoning empirical literature documents trends in income and wealth and
has been particularly focused on increased dispersion over time. Greater dispersion is
attributed to top earners, and therefore researchers work primarily with survey data from
the SCF or administrative tax data from the IRS. For example, Kuhn and Rios-Rull (2016)
provide a nearly exhaustive summary of distributional facts about U.S. earnings, income,
and wealth based on the SCF. A starting point for several papers in this literature is the
observation that, for broad income categories, aggregated SCF responses match up well to
the aggregated IRS data. In Figure 3.1, we replicate the time series plot for adjusted gross
income (AGI) from the SCF and plot it against the corresponding data from the IRS. We
see that the SCF tracks the level and cyclical trends for AGI in the IRS.
Our focus is on measures that relate to business activity. Of particular relevance are the
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findings in Kuhn and Rios-Rull (2016) that business income is one of the main contributors
to income inequality and that business equity is one of the main contributors to wealth
inequality, which they document for the history of the SCF surveys between 1989 and 2013.
Bricker et al. (2016) also use the SCF to document the rise of the top share of wealth
holdings over time and find that the share of wealth attributable to the top 1 percent
rose from 30 percent in 1992 to 36 percent in 2013. Our paper exploits the fact that SCF
answers can be compared to administrative data from the IRS and finds that respondents
are not reliably or consistently answering questions about their business income or business
equity, and therefore we cannot trust the SCF distributions.
Given issues with measuring business incomes, researchers might be tempted to combine
all nonwage income into a residual “capital income” category, since SCF aggregates match
up well with aggregated IRS data. Here, we argue that this capital income measure would
not be appropriate for either research on U.S. businesses or research on U.S. capital. For
research on businesses, the residual income measure would be inappropriate because sig-
nificant nonbusiness income is included with interest payments, capital gains, pensions and
annuities, alimony, trusts, and government transfers. Furthermore, as we noted earlier,
there is evidence that owners are not miscategorizing income categories, and therefore us-
ing broader categories of income would do little to ameliorate the measurement issues.
For research on capital, the nonwage income in AGI would be inappropriate because a
significant fraction of capital income is untaxed and the corresponding assets are held by
fiduciaries. Furthermore, as we show later, the majority of respondents do not reference
financial documents, making it nearly impossible to have reliable estimates of their total
capital income or wealth.
Saez and Zucman (2016) document trends in wealth dispersion by capitalizing incomes
from administrative tax data. They compare their results to the SCF and find similar
levels and trends for wealth in the top 10 percent of the distribution but differences for
the top 1 percent.7 The Saez and Zucman (2016) capitalization method is inappropriate
for estimating wealth in business for several reasons. First, there is no way to validate
the procedure except by comparing to survey data, which we find are unreliable. Second,
7They also compare results to estate taxes and foundation records, but these data are not informative
about most businesses in the United States.
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the U.S. flow of funds aggregates used to compute capitalization factors include ad hoc
imputations made by the Federal Reserve for private businesses.8 Third, the assumption
that returns are the same for everyone and constant over time is hard to reconcile with
the fact that there is significant entry into and exit out of business (see Bhandari and
McGrattan (2018)).
Because of the problems with data from the SCF and the capitalized IRS incomes, the
main message of our findings for the theoretical literature is a cautionary one, namely,
that these data tell us little about business valuations or returns, and therefore theorists
should not insist on models that replicate “stylized facts,” which are not actually facts.
The most popular stylized facts are that entrepreneurs, as a group, own a substantial share
of household wealth and income, with shares increasing throughout the distribution, and
that entrepreneurs have high savings rates relative to the population, implying much more
dispersion in wealth than in income (see De Nardi, Doctor, and Karen (2007) and Gentry
and Hubbard (2004)). These findings have led researchers to model entrepreneurs as over-
coming significant market frictions to run highly risky businesses with the expectation of
earning high returns and amassing significant wealth (see, for example, Quadrini (2000),
Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), and Buera (2009)). Furthermore, the theoretical frameworks
parameterized to match the survey data have been used as a laboratory for policy work,
especially when considering tax policy reform (see, for example, Meh (2005), Kitao (2008),
Bohacek and Zubricky (2012), and Scheuer (2013)). Our results cast doubt on the sur-
vey data underlying the models of financial frictions and, hence, the subsequent policy
recommendations.
Our paper is also related to a second strand of the empirical literature, which reaches
8For example, when constructing capitalization factors, Saez and Zucman (2016) use aggregate flow
of funds wealth measures for closely held corporations (both subchapter C and S) and unincorporated
businesses. These businesses are not publicly traded and thus have no market valuations. The Federal
Reserve imputes market values for closely held corporations by taking a ratio of market value to revenues
for publicly traded companies and then applying that ratio to private businesses with similar industry,
employment, and revenue profiles—after arbitrarily adjusting the estimate downward by 25 percent to
reflect the lack of liquidity of closely held shares. Valuations for unincorporated businesses are based
on balance sheet data reported to the IRS, which are historical-cost accounting measures, not market
valuations.
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different conclusions about the payoffs to entrepreneurial activity.9 Hamilton (2000) uses
survey data from the 1984 SIPP and finds that self-employed individuals—who could be
running an incorporated or unincorporated business—have lower median earnings than
similar individuals in paid employment. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) extend
his analysis and work with SCF data, allowing for a more comprehensive treatment of equity
returns and including adjustments for firm entry and exit. They find that returns to private
businesses are no higher than returns to publicly traded firms and thus puzzlingly low given
the risks entrepreneurs face.10 Using PSED data, Hurst and Pugsley (2011) report that
more than 50 percent of new business owners cite flexible hours and being one’s own boss
as the primary reason for starting their own business. These findings have led researchers
to conclude that the nonpecuniary benefits of self-employment play an important role in
occupational choice.
We document that survey data overstate business incomes, and the overstatement leads
to income yields for private businesses that are significantly higher than those for publicly
traded companies. In other words, we find that the private returns computed with survey
data are puzzlingly high, not puzzlingly low. When comparing our results to Moskowitz
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), we find that the main difference is the concept of return:
they add an imputation for capital gains that drive their results. Regrettably, neither
the income yield nor the capital gain imputation are reliable estimates, leaving us with
little to say about whether private returns are low or high relative to public returns. This
finding is relevant for policy discussions related to business taxation and subsidization.
For example, Hurst and Pugsley (2017) followed up on the work of Hamilton (2000) and
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) by incorporating nonpecuniary benefits in a model
of entrepreneurship and then analyzed the impact of small business subsidies. Our results
cast doubt on SIPP and SCF survey data and hence on policy recommendations that arise
9Later, we document inconsistencies across surveys and across time that could lead to different empirical
insights.
10Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) used samples over the period 1989–1998. Kartashova (2014)
extended their analysis to 2010 and documented that for the longer sample, the private equity premium is
about 6 percent as compared to about 0 percent in the shorter sample. Since the difference in means is
swamped by the variability of the CRSP index returns, which has a standard deviation of 20 percent over
the period 1988–2015, we would argue that their estimated private returns are not significantly different.
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from frameworks that incorporate nonpecuniary benefits of business entrepreneurs.
3.3 Business Incomes
In this section, we compare SCF pretax business incomes that correspond to specific lines
on U.S. tax forms with incomes reported to the IRS. We first document that the SCF
responses—both in the aggregate and across the distribution—are statistically different
and argue that the magnitudes of the differences are economically important. We then
explore reasons for the mismatch.11
3.3.1 Aggregates
We start with aggregated business incomes and show that, while the SCF does well in
matching the IRS total AGI (as shown in Figure 3.1), there are large discrepancies between
the survey and tax data for businesses. For pass-through businesses, business income per
return is significantly and consistently overstated in the SCF relative to the IRS. For
C corporations, the average per-return business income in the SCF is not very different
from the IRS but should be much smaller given that the survey excludes publicly traded
companies.
To demonstrate that there is a significant discrepancy between SCF and IRS data, we
start by defining business income as gross receipts from sales minus expenses (including
depreciation) incurred in running the business. Information on business incomes is obtained
from the respective business tax forms: Form 1040, Schedule C (line 31) for sole proprietors,
Form 1065 (line 22) for partnerships, Form 1120S (line 21) for S corporations, and Form
1120 (line 30) for C corporations. In each survey year, we use the SCF sampling weights
and ownership information to compute the aggregate business income and the aggregate
number of business tax returns by legal form of the business.
Figure 3.2 plots aggregated business income divided by the number of business tax returns
using the SCF and the data actually reported to the IRS for tax years between 1988
11In Appendix C, cited henceforth as Bhandari, et al. (2019), we provide a comprehensive collection of
statistics for all survey years and subsamples.
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and 2015.12 All data are reported in thousands of current dollars. The shaded region
in Figure 3.2 shows the 90 percent confidence interval of the average per-return business
incomes.13 Panel A of Figure 3.2 shows the results for sole proprietorships. For this
group, average incomes reported in the IRS are about $8,000 per return in 1988 and rise
gradually to $12,000 per return by 2015. Average incomes per return reported in the SCF
are significantly higher, rising from $32,000 in 1988 to $40,000 by 2015, and display large
year-to-year variation. If we construct a percentage error (that is, 100(SCF−IRS)/IRS)
in each year, we find the average error is 289 percent and ranges from 158 percent to 384
percent across all years. We see a similar result in Panel B, which shows the data for S
corporations. The SCF S-corporation incomes per return are significantly higher than the
IRS analogues for the entire sample period. The errors in this case average 273 percent
and range from 142 percent to 387 percent.
In the case of partnerships, a sampling issue implies that the discrepancy between the
SCF and IRS income could be even larger than that shown in Panel C of Figure 3.2. The
SCF only surveys owners of partnerships who are individuals, whereas the IRS includes
information on partnerships owned by individuals and other legal entities such as corpora-
tions.14 The exclusion of corporate partners in the SCF should lead to an understatement
of aggregate business income but, in principle, should not affect the business income per
12In the SCF, we assume that a business owner who owns multiple sole proprietorships files one return.
This assumption is made to be consistent with IRS statistics that state: “For purposes of the statistics,
if a proprietor owned more than one business, the statistics for each business were combined with those
of the proprietor’s dominant business and included in the industrial group for that business activity” (see
Dungan (2017, p. 2)). For partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations, we calculate the number of
returns taking into account the ownership share of the family from each reported business.
13Standard errors are computed using a bootstrap method. For each survey year, the SCF provides a
set of 1,000 replicate weights. We use these weights to compute 1,000 values for the relevant statistic, for
example, business income per return, and then we compute the confidence intervals using the 5th and 95th
percentiles of these 1,000 draws.
14For the year 2011, Cooper et al. (2016) estimate that 32 percent of total business income from part-
nerships is generated by individual partners, who account for 73 percent of all partners.
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return.15 However, we find that both aggregate income and per-return income are over-
stated for partnerships. Aggregate business income from partnerships in the SCF is higher
than the IRS by 305 percent on average, with the range of errors between 52 percent and
889 percent across survey years. Per-return income is also overstated by 300 percent on
average, with errors between 31 percent and 837 percent, as shown in Panel C of Figure
3.2.
If we include all pass-through businesses in one category (using data in Panels A through
C of Figure 3.2), we find that the SCF error is 400 percent on average and ranges from 230
percent to 568 percent for business income per return. Contrast this with business incomes
per return for C corporations, shown in Panel D of Figure 3.2. For these businesses, we find
that in most years, the average SCF business income per return is actually understated by
about 26 percent as compared to the IRS data. However, the IRS data include publicly
traded corporations, whereas the SCF data do not. Publicly traded C corporations are
typically much larger than their private counterparts. If we could include the incomes
from these publicly traded corporations with the SCF estimates, we would find that the
SCF total incomes would be significantly higher than the IRS estimates, as is the case
for the pass-through businesses. Despite these measurement issues, we compare business
incomes of C corporations in the SCF with the IRS and interpret the results with the
understanding that the SCF will underrepresent large businesses.
While incomes per return are overstated in the SCF relative to the IRS, the number of
returns filed by businesses are significantly understated for sole proprietors and corporations
in all years. Figure 3.3 plots the number of business returns filed as reported by the IRS
and the SCF, over time and by legal entity, with shading marking the 90 percent confidence
interval. In the case of sole proprietors and S corporations shown in Panels A and B, the
understatement has worsened over time as the number of IRS filings has grown and the
number reported in the SCF has not. In Panel C, we see that the number of partnership
returns in the SCF is undercounted in only a few years and not by as much as in the case
of the other business types. However, as mentioned before, the SCF data only include
partners who are individuals, implying that the SCF significantly overstates the number
15Here, we are operating under the assumption that the SCF is representative and partnerships with
all corporate partners (which are entirely missed by the SCF) either are small in terms of their share of
aggregate business income or else are not systematically different from the rest of the partnerships.
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of returns for partnerships owned by individuals. The number of C-corporate returns is
shown in Panel D of Figure 3.3. In this case, part of the difference between the IRS and
SCF results is the exclusion of publicly traded companies in the SCF, but these businesses
only account for about 5,000 out of the roughly 1.6 million C corporations and therefore
cannot account for the large understatement of returns shown in the figure.
One possible reason for understated returns is that the SCF data may not include owners
that earn very little business income (for example, part-time Uber drivers or AER referees),
while the IRS includes all business tax filers. If this were indeed the case, then the aggregate
business incomes—found by multiplying values in Figure 3.3 by values in Figure 3.2—would
be similar for the IRS and SCF. We find that this is not the case: aggregate business
incomes are significantly overstated in the SCF. For example, in the case of pass-through
businesses, we find average overstatements of 34, 137, and 305 percent for sole proprietors,
S corporations, and partnerships, respectively, with a large range in the errors over time.
(See Bhandari et al. (2019) for details.) The large overstatement of aggregate incomes,
especially in S corporations and partnerships, is clearly inconsistent with the hypothesis
that nonactive business owners explain the differences between the SCF and IRS results.
Finally, we extend the analysis to business receipts and again find large and variable errors
in the SCF responses when compared to the IRS counterparts. (Full details are provided
in Bhandari et al. (2019).) For example, in the case of pass-through businesses, we find
that the average error in business receipts per return over the period 1988–2015 is 169
percent, with errors over the period in the range of 89 percent to 367 percent. Thus, our
main finding is an overstatement of aggregated business incomes and receipts in the SCF
across all legal forms, with large variation in the discrepancies across survey years.
3.3.2 Distributions
Next, we show that the overstatement of business income per return documented in the
previous section varies in the cross section and year by year, making it impossible to
systematically correct the SCF responses. The discrepancies between the SCF and IRS
statistics are so large and variable as to make the cross-sectional moments based on the
survey data unusable for applied work.
To demonstrate this, we compute percentage errors by grouping businesses in two different
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ways. First, we group those with positive business income (profits) separately from those
with negative business income (losses). For pass-through businesses, the SCF overstates
business income per return for those that have profits by 277 percent on average, with the
year by year errors in the range of 151 percent to 446 percent. The SCF understates the
business income per return for those that have losses by about 82 percent, with the errors
in the range of 66 percent to 94 percent. Both the overstatement of profits and the under-
statement of losses affect the errors in cross-sectional statistics in quantitatively important
ways. We demonstrate this in Table 3.1 for pass-through businesses by decomposing the
percentage errors in the aggregate business income into the fraction that arises due to
overstatement of profits and the fraction that arises due to understatement of losses. For
example, in tax year 1988, the overstatement of profits and understatement of losses each
account for about 50 percent of the aggregate error. In subsequent years, these fractions
vary but are nontrivial in both the overstatement of profits and understatement of losses.
(See Bhandari et al. (2019) for results across all legal forms and survey years.)
A second method of grouping businesses is by ranking them according to total income of
the owners. Here, we do this in the case of sole proprietorships since we have comparable
IRS data in all SCF survey years. (See Bhandari et al. (2019) for a more limited analysis
of S corporations.) Specifically, we rank sole proprietors in the SCF by their AGI and then
assign them to income brackets using the same bins as the IRS. In Figure 3.4, we plot the
fractions of business income for owners with below-median AGI and for those with AGIs
in the top 1st percentile. For most years, the SCF income shares for these two groups
are understated and display large year by year variation. For example, the share for those
with below-median AGI is nearly doubled or halved from one survey to the next. Since
the fractions sum to 100 percent across all AGI groups, the SCF must necessarily overstate
incomes for some bins. We find the largest overstatement of shares for those with AGIs
between the 50th and 75th percentile.
In Figure 3.5, we see that the overstatement of business income per return in the SCF data
also varies a lot across years and across AGI bins, with no systematic pattern. The panels
of this figure can be compared to the aggregate data for sole proprietorships in Panel A of
Figure 3.2. In contrast, the incomes per return in the IRS data show little variation over
time and vary similarly across AGI bins.
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3.3.3 Nonrepresentativeness and measurement error
We now investigate the reasons behind the discrepancies in business incomes between the
SCF and IRS and provide evidence for two types of errors in the SCF: nonrepresentativeness
of business owners and misreporting of business income by business owners. The evidence
of both types of errors again demonstrates that there is no easy correction for the survey
data.
To fix ideas, we decompose the difference between a survey aggregate, XS , and an IRS
aggregate, XI , for some measure into three terms as follows:
XS −XI =
(∑
i(ω
S
i − ωIi )∑
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where sums are taken over household types indexed by i. The average X for type i is
denoted by Xsi , and the population weight for type i is denoted by ω
s
i , with s ∈ {S, I}.
The first two terms capture differences in weights, ωSi 6= ωIi , which we refer to as “sampling
errors,” and the last term captures differences in averages, XSi 6= XIi , which we refer to as
“measurement errors.”
With linked survey-IRS data, one can fully decompose the difference on the left-hand side
of (3.1) into the sampling and measurement error components. For the SCF, we do not
have access to such linked data but can provide evidence that is strongly indicative that
both sampling and measurement errors are nontrivial. We start with evidence on the sam-
pling errors. Earlier, we provided evidence based on the total number of business returns
that the first term in (3.1) is significantly different from zero. Recall that we found a signif-
icant underrepresentation of sole proprietors and corporations and an overrepresentation
of partnerships, indicating severe sampling issues.
To shed light on the second term in (3.1), we analyze how the returns are distributed in the
cross section. We define the groups of businesses as we did previously in Section 3.3.2, first
on the basis of whether they earned profits or losses and second by ranking them according
to their owners’ AGI. We then compare ratios of population weights, ωSi /ω
I
i , across types
and across time. For example, if we compare these ratios for pass-through businesses that
have profits with those that have losses, we find significant differences in most years, with
the highest difference being 35 percentage points. Similarly, if we compare ratios for sole
proprietors in different AGI bins, we find significant differences across AGI bins. Figure
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3.6 shows this in the case of sole proprietors with AGIs per return below and above the
median. For businesses that have owners with below-median AGIs, the number of IRS
returns (ωIi ) has risen from about 5 million in 1988 to over 12 million in 2015, but the
SCF estimate (ωSi ) has remained at roughly 2 million for the entire period. For businesses
with above-median AGIs, the number of IRS returns has risen from a little over 8 million
to above 12 million, but the SCF estimate has hovered around 5 million. Comparing these
data to the full sample in Figure 3.6, we find that the share of sole proprietorship returns
below the median AGI is around 25 percent in the SCF and 43 percent in the IRS. These
findings suggest a significant underrepresentation of low-income businesses, which leads to
an overstatement of business incomes if business income is positively correlated with AGI.
Finally, we provide evidence on the last term in (3.1), which summarizes the measurement
error. As mentioned earlier, without linked records, it is impossible to directly validate
measurement errors, but we document several aspects of the SCF survey results that sug-
gest they are nontrivial. The first is related to the aforementioned observation that a
significant part of the overstatement of income is due to an understatement of losses. This
could arise from the framing of the question “What is your net income?” which could be
misinterpreted as being a question about positive net income. For instance, consider the
distribution of losses by AGI bins for tax year 2015 as shown in Table 3.2. We see that 10
out of 19 bins, which account for 23 percent of the total number of returns and 26 percent
of the total losses in the IRS, have an aggregate zero (that is, all respondents in those
income brackets reported a zero net income) in the SCF data.
A second reason to be suspicious about misreported incomes in the SCF is that a very
small fraction of respondents refer to their tax documents when responding to questions
about the specific line items on tax forms. At the end of the survey, SCF interviewers note
how frequently respondents accessed particular documents while answering questions and
the type of documents they referenced, if any. Using this information, we calculate the
frequency with which business owners referenced either tax or other financial documents
in tax year 2015.16 These tabulations are shown in Table 3.3. The first row shows that 75
percent of business owners in the SCF never referenced tax documents, 2 percent rarely
16 Other financial documents include account statements, investment and business records, loan docu-
ments, and pension documents. If any of these documents are referenced, we assume all are.
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did, 9 percent sometimes did, and 14 percent frequently did. The second row shows that
64 percent never referenced any other financial documents, 6 percent rarely did, 15 percent
sometimes did, and 15 percent frequently did.
To provide further evidence on measurement errors, we show that the SCF fails a simple
consistency check by comparing answers to two closely related questions. In the case of
sole proprietors, respondents are asked to report incomes listed on lines 12 and 18 of their
Form 1040, which correspond to Schedule C and F incomes, respectively. Separately, they
are asked about business income from a sole proprietorship and told it is listed on line
31 of Schedule C.17 By design, the difference in responses to these two questions must be
farm income from Schedule F. In Figure 3.7, we see that the differences across the two
answers vary between $17,000 and $40,000 per return, considerably more than could be
attributable to farm incomes. In a typical year, only 4 percent of business profits listed
on Form 1040 are farm income, and farm losses exceed profits in many of the years of our
sample.
A related exercise is to check whether there are SCF respondents who report that they
do not own or actively manage a sole proprietorship but still report nonzero income from
a sole proprietorship or farm. For example, in 2015, of the 16 million who reported a
nonzero income (coded as X5704), only 6 million reported that they actively manage a sole
proprietorship (coded as X3119, X3219, or X3319), while 10 million reported that they
did not. More importantly, the fraction of misreported income is significant. According to
SCF data, 65 percent of the business income from Schedule C and F was earned by those
reporting that they did not actively manage a sole proprietorship.
We turn next to measures of business valuations and rates of return, which are key for
measuring wealth inequality as well as disciplining theories of entrepreneurial activity.
3.4 Business Valuations and Rates of Return
A challenge in estimating valuations and returns for privately held businesses is that they
are not frequently traded, and for this reason, most researchers use the SCF to study the
17The first answer is coded as X5704 and the second as X3132, X3232, and X3332, combined with the
response to legal status of the actively managed business with codes X3119, X3219, and X3319.
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distributional aspects of business wealth and returns.18 SCF business valuations are self-
reported evaluations of the current net worth of the business if sold. We can use these
estimates along with net incomes to construct SCF income yields that are comparable to
available yields from brokered private business sales and publicly traded firms, both small
and large. We find that for virtually all subsamples and all years, the SCF yields are
significantly higher and more right-skewed than comparable measures from the brokered
sales and public firms. We relate this finding to a previous empirical literature that has
documented a puzzlingly small private equity premium and show that the earlier estimates
are driven by an inconsistent imputation of capital gains on private businesses.
We start by describing the measurement of SCF income yields, which will be compared
to yields based on broker data from Pratt’s Stats and public firm data from the CRSP-
Compustat merged database. The SCF income yield, which is computed for each business,
is the ratio of total pretax net income from businesses divided by the self-reported total
net worth of businesses. Let {ωi,t} be the SCF population weights for survey year t. We
compute an equally weighted and value-weighted mean yield for t, denoted as Rewt and
Rvwt , respectively:
Rewt =
∑
i
ωi,t
(
NIi,t
Vi,t
)
, Rvwt =
∑
i
(
ωi,tVi,t∑
i ωi,tVi,t
)(
NIi,t
Vi,t
)
, (3.2)
where NI is total pretax net income and V is the self-reported total business value. In
Figure 3.8, we plot time series of yields for all businesses by legal form across years. Across
SCF survey years 1989–2016, the average equally weighted yield, Rewt , is 102 percent for
all businesses, 104 percent for pass-through businesses, and 57 percent for C corporations.
The average value-weighted yield, Rvwt , is 19 percent for all businesses, 20 percent for pass-
through businesses, and 17 percent for C corporations. Yields vary significantly across
surveys. For example, in the case of C corporations, Rewt is in the range of 14 to 102
percent, and Rvwt is in the range of 11 to 28 percent.
Next, we compare the SCF income yields to comparable statistics from Pratt’s Stats and
show that the SCF yields are much higher and more right-skewed. The Pratt’s Stats
18Some studies use aggregate business valuations from the Federal Reserve’s flow of funds, which imputes
values for privately held businesses using estimates of private business revenues, publicly traded business
revenue-to-value ratios, and an estimate of the liquidity premium on public versus private business.
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database has transaction-level data on sales of private and public businesses over the period
1988–2017. The dataset includes financial information about the target business and other
attributes of the sale including payment terms, purchase price allocations, and employment
agreements. We compute the income yield in Pratt’s Stats by dividing the pretax income
earned by the business in the year before the sale by the sale price. The advantage of
Pratt’s Stats is that it records the price at which the business was actually sold, thus, it
is conceptually close to the ideal answer to the SCF question on business valuation. The
results of this comparison are shown in Table 3.4. In the first two rows and columns,
we report equally weighted and value-weighted mean yields for all businesses in the SCF
dataset and the Pratt’s Stats dataset. The differences are dramatic: the Pratt’s Stats
equally weighted yield is 27 percent as compared to 102 percent for the SCF, and the
Pratt’s Stats value-weighted yield is 2 percent as compared to 19 percent for the SCF.
The fact that there is a larger discrepancy in the equally weighted yield than in the value-
weighted yield suggests that there are also discrepancies in the distribution of yields. In the
last three rows of Table 3.4, we report percentiles of the income yield distribution across
data sources. Here, we see that the 75th percentile yield in the SCF is substantially higher
than the counterpart in Pratt’s Stats. This result suggests that the SCF overestimates the
right-skewness of the cross-sectional distribution of business returns.
An obvious concern about the broker data is its representativeness. There may be a bias
in business returns arising from the comparison of ongoing concerns (in the SCF) and
a possibly selected subset of businesses that were sold. For instance, if businesses with
higher rates of return also have a higher probability of finding potential buyers, then
Pratt’s Stats returns will be biased upward. On the other hand, there could be factors
that lead to a downward bias in the Pratt’s Stats returns. Sales triggered by distress, say
because of health-related issues facing the owner, would imply a lower yield. Similarly,
sales of technology- or research-intensive businesses would imply lower yields because of
the significant expensing done by these firms. We can partially correct for the downward
bias by ignoring transactions in which the target company is in technology- and research-
intensive sectors (that is, with NAICS codes 51, 5415, or 5417) and those for which the
stated reason for the sale was health related. In the third column of Table 3.4, we report
the data for this subset of firms and find the results are nearly the same as for all businesses.
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Next, we compare SCF income yields to those of publicly traded firms in the CRSP-
Compustat database. This comparison has the advantage that we have a sample of busi-
nesses that are active, but it has the disadvantage that the typical firm in CRSP is much
larger than the typical firm in the SCF. To address this issue, we restrict our attention
to larger firms in the SCF (S and C corporations) and compare them to both the full
sample of CRSP-Compustat firms and a subset of small firms. Our baseline definition of
“small” is a firm that belongs to the bottom quintile of firms ranked by the book value
of assets.19 The income yield for a firm in CRSP-Compustat is computed by dividing
business income (before taxes and retained earnings) by the firms’ market capitalization.
The equally weighted and value-weighted means are computed as in (3.2) where we use the
end-of-year market capitalization as a measure of business value. In Table 3.5, we see that
the equally weighted income yield is negative for both the full sample (−9 percent) and
the subsample of small firms (−27 percent) in the CRSP-Compustat database, whereas
the yield is large and positive for both C corporations (57 percent) and S corporations
(76 percent) in the SCF. Similarly, SCF value-weighted yields are significantly higher than
CRSP yields, although less dramatically different. Considering the distribution, we again
find that the SCF yields are more right-skewed than those in CRSP-Compustat. For ex-
ample, at the 75th percentile, the SCF C-corporate yield is 36 percent, while the CRSP
yield for all businesses is 10 percent.
Our results thus far would appear to be inconsistent with Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002), who constructed private business returns using SCF data and concluded that they
were surprisingly low when compared to those of publicly traded firms. We use a longer
sample than they do, but we know from Kartashova (2014) that this would account for
only about a 6 percentage point difference in the SCF estimates. The more important
difference for the quantitative results is the concept of return. The earlier results are
based on a measure of return equal to the sum of a value-weighted income yield and an
imputed capital gain. In theory, one would need a panel of firm valuations to compute a
value-weighted capital gain, namely,
Rcgt+1 =
∑
i
(
ωi,tVi,t∑
i ωi,tVi,t
)(
Vi,t+1
Vi,t
)
, (3.3)
19In Bhandari et al. (2019), we also report results separately for each survey year and for different
definitions of “small,” for example, based on gross sales or market capitalization.
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using survey weights {ωi,t} and valuations {Vi,t} for each firm i in year t. Given that the
SCF survey is triennial with virtually no panel aspect (other than two surveys), there is no
way to compute Vi,t+1/Vi,t firm by firm. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) instead
compute their capital gains measure using the following annualized index:
R˜cgt+3 =
(∑
i ωi,t+3Vi,t+3∑
i ωi,tVi,t
) 1
3
− 1. (3.4)
Their concept of rate of return is given by Rvwt + R˜
cg
t , where R
vw
t is defined in (3.2).
They adjust the SCF net income by subtracting imputed measures of taxes and retained
earnings and compare their measure of return to the value weighted mean holding period
return on the CRSP index portfolio.20 This procedure generates private returns that
are similar in magnitude to the CRSP returns. Considering the higher risk for private
businesses, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) conclude that there is a puzzle as
to why individuals become entrepreneurs. Their preferred explanation is that there are
non-pecuniary benefits of running a business.21
Replicating the exercise of Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) for our full sample
with income yields and capital gains compared separately, we find that the capital gain
imputation drives the differences between our findings and theirs. The results are summa-
rized in Table 3.6. The first two columns show estimates of SCF and CRSP-Compustat
income yields, Rvwt , in all SCF survey years. The last three columns show estimates of R˜
cg
t
for SCF and both Rcgt and R˜
cg
t for the CRSP-Compustat sample. The table reveals several
noteworthy patterns. First, consistent with our findings for the average income yields, the
yearly SCF yields are substantially higher than the CRSP-Compustat counterparts for all
survey years. Second, the annualized SCF capital gains vary substantially less than those
for firms in the CRSP-Compustat gains Rcgt over the sample, which is not surprising given
the conceptual differences in the measures and the long interval between survey years.22 If
20Since the assumptions underlying the imputations of taxes and retained earnings are ad hoc, we
measure Rvwt using pretax income in both the SCF and CRSP samples.
21See also Hamilton (2000) and Hurst and Pugsley (2011), who reach a similar conclusion using data
from the SIPP and the PSED, respectively.
22Incidentally, the time variation in the capital gains components explains why Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002) and Kartashova (2014) estimate different average returns for the different sample periods
they study.
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we were to add Rvwt plus R˜
cg
t for SCF and R
vw
t plus R
cg
t for CRSP-Compustat firms, we
would confound two discrepancies and conclude that the private and public returns are not
very different on average: 26 percent for SCF versus 21 percent for CRSP-Compustat. If
we were to restrict attention to comparable measures, either Rvwt or R
vw
t + R˜
cg
t , we would
instead conclude that the private business yields and the imputed total returns are rela-
tively high for private businesses when compared to public returns, not low as previously
thought.
As we discussed in Section 3.3.3, we find that SCF returns are relatively high because there
are significant measurement and sampling errors. In the case of self-reported business
valuations, respondents would understate values of intangible assets or nontransferable
human capital (for example, reputation of the owner). Given that the SCF incomes are
verifiably overstated, an understatement of business value would bias the SCF returns
upward even more. Furthermore, a rate of return is the ratio of two terms, both of which
have measurement errors. This injects a much larger error in the ratio and can cause
large discrepancies in the distribution of measured returns with no obvious correction. A
constructive way to deal with the measurement issues in the SCF and estimate aggregate
and distributional statistics for business valuations is to rely more heavily on a theory that
is disciplined by the flows measured from the IRS and business sales data such as Pratt’s
Stats. A theory featuring business sales would take a stand on the selection bias and also
provide a way to impute the valuations for ongoing concerns.23
3.5 Robustness
In this section, we show that the overstatement of business incomes in the SCF is robust to
potential misreporting in the IRS and to potential miscategorization by SCF respondents
across closely related categories of business income.
3.5.1 Adjusting for misreporting in the IRS
One explanation for the overstated business incomes in the SCF is that individuals might
report true incomes in the surveys but underreport their incomes to the tax authorities. In
23An attempt in this direction is some ongoing work in Bhandari and McGrattan (2018).
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principle, this should not be a concern for our analysis because the SCF specifically asks
them to report what they wrote on their tax forms. Nevertheless, we analyze data from
several sources on the extent of misreporting on tax forms to evaluate this hypothesis and
conclude that tax misreporting is far from sufficient to close the gap between the SCF and
IRS business incomes.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates tax misreporting for noncorporate in-
come (that is, incomes from sole proprietorships and partnerships) to reconcile the national
accounts with the data from tax audits. For the years 1988–2015, the BEA estimates that
reported noncorporate tax incomes are lower by roughly 50 percent because of misreporting.
These BEA estimates are in line with studies such as Johns and Slemrod (2010), who used
tax audit data for the year 2001 and document that Schedule C income is underreported
by 54 percent. For S- and C-corporate business incomes, measures of tax misreporting
are hard to obtain. Johns and Slemrod (2010) document underreporting of 18 percent for
Schedule E income, which includes all supplemental income from S corporations, partner-
ships, rental real estate, royalties, estates, trusts, and farm rentals. Based on reviews of
documents stemming from the National Research Program at the IRS, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) estimates net misreporting margins for S-corporate incomes
on the order of 15 to 20 percent. We construct a measure of adjusted IRS pass-through
income by adding back the BEA estimates of misreporting for noncorporate incomes, along
with an adjustment of 18 percent for income from S corporations based on the study of
Johns and Slemrod (2010) and the reports of the GAO. In Figure 3.9, we compare the SCF
business incomes per return to the adjusted IRS incomes per return and find that they are
still significantly higher. Computing the SCF errors as before, we find that the average
error with the tax audit adjustment is 178 percent, with a range of errors of 98 percent to
274 percent over the sample.
3.5.2 Adjusting for categorization of business income
Another source of measurement error in the SCF is the respondent’s possible confusion
about closely related categories of business income. For example, when asked about income
from a sole proprietorship appearing on line 31 of Schedule C, business owners might also
include income appearing on Schedule E, which includes income from real estate, royalties,
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partnerships, S corporations, estates, and trusts. From our previous analysis, we know
that business incomes from Schedule C are overstated in the SCF. If the overstatement
was due to classification errors, we should see an understatement in categories of income
corresponding to Schedule E. In Table 3.7, we report the percentage errors for Schedule E
income and document that they are overstated for most survey years.
Johnson and Moore (2008) conducted a similar exercise but constructed an even broader
category of business income by including capital gains and losses (lines 13 and 14 of Form
1040) to the incomes individuals report on Schedules C, E, and F. Neither the IRS nor
SCF data allow us to isolate the capital gains for business owners or for business-related
assets. Hence, we did not include these data in our baseline analysis of business income.
In Bhandari et al. (2019), we replicate the findings of Johnson and Moore (2008) and
extend them to all survey years. We find that, although the capital gains in the SCF are
lower when compared to the IRS gains, the Johnson and Moore (2008) measure of broader
business income in the SCF is still larger in all years than its counterpart in the IRS. The
average error is 47 percent, with a range of 18 percent to 115 percent across survey years.
3.6 Other Surveys
In this section, we review evidence from other surveys, namely, the CPS, PSID, SIPP, KFS,
and PSED. These surveys contain information about businesses and have been widely used
by researchers. When comparing business incomes and valuations across these surveys and
with the SCF, we find that there are significant inconsistencies but similar concerns related
to sampling and measurement.
We start with the CPS, PSID, and SIPP. All three surveys contain questions about business
incomes and organizational forms (that is, whether they are incorporated or unincorpo-
rated). The PSID and SIPP additionally contain self-reported estimates of business valu-
ations.24 Unlike the SCF, the surveys have less detailed information on the legal form of
the businesses. For example, these surveys do not distinguish among types of pass-through
businesses, and the questionnaires do not specifically connect responses to line items on
tax forms. In order to compare across surveys, we focus on business income per owner and
24See Bhandari et al. (2019) for more details.
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income yields for unincorporated businesses.
In Figure 3.10, we plot incomes per owner for four surveys (SCF, CPS, PSID, and SIPP)
and the IRS in Panel A and the number of owners for all surveys in Panel B.25 As with the
SCF, the CPS, PSID, and SIPP have higher business income per owner than is reported
by the IRS, but the magnitudes are statistically different across surveys. The SCF is
highest with estimates in the range of $29,000–$100,000, the PSID is next with a range
of $15,000–$55,000, the CPS after that with a range of $15,000–$35,000, and the SIPP
is lowest with a range of $13,000–$18,000. All are higher than the IRS, which has a
range of $5,000–$15,000.26 The inconsistencies between surveys are driven primarily by
differences in aggregate business incomes. The number of owners across these surveys are
not significantly different from each other—on the order of 10 to 13 million and stable
across years—but are far lower than the IRS, which reports roughly 35 million owners in
1988 and over 50 million by 2015.27
Next, we use the responses on self-reported business valuations to compute income yields,
as we did for the SCF in Section 3.4. In Table 3.8, we see that value weighted income
yields in the PSID and SIPP are comparable to the SCF even though business income
per owner is lower than that in the SCF by a factor of two or three. This implies that
average business values are even lower in these other surveys. However, if we compare
yields across the distribution, we see large differences, especially in the right tail. These
observations point to the lack of representativeness in the PSID and SIPP for the universe
of unincorporated businesses as well as their lack of comparability to the SCF.
25Our sample in the PSID starts in 1992 and provides annual data until 1996 and biennially after that
until 2014. The SIPP reports business incomes every four months for the years 2004–2006 and 2009–2012,
and valuations are reported once a year for 2004, 2005, and 2009–2011 depending on when the “topical”
modules are available.
26Hurst, Li, and Pugsley (2014) combine spending data from the Consumer Expenditure (CE) survey
with the PSID and estimate that self-employed individuals underreport income by about 25 percent relative
to an imputed measure of true income. The imputation relies on estimating the relationship between
expenditures and incomes for wage and salary workers and using it along with food expenditures for the
self-employed to infer “true” income of the self-employed. We instead compare survey responses directly to
IRS data.
27As in the SCF, these surveys only account for partners who are individuals. However, as we mentioned
before, using estimates from Cooper et al. (2016), this fact alone does not help to account for the massive
understatement in the number of owners.
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For KFS, Gurley-Calvez et al. (2016) compare responses about receipts, expenses, and
profits with matched tax forms for an eight-year panel of new businesses beginning in
2004. They match responses from Form 1040, Schedule C for sole proprietorships, Form
1065 for partnerships, and Form 1120S or 1120 for corporations. Eighty percent of firms
are matched to tax files, and the matched data file includes 3,940 firms. They find that the
businesses in the survey overstate receipts and overstate expenses by even more, implying
that the businesses understate profits across the distribution. These findings are for the
most part in contrast to the SCF and IRS comparison, as the SCF overstates business
income, while the KFS firms understate business income. We report estimates from their
study in Table 3.9 for ease of comparison.
The PSED provides information about business start-ups using a nationally representative
sample. However, from the perspective of our study, the PSED suffers from a critical
measurement issue: the response rates for business-related questions is very low in all
years of the survey. For example, among the 1,214 entrepreneurs in the 2005 panel, only
115 (that is, 9 percent) responded to the question that asks about calculated profits and
losses during a follow-up interview for tax year 2006. Thus, we would caution against any
use of statistics for quantitative research on entrepreneurial activity from this survey given
the small sample size.
In summary, we find severe measurement issues with other surveys currently being used
to study U.S. businesses. Key statistics drawn from these surveys are inconsistent with
administrative data from the IRS and are inconsistent with each other.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper has examined the reliability of widely used survey data for studies of U.S. busi-
nesses. We compared key statistics for net incomes and receipts to counterparts in ad-
ministrative data from the IRS and found large sampling and measurement errors. In
all surveys examined, we found that incomes are significantly overstated relative to IRS
data, even when respondents are asked to provide incomes from specific lines on their tax
forms. The errors we document are large on average and vary wildly across years and
across surveys. We provide evidence that the overstatements of income may be due to the
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nonrepresentativeness of business owners with lower incomes and to the fact that the ma-
jority of respondents do not reference any tax or financial documents. We also consider the
implications for key statistics used in economic research, such as the level and dispersion
of wealth and the return on businesses.
We hope and expect that our analysis will lead to improved measurement in future surveys.
Studies of wealth inequality, entrepreneurial choice, and business taxation are using current
surveys as predictive tests for economic theory. Our findings suggest that the current data
should be treated with great caution, but we hope improvements in sampling will lead to
improvements in quantitative predictions in the future. Attempts should be made to link
responses to administrative data where possible. Questions should be limited to queries
that are verifiable. In the case of businesses, care should be taken to ensure representative
samples of all types of legal organizations.
Table 3.1: Decomposition of SCF-IRS pass-through business income gap
Percentage of Gap
Tax SCF−IRS Overstatement Understatement
Year $ Bill. of Profit of Loss
1988 159 50 50
1991 307 64 36
1994 624 83 17
1997 386 63 37
2000 635 68 32
2003 785 71 29
2006 1,096 77 23
2009 750 41 59
2012 218 −56 156
Mean 551 51 49
Note: This table shows the difference (gap) between aggregated business income of all pass-through businesses in
the SCF and the IRS. The gap is then decomposed into the fraction attributable to an overstatement of profits or
that attributable to an understatement of losses.
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Table 3.2: Sole proprietorships with net losses in the IRS and SCF by AGI bins, 2015
IRS SCF
AGI Returns Losses Returns Losses
Bins ’000 $ Bil. ’000 $ Bil.
No adjusted gross income 426.0 12.2 91.4 0.2
$1 under $5,000 138.3 0.9 39.7 0.2
$5,000 under $10,000 185.7 1.5 33.3 0.0
$10,000 under $15,000 270.8 2.4 10.6 0.0
$15,000 under $20,000 344.3 3.5 47.9 0.0
$20,000 under $25,000 351.4 3.1 60.0 0.2
$25,000 under $30,000 316.8 3.0 77.5 0.2
$30,000 under $40,000 533.0 3.9 102.2 0.6
$40,000 under $50,000 469.3 3.4 62.8 0.0
$50,000 under $75,000 833.7 5.8 159.3 0.1
$75,000 under $100,000 626.4 4.3 199.5 0.8
$100,000 under $200,000 1047.9 7.7 216.2 0.8
$200,000 under $500,000 312.4 3.7 71.6 0.4
$500,000 under $1,000,000 50.4 1.3 0.0 0.0
$1,000,000 under $1,500,000 11.6 0.6 0.6 0.0
$1,500,000 under $2,000,000 5.3 0.4 0.0 0.0
$2,000,000 under $5,000,000 8.4 1.0 0.1 0.0
$5,000,000 under $10,000,000 2.3 0.5 0.7 0.0
$10,000,000 or more 1.8 1.3 36.6 0.0
Note: This table shows the number of business returns that report a net loss and the corresponding amount of these
net losses across various AGI bins for tax year 2015.
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Table 3.3: Percentage of respondents checking documents in SCF 2016
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently
Income tax document 75 2 9 14
Other financial documents 64 6 15 15
Note: This table shows the fraction of business owners that refer to their income tax documents or other relevant
financial documents in varying frequency. A respondent who referred to account statements, investment/business
records, or loan documents is considered to have checked other financial documents.
Table 3.4: Net income yields in the SCF and Pratt’s Stats
SCF Pratt’s Stats
All All Non-tech &
Moments businesses businesses nondistressed
Equally weighted mean 102.5 27.4 29.3
Value weighted mean 19.1 1.9 3.5
p25 0.9 3.8 5.0
p50 17.6 21.7 23.1
p75 63.0 46.8 48.3
Note: This table shows moments of the net income yield distribution from the SCF and Pratt’s Stats. For Pratt’s
Stats, we also consider income yields for a subset of businesses that excludes those in technology- and research-
intensive sectors (NAICS codes 51, 5415, or 5417) and those for which the stated reason for the sale was health
related.
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Table 3.5: Net income yields in the SCF and CRSP-Compustat
SCF CRSP-Compustat
C Corps S Corps All businesses Small businesses
Equally weighted mean 56.8 76.4 −9.2 −26.6
Value weighted mean 16.9 15.2 7.3 −8.5
p25 1.3 2.2 −5.5 −29.0
p50 10.6 14.2 5.4 −7.7
p75 36.2 50.5 10.4 4.0
Note: This table shows moments of the net income yield distribution from the SCF and the CRSP-Compustat
database. For the CRSP-Compustat sample, small businesses refer to publicly traded firms in the CRSP database
that belong to the bottom 20 percent when ranked by total assets.
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Table 3.6: Net income yields and capital gains
Tax Year Net Income Yields Capital Gains
SCF CRSP SCF CRSP-Compustat
(t− 1)→ t (t− 3)→ t
1988 16.6 12.4 — — —
1991 20.7 6.2 0.2 26.9 13.2
1994 31.5 9.8 5.3 -3.2 8.5
1997 20.6 6.2 11.4 30.2 29.7
2000 22.6 4.6 11.7 3.7 13.8
2003 17.7 6.2 6.6 28.6 -4.8
2006 18.1 8.0 15.9 10.3 8.9
2009 14.8 5.7 −7.9 21.6 -8.6
2012 14.1 8.0 2.9 12.0 9.6
2015 14.6 5.4 12.8 -3.0 10.7
Mean 19.1 7.3 6.6 14.6 9.0
Note: This table shows estimates of income yields and capital gains for businesses in the SCF and CRSP-Compustat
firms. For the SCF, capital gains are computed using Equation 3.4 found in the main text, as in Moskowitz and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). For the CRSP-Compustat firms, we report two measures of capital gains. The column
(t − 1) → t measures the realized capital gains using Equation 3.3 for year t where t corresponds to the fiscal year
for which income is reported in the SCF. The column (t− 3)→ t measures a geometric mean of the capital gains for
the index over the past three periods using equation 3.4.
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Table 3.7: Schedule E income comparison
Tax Year IRS SCF Error
$ Bill. $ Bill. %
1988 57.3 116.1 102.6
1991 69.9 129.6 85.6
1994 133.0 121.8 −8.4
1997 195.3 147.0 −24.7
2000 249.0 180.3 −27.6
2003 292.7 427.1 45.9
2006 463.1 805.6 74.0
2009 380.8 720.7 89.3
2012 613.3 949.3 54.8
2015 713.2 1142.1 60.1
Note: This table shows aggregated Schedule E income from the IRS and respondents’ reported Schedule E income
in the SCF. Dollar amounts are in billions.
Table 3.8: Income yield distribution of noncorporate businesses in the SCF, SIPP, and
PSID
SCF SIPP PSID
Value-weighted mean 22.6 17.7 14.9
p25 0.8 2.2 3.2
p50 19.6 33.2 27.0
p75 70.6 230.1 114.9
Note: This table shows moments of the income yield distribution for noncorporate businesses for the SCF, SIPP, and
PSID. The columns average the income yields for all years that the data are available. The SCF is available triennially
between 1989 and 2016, the SIPP for the years 2004–2005 and 2009–2011, and the PSID biennially between 1988
and 2014.
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Table 3.9: Comparison of KFS and IRS business tax data, 2004–2011
Receipts Expenses Profit
KFS IRS Error KFS IRS Error KFS IRS Error
Statistic ’000 ’000 % ’000 ’000 % ’000 ’000 %
Mean 552 417 32 369 188 96 30 169 −82
Median 92 66 29 57 36 57 5 24 −79
p25 21 11 74 1 12 -1,400 -3 1 −700
p75 350 281 25 236 152 55 31 142 −78
p99 11,500 7,434 55 7,450 2,680 178 810 2,478 −67
Note: The source of statistics is Gurley-Calvez et al. (2016).
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Figure 3.1: Adjusted gross incomes: SCF vs. IRS
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Note: For the IRS, adjusted gross income is obtained from Form 1040. For the SCF, if AGI is not available, we
construct it by adding the appropriate income categories.
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Figure 3.2: Business income per return by legal entity: SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots business income per business tax return in the IRS and the SCF as reported on Form 1040
Schedule C for sole proprietorships, Form 1120S for S corporations, Form 1065 for partnerships, and Form 1120 for
C corporations. IRS data for partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations are available only until 2013. IRS
data for C corporations exclude data for those filing 1120A, 1120F, 1120L, 1120PC, 1120REIT, 1120RIC. Prior to
1990, only consolidated information is available and thus is not comparable to the series plotted here. The shaded
region for the SCF shows the 90 percent confidence interval.
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Figure 3.3: Number of returns by legal entity: SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the number of business returns of sole proprietorships, S corporations, partnerships, and C
corporations over time in the IRS and the SCF. IRS data for partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations are
available only until 2013, and C-corporation data are unavailable prior to 1990 when only consolidated information is
available and thus is not comparable to the series plotted here. The shaded region for the SCF shows the 90 percent
confidence interval.
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Figure 3.4: Proprietor income shares: SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the fraction of business income from sole proprietorships attributable to returns with AGI
below the median and above the 99th percentile.
Figure 3.5: Income per return, proprietors with below- and above-median AGI: SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots sole proprietorship business income per return for those with below- and above-median AGI.
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Figure 3.7: Comparing proprietors’ individual and business incomes, SCF
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Note: This figure plots business income per return in the SCF for questions that ask respondents to report individual
incomes listed on Form 1040, lines 12 plus 18, and business income on Schedule C of 1040, line 31.
Figure 3.6: Number of returns, proprietors with below- and above-median AGI: SCF
vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the number of sole proprietorship returns (Form 1040 Schedule C) filed by business owners
with below- and above median AGI.
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Figure 3.8: Equally and value-weighted average net income yields, SCF
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Note: This figure plots equally weighted and value-weighted average net income yields. The SCF sample includes
businesses with positive net worth and excludes the bottom 1st percentile of these businesses. The business income of
each business that the family members own in the SCF is obtained from SCF variables that correspond to information
on business tax forms.
Figure 3.9: Pass-through business income per return with tax misreporting adjustments,
SCF vs. IRS
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Note: In this figure, we use BEA estimates for misreporting of pass-through business incomes and reports from the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) on misreporting of S-corporation business incomes to adjust IRS pass-
through business income per return. We add these yearly adjustments to the sum of pass-through income in the
IRS, calculate total business income per tax return, and compare it with estimates from the SCF.
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Figure 3.10: Unincorporated business income per owner and number of owners
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Note: This figure plots the total business income per owner of unincorporated businesses (Panel A) and total number
of unincorporated business owners (Panel B) in the SCF, CPS, PSID, SIPP, and the IRS. Before 2004, the SIPP
does not provide information about an individual’s own share of business income from an unincorporated business.
Instead, it contains information about the total income of the business, which is not enough information to calculate
the total business income of unincorporated businesses.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Model
In this section, I lay out and discuss the expectation over the transition of employment
statuses of unemployed - unemployed and employed - employed households respectively.
These supplement the discussion in Section 1.2.2 of the main text.
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where I drop the conditions of the expectation in the left hand side to save space. The first
two lines in the right hand side show the case when both male and female search for a job in
the current period, and he finds a job. In this case, if she finds a job, the household will be an
employed - employed household, otherwise the household will be an employed - unemployed
household but she may retain or lose eligibility for employment-tested transfers. The third
and fourth lines is the case when both of them search for a job and he does not find
it. Then, if she finds a job, the household will be an unemployed - employed household
where he may or may not be eligible for employment-tested transfers. If she cannot find
a job, then both members of the household will continue to be unemployed, and they will
both face eligibility risk for the employment-tested transfers. The fifth to eighth lines are
cases when one of them searches for a job and the other does not. In these cases, if the
searcher finds a job, then the household will have one employed member and the other
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faces eligibility risk, otherwise both members will continue to be unemployed and both
face eligibility risk. Finally, the last line shows the case when both members do not search
for a job, continue to be unemployed, and face eligibility risk.
Similarly, for the household in which any unemployed member is ineligible unemployed, the
above expectation is the same except that this member stays ineligible for employment-
tested transfers if he/she does not find a job.
Employed - employed household
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where I drop the conditions of the expectation in the left hand side to save space. The
first two lines in the right hand side show cases when male keeps his job, female may or
may not lose her job, and face eligibility risk if she loses it. The last two lines give cases in
which he loses his job and face eligibility risk, and again female may or may not lose her
job, and face eligibility risk if she loses it.
A.2 Data
In this section, I first discuss sample selection and construction of some of the important
variables for the PSID data that is used in Section 1.3.1 of the main text. Second, I show
that the main empirical conclusions of Section 1.3.1 remain almost unaltered if under alter-
native data samples. Third, I document the relative change in annual working hours of the
head and the spouse upon head’s job displacement in recessions and in expansions. These
supplement the discussions in Section 1.3.1. Finally, I explain the details of calculating
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asset-to-income distribution from the PSID and the SCF data, both of which are used in
Section 1.3.3 of the main text.
PSID data
In Section 1.3.1, I use data from PSID in order to analyze the impact of head’s job dis-
placement over the business cycle on his own labor earnings, spousal labor earnings, and
family labor earnings as well as working hours of the head and the spouse. The PSID is
a nationally representative survey that was conducted in the United States annually from
1968 to 1997 and biannualy from 1997 to 2015. I use all of these waves of the data. The
PSID provides information on labor market outcomes such as annual labor earnings and
working hours, as well as characteristics of the family such as age, education, and number
of children of the couples. Labor earnings of the head or spouse include wages and salaries,
bonuses, overtime, tips, commissions, professional practice or trade, market gardening,
miscellaneous labor income, and extra job income.1
While I take many of the variables that I use in the main analysis directly from the PSID,
there are several variables I must create using the other available information in the data.
First, to address inconsistencies for the variable defining the age of the individuals, I create
a new age variable separately for the head and the spouse by an increase based on the age
reported in the first observation of the family. Next, I use completed years of education
to create potential years of labor market experience for both head and spouse in any of
their available observation as Age − Education − 6 if the individual’s years of completed
education is larger than or equal to 12, and as Age− 18 if otherwise. This way, individuals
with fewer years of completed education are not assigned large values for their labor market
experience. I also create the total number of children and young children (defined as the
number of children with age less than 6) of the family in any of their available observation
using the relation of each individual in the family unit to the head of the family.
I create variables for involuntary job displacement using a question that asks the reason
for loss of the previous job to the individuals who are either without a job or have been
1PSID defines the head of a family unit as the individual with the most financial responsibility who is
at least 18 years old. In the case that this person is a female and she has a spouse or partner or a boyfriend
with whom she has been living for at least one year, then he is assigned to be the head of the family unit.
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employed in their current job for less than a year. Following the literature, I define an
involuntary job loss as a separation due to firm closure, layoff or firing. As Stevens (1997)
and Stephens (2002) point out, the timing of the displacement is not precisely identified
in all years of the survey. This is because while the earnings and hours questions are
designed to obtain information for the previous year, the question that I use to determine
job displacement is not year specific. To better understand this, consider a head of the
family who reports to be displaced according to the definition above in 1992 survey of
the PSID. This implies that the head may be displaced in any time between January of
1991 and the survey date in 1992. Thus, the econometrician may assign such displacement
either in 1991 (previous calendar year) or in 1992 (survey year). In my analysis, following
Stephens (2002), I assume that displacements occur in the previous calendar year to align
the displacement year with the earnings and hours information.
Given that I also use the data from biannual survey years of the PSID (1997-2015), dis-
placements that occur in between these years have information only for every other year.
However, I still prefer to keep this time period in my main sample especially to incorporate
the Great Recession period to my analysis to better analyze the differential effects of dis-
placements over the business cycle on the labor market outcomes of couples. Furthermore,
given that 1968 survey only identifies workers who have been displaced within the past ten
years, it is not possible to determine the exact year of such displacement within these ten
years. Therefore, I do not incorporate displacements that occur in 1968 into my analysis.
The PSID has four samples: Survey Research Center (SRC), Survey of Economic Oppor-
tunities (SEO), Immigrant, and Latino samples. I obtain the main results in Section 1.3.1
using SRC, SEO, and Immigrant samples. However, the main conclusions of the empirical
section remain almost unaltered if I use other combinations of these samples. I find similar
results to those obtained in the main text, given that spousal earnings and hours response
is small on average in recessions, and slightly positive in expansions.
In Section 1.3.1, I restrict the baseline sample to families in which both the husband and the
wife are between the ages of 20 and 60 with at least two years of observation. I also drop
families whose family labor income is above the 99th percentile of family labor income
distribution. I check my empirical results under alternative restrictions in the baseline
sample. First, I change the age limits in the baseline sample so that I only use information
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until age 55 as in Davis and von Wachter (2011). Second, I include family head’s who are
single into the baseline sample. Third, I keep families whose family labor income is above
the 99th percentile of family labor income distribution. Fourth, I drop families with family
labor income below the bottom 1 percentile and families with family labor income above the
top 1 percentile. Fifth, I drop families when any member of the family is not living in the
family unit. Finally, in Section 1.3.1, I estimate Equation (1.9) separately for i) a treatment
group where the head is displaced only in recessions and a control group where the head
is never displaced, and ii) a treatment group where head is displaced only in expansions
and a control group where head is never displaced. This allows me to better isolate the
differential effect of head’s displacement in recessions and expansions on families since I
do not incorporate families whose head is displaced both in recessions and expansions in
these separate regressions. Finally, I analyze results when I incorporate such families to
each of the two separate regressions. Overall, I find that the main result remains robust
across all of these alternative restrictions, given that spousal earnings and hours response
is small on average in recessions, and slightly positive in expansions.
Head and spouse hours upon head’s job displacement Figure A.1 shows that
magnitude of the drop in head’s relative hours when the head is displaced in recessions (18
percent) is similar to the one in expansions (14 percent) in the year following displacement.
Moreover, it shows that the relative hours recover just after 2 years upon displacement
both in recessions and expansions. These suggest that both the cyclical gap in earnings
loss upon displacements over the business cycle and the persistence of the earnings loss
are largely explained by drop in wages rather than drop in hours. Previously, Ruhm
(1991), Stevens (1997), and Huckfeldt (2016) have already documented this quick recovery
of relative hours of the displaced workers using PSID. My findings complement their results
as I provide additional evidence that hours recover relatively quickly upon displacements
both in recessions and expansions, and that it wage losses explain most of the cyclical gap
in earnings losses.
Figure A.2 shows the change in relative spousal hours upon head’s job displacement in
recessions and in expansions. I find that the average change in spousal hours upon head’s
displacements in recessions is small, while spousal hours upon head’s displacements in
expansions increases by up to 15 percent and coefficients remain significant after 3 years
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Figure A.1: Relative working hours of family head upon job displacement
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Note: This figure plots the changes in relative working hours of the family head upon his job displacement in recessions
(left panel) and expansions (right panel). I estimate the changes in relative labor earnings from a distributed lag-
recession model using PSID. The solid blue line shows the point estimates and the dashed light blue line shows the
90 percent confidence interval.
following the displacement. According to my results, the average postdisplacement change
is −0.1 percent in recessions and 10.1 percent in expansions.2
Asset-to-income distribution Starting from 1999 survey, PSID provides information
on asset holdings of households in every two years. However, the amount of credit card
debt is only available after 2011. For this reason, I choose to present the asset-to-income
distribution for the latest survey of PSID in 2015.
I calculate the net liquid wealth of each households in my main sample for the PSID by
adding the amount of checking and saving account, the amount of bonds and other assets,
the amount of stocks, and the amount of vehicle equity, and then deducting the amount
of credit card debt. Then, fraction of families of non-positive liquid wealth is simply given
by ratio of the total number of families with non-positive values of this net liquid wealth
measure to the total number of families. Next, I calculate the net liquid wealth to quarterly
labor income ratio by dividing this measure of net liquid wealth to total quarterly family
2Previously, Stephens (2002) uses PSID to study the impact of head’s job displacement on relative
working hours of spouses and finds that the average increase in relative spousal hours is 11 percent across
all years after head’s displacement.
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Figure A.2: Relative working hours of spouse upon job displacement
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This figure plots the changes in relative working hours of the spouse upon family head’s job displacement in recessions
(left panel) and expansions (right panel). I estimate the changes in relative spousal hours from a distributed lag-
recession model using PSID. The solid blue line shows the point estimates and the dashed light blue line shows the
90 percent confidence interval.
labor income (i.e. sum of head and spouse labor income) for each family with positive
total family labor income.3 Finally, I calculate the weighted distribution of this net liquid
wealth to quarterly labor income ratio across these families. The percentiles of the PSID
2015 distribution given in Table 2.2 in the main text are obtained from this calculation.
SCF data
I also calculate the net liquid asset-to-income distribution from the SCF 2007. In order to
do so, I first construct a sample of family head’s with the following restrictions: i) marital
status is married or cohabiting, and ii) ages of the head and spouse are between 20 and
60. This way, the SCF sample will be similar to the PSID sample.
The SCF provides information on the i) amount in up to seven different checking ac-
counts, ii) amount in up to seven different savings/money market accounts, iii) value of
all certificates of deposits, iv) total value of all types of mutual funds, v) total value of
all savings bonds, vi) total value of all bonds other than saving bonds, vii) total value of
publicly traded stocks, viii) total value of all the cash or call money (brokerage) accounts,
3I obtain the total quarterly family labor income by dividing the annual amount of total family labor
income by 4.
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ix) amount in annuity and trust accounts, x) other assets such as money owed to family or
gold, silver, and other jewelry, and xi) value in vehicle equity. Summation of these values
gives the total liquid wealth of the family. I then subtract the total credit card debt to
obtain the net liquid wealth of each family. Then, fraction of families of non-positive liquid
wealth is simply given by ratio of the total number of families with non-positive values
of this net liquid wealth measure to the total number of families. Next, I calculate the
net liquid wealth to quarterly labor income ratio by dividing this measure of net liquid
wealth to total quarterly family labor income for each family with positive total family
labor income.4 Finally, I calculate the weighted distribution of this net liquid wealth to
quarterly labor income ratio across these families. The percentiles of the SCF 2007 distri-
bution given in Table 2.2 in the main text are obtained from this calculation. Moreover,
the median ratio of credit limit to quarterly labor income in Table 1.3 is also obtained
from this dataset, using the information on the total credit limit and total quarterly family
labor income of each family.
SIPP data
In this section, I document the amount and incidence of transfer receipts by married
households. To do so, I use monthly data from the SIPP 1996 to 2008 Panels (covering
December 1995 to August 2013) that provide information on monthly amounts of means-
tested transfers and unemployment insurance transfers received by the family. Figure A.3
shows the results.
In Panel A, I show the total means-tested and employment-tested (UI) transfers paid
to married households as a fraction of aggregate means-tested and employment-tested
transfers separately. On average, around 35 percent of all means-tested transfers and
60 percent of total UI transfers are paid to married households. According to Panel B,
married households constitute around 33 percent of all means-tested transfer recipients
and 58 percent of all UI recipients. Finally, Panel C shows that around 60 percent of all
transfers received by the married households are means-tested transfers. However, this
value drops to as low as 30 percent after 2008. This is because, starting from this year, the
4I obtain the total quarterly family labor income by dividing the annual amount of total wages and
salaries income of family (IRS Form 1040 Line 7) by 4.
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Figure A.3: Transfer receipts by married households
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Note: Panel A plots the total means-tested and employment-tested (UI) transfers paid to married households as
a fraction of aggregate means-tested and employment-tested transfers separately. Panel B shows the total number
of married household heads receiving means-tested and employment-tested transfers as a fraction of all recepients
of these transfers separately. Panel C shows the ratio of total means-tested transfers to total transfers (sum of
means-tested and UI) received by married households. Finally, Panel D plots the total annual transfer amounts in
SIPP data as a fraction of aggregate transfer amounts in NIPA tables, separately for means-tested and employment-
tested transfers. Values in Panel A-C are obtained from SIPP 1996-2008 panels. NIPA amounts in Panel D are
obtained from Table 3.12, where I classify EITC, SNAP, and TANF payments as means-tested transfers, and UI as
employment-tested transfer. Dashed lines indicate time periods when the data is not available.
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survey data drastically underestimates total annual means-tested transfers when compared
to total government means-tested government transfers in NIPA tables, as shown in Panel
D.
Overall, Figure A.3 documents that means-tested transfers consitute a large fraction of
total transfer receipts of married households.
A.3 Effects of Optimal Policy on Family upon Displacement
In Section 1.5.2, I discuss the change in family outcomes upon head’s job displacement in
recessions and expansions in the model under the countercyclical baseline (current) policy
and the optimal policy. In the main text, I show comparisons for spouse earnings, transfer
receipts, and family consumption. The goal of this section is now to understand the effects
of the optimal policy on the other components of the household budget: total family
earnings and assets. This allows us to decompose the changes in family consumption.
Figure A.4 compares the change in family earnings upon head’s job displacement in reces-
sions and in expansions in the model under the countercyclical baseline (current) policy and
the optimal policy. There are three results that I want to highlight. First, the magnitudes
of initial drops of family earnings upon head’s job displacement both in recessions and in
expansions are lower under the optimal policy than their counterparts under the current
policy. This is because of higher labor force participation rates of spouses and their higher
labor earnings due to the increase in their human capital. Second, the gap between the
magnitudes of initial drops under the current and optimal policies are larger in recessions
(0.33 − 0.26 = 0.07) than in expansions (0.18 − 0.15 = 0.03). This is because, under the
optimal policy, the change in spousal earnings in response to head’s displacement in reces-
sions is larger than its counterpart in expansions, as shown in Figure 1.8 in the main text.
As a result, the contribution of spouses to their family income under the optimal policy is
larger in recessions. Finally, while the recovery of family earnings under the optimal policy
is faster than the recovery under the current policy in recessions, the recovery under the
optimal policy is similar to the recovery under the current policy in expansions. This is
due to the persistent increase in spousal earnings upon head’s displacement in recessions
under the optimal policy, as shown in Figure 1.8 in the main text.
Figure A.5 compares the change in family assets upon head’s job displacement in recessions
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Figure A.4: Relative labor earnings of the family upon job displacement: Current policy
vs optimal policy
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Note: This figure plots the changes in relative labor earnings of the family upon head’s job displacement in recessions
(left panel) and expansions (right panel) in the model under the countercyclical baseline policy and the optimal policy.
I estimate the changes in relative family earnings from a distributed lag-recession model using model simulated data,
which is aggregated up to yearly period.
and in expansions in the model under the current policy and the optimal policy. I find that
families dissave less upon head’s displacement both in recessions and expansions under the
optimal policy since larger fraction of spouses are already working at the time of head’s
displacement under the optimal policy, and this allows families to self-insure more through
spousal earnings and less through savings. Similarly, this effect is more pronounced in
recessions due to larger spousal labor earnings response. As a result, family assets recover
earlier in recessions under the optimal policy. However, the recovery of assets in expansions
is a bit slower under the optimal policy due to slightly smaller increase in spousal earnings
upon head’s displacement in expansions under the optimal policy than under the current
policy, as shown in Figure 1.8 in the main text.
A.4 Model with Endogenous Wages
In this section, I present an extension of the baseline model with endogenous wages. This is
a directed search model in which wage choices of unemployed individuals are endogeneous.
In this model, submarkets in the labor market are indexed by the wage offer w of the firms
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Figure A.5: Relative assets of the family upon job displacement: Current policy vs optimal
policy
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Note: This figure plots the changes in relative asset holdings of the family upon head’s job displacement in recessions
(left panel) and expansions (right panel) in the model under the countercyclical baseline policy and the optimal policy.
I estimate the changes in relative family earnings from a distributed lag-recession model using model simulated data,
which is aggregated up to yearly period.
and human capital level h of the job. This means that unemployed individuals now direct
their search effort toward a specific wage offered by a job that is compatible with their
own skill level. In this case, wage levels of the employed members of the household become
extra state variables.
Below, I first lay out household problem, and then show firm problem. Next, I prove the
existence of BRE of this model.
Household problem I write down the problems of several types of households, and the
rest follows from similar explanations as in the baseline model.
Employed - unemployed household First, consider a household in which the male is
employed and the female is eligible unemployed. The recursive problem of this household
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is given as follows:
V EUb (a,wm,h;µ) = max
a′≥aL, sf∈{0,1}
u (c) + ηf (1− sf )
+ max
w˜f
{
β (1− ζR)El′,h′,µ′
[
V l
′ (
a′, wm,h′;µ′
) ∣∣∣sf , w˜f , l,h;µ]}
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ y + φ (z; a, y) + b (z; Ub, sf ) (1− τ)
y = wm (1− τ)
Γ′ = Λ
(
µ, z′
)
and z′ ∼ Φ (z′ | z) .
where we now have to keep track of wage level of the employed member of the household.
Notice also that wage of the employed is not a direct function of the human capital level.
Instead, unemployed members of the household may direct their search effort toward any
wage submarket w˜f , but the job finding rate for that wage submarket varies across human
capital level of the unemployed. In that sense, we can think of different human capital
submarkets that are present inside each wage submarket. Moreover, the expectation is
also indexed by wage choice of the unemployed member of the household, given that her
job finding rate will be affected by her wage choice. The rest of the explanation of this
problem is similar to its counterpart in the baseline model.
It is also insightful to show the expectation over the transition of employment statuses of
this household, which I lay out below:
El′,h′,µ′
[
V l
′
(a′, wm,h′;µ′)
∣∣∣·] = Eh′,µ′[sf (1− δ′m)(p′f (w˜f , hf )V EE (a′, wm, w˜f ,h′;µ′)
+
(
1− p′f (w˜f , hf )
) ∑
k∈{b,n}
λ′kV
EUk (a′, wm,h′;µ′)
)
+ sfδ
′
m
(
p′f (w˜f , hf )
∑
k
λ′kV
UkE (a′, w˜f ,h′;µ′)
+
(
1− p′f (w˜f , hf )
) ∑
k,d∈{b,n}
λ′kλ
′
dV
UkUd (a′,h′;µ′)
)
+ (1− sf ) (1− δ′m)
∑
k
λ′kV
EUk (a′, wm,h′;µ′)
+ (1− sf ) δ′m
∑
k,d∈{b,n}
λ′kλ
′
dV
UkUd (a′,h′;µ′)
) ∣∣∣∣∣h, µ
]
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where p′i (w˜i, hi) ≡ p (θ (w˜i, h′i; µ′)) ∀i ∈ {m, f}. The explanation of the terms in the right
hand side is similar to its counterpart in the baseline model.
Unemployed - unemployed household Second, consider a household in which both
male and female are eligible unemployed. The recursive problem of this household is given
as follows:
V UbUb (a,h;µ) = max
a′≥aL, sm,sf∈{0,1}
u (c) +
∑
i∈{m, f}
ηi (1− si)
+ max
w˜m,w˜f
{
β (1− ζR)El′,h′,µ′
[
V l
′ (
a′,h′;µ′
) ∣∣∣sm, sf , w˜m, w˜f , l,h, µ]}
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ φ (z; a, 0) + [b (z;Ub, sm) + b (z;Ub, sf )] (1− τ)
Γ′ = Λ
(
µ, z′
)
and z′ ∼ Φ (z′ | z) .
Again, I show the expectation over the transition of employment statuses of this household,
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which is given below:
El′,h′,µ′
[
V l
′
(a′,h′;µ′)
∣∣∣·] = Eh′,µ′[smsfp′m (w˜m, hm)(p′f (w˜f , hf )V EE (a′, w˜m, w˜f ,h′;µ′)
+
(
1− p′f (w˜f , hf )
) ∑
k∈{b,n}
λ′kV
EUk (a′, w˜m,h′;µ′)
)
+smsf (1− p′m (w˜m, hm))
(
p′f (w˜f , hf )
∑
k
λ′kV
UkE (a′, w˜f ,h′;µ′)
+
(
1− p′f (w˜f , hf )
) ∑
k,d∈{b,n}
λ′kλ
′
dV
UkUd (a′,h′;µ′)
+sm (1− sf )
(
p′m (w˜m, hm)
∑
k
λ′kV
EUk (a′, w˜m,h′;µ′)
+ (1− p′m (w˜m, hm))
∑
k,d∈{b,n}
λ′kλ
′
dV
UkUd (a′,h′;µ′)

+ (1− sm) sf
(
p′f (w˜f , hf )
∑
k
λ′kV
UkE (a′, w˜f ,h′;µ′)
+ (1− p′m (w˜m, hm))
∑
k,d∈{b,n}
λ′kλ
′
dV
UkUd (a′,h′;µ′)

+ (1− sm) (1− sf )
∑
k,d∈{b,n}
λ′kλ
′
dV
UkUd (a′,h′;µ′)
) ∣∣∣∣∣h, µ
]
.
The explanation of the terms in the right hand side is similar to its counterpart in the
baseline model.
Employed - employed household Next, consider a household in which both male and
female are employed. The recursive problem of this household is given as follows:
V EE (a,wm, wf ,h;µ) = max
a′≥aL
u (c) + β (1− ζR)El′,h′,µ′
[
V l
′ (
a′, wm, wf ,h′;µ′
) ∣∣∣l,h, µ]
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ y + φ (z; a, y)
y = [wm + wf ] (1− τ)
Γ′ = Λ
(
µ, z′
)
and z′ ∼ Φ (z′ | z) .
210
Similarly, I lay out the expectation over the transition of employment statuses of this
household, which is given below:
El′,h′,µ′
[
V l
′ (
a′, wm, wf ,h′;µ′
) ∣∣∣·] = Eh′,µ′
[(
1− δ′m
)((
1− δ′f
)
V EE
(
a′, wm, wf ,h′;µ′
)
+ δ′f
∑
k∈{b,n}
λ′kV
EUk
(
a′, wm,h′;µ′
))
+ δ′m
((
1− δ′f
)∑
k
λ′kV
UkE
(
a′, wf ,h′;µ′
)
+ δ′f
∑
k,d∈{b,n}
λ′kλ
′
dV
UkUd
(
a′,h′;µ′
) ∣∣∣∣∣h, µ
]
The explanation of the terms in the right hand side is similar to its counterpart in the
baseline model.
Finally, the problem of retired households is identical to their problem in the baseline
model.
Firm problem First, consider a firm that is matched with a worker in submarket (w, h)
when the aggregate state is µ. The pair operates under a constant returns to scale technol-
ogy and produces g (h, z) units of output, and the worker is paid a wage of w. With some
probability δ (h, z) the match dissolves, and the worker retires with probability ζR. Let
J (w, h; µ) be the value of a matched firm in submarket (w, h) when the aggregate state
is µ. The recursive problem of this firm is given as follows:
J (w, h; µ) = g (h, z)− w + 1
1 + r
(1− ζR)Eh′,µ′
[(
1− δ (h′, z′)) J (w, h′; µ′) ∣∣∣h, µ]
subject to (A.1)
Γ′ = Λ
(
µ, z′
)
and z′ ∼ Φ (z′ | z) .
Meanwhile, the value of a firm that posts a vacancy in submarket (w, h) under aggregate
state µ is given by
V (w, h; µ) = −κ+ q (θ (w, h; µ)) J (w, h; µ)
where κ is a fixed cost of posting a vacancy that is financed by risk-neutral foreign en-
trepreneurs who own the firms.
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The free entry condition implies that profits are just enough to cover the cost of filling a
vacancy in expectation. As a result, the owner of the firm makes zero profits in expectation.
Thus, V (w, h; µ) = 0 for any submarket (w, h) such that θ (w, h; µ) > 0. Then, imposing
the free entry condition yields the equilibrium market tightness:
θ (w, h; µ) =
q
−1
(
κ
J(w, h;µ)
)
if w ∈ W (µ) and h ∈ H (µ)
0 otherwise.
(A.2)
The equilibrium market tightness contains all the relevant information needed by house-
holds to evaluate the job finding probabilities at each submarket.
Equilibrium Definition of Recursive Equilibrium is very similar to that under Section
1.2.4 of the main text, with indexing relevant policy functions with extra state of wage
level w. The directed search feature of this model, together with the other assumptions
discussed in Section 1.2.4, allows this model to admit a BRE as well. This time unemployed
endogenously choose wage submarkets compatible with their own skill to direct their search
effort, rather than being automatically assigned to skill submarkets based on their own skill.
This extra feature of the extended model deserve a proof on the existence of BRE.
Proposition: If i) utility function u (· ) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfies
Inada conditions; ii) choice sets W and A, human capital set H, and set of exogenous
process Z are bounded, iii) matching function M exhibits constant returns to scale, and
iv) government policy instruments are restricted to be only a function of current aggregate
labor productivity, then there exists a Block Recursive Equilibrium for this economy.
Proof: This proof is an extension of the proof given in Birinci and See (2017) in two ways:
i) this model incorporates endogenous labor supply decision, and ii) submarkets are also
indexed by skill levels.
I prove the existence of the BRE in two steps. In the first step, I show that the firm value
functions and the corresponding labor market tightness depend on the aggregate state of
the economy only through the current aggregate labor productivity. Then, in the second
step, given that government policy instruments are restricted to be a function of the current
aggregate labor productivity z, I show that the household value functions do not depend
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on the aggregate distribution of households across states Γ. As a result, I show that given
the government policy, the solution of the household’s problem together with the solution
of the firm’s problem and labor market tightness, constitute a block recursive equilibrium.
Let J (W ,H ,Z) be the set of bounded and continuous functions J such that J : W ×
H × Z → R and let TJ be an operator associated with (A.1) such that TJ : J → J .
Then, using Blackwell’s sufficiency conditions for a contraction and the assumptions of the
boundedness of sets of exogenous process Z, choice set W, and human capital set H, we
know that TJ is a contraction and has a unique fixed point J
∗ ∈ J . Thus, the firm value
function satisfying (A.1) depends on the aggregate state of the economy µ only through
the aggregate labor productivity z. This means that the set of wages posted by the firms
in equilibrium W for each element in the set of possible skill level H is determined by the
aggregate labor productivity z as well. Then, plugging J∗ into (A.2) yields
θ∗ (w, h; z) =
q
−1
(
κ
J∗(w, h; z)
)
if w ∈ W (z) and h ∈ H (z)
0 otherwise.
Notice that, as explained in the main text for the baseline model, the constant-returns-
to-scale property of the matching function M is crucial here so that we can write the job
finding rate and vacancy filling rate as a function of θ only.5 Hence, I show that equilibrium
market tightness θ∗ does not depend on the distribution of households across states Γ as
well.
Next, using this result and the assumption that the government policy only depends on z,
I show that the household value functions do not depend on the aggregate distribution of
households across states Γ. To do so, I first collapse the problem of households into one
functional equation and show that it is a contraction. Then, I show that the functional
equation maps the set of functions that depend on the aggregate state µ only through z.
Let Ω denote the possible realizations of the aggregate state µ and define a value function
5The free entry condition (2.6) is also important to pin down market tightness.
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K : {0, 1, 2} × {0, 1, 2} × {0, 1} × {0, 1} × A×W ×W ×H×H×Ω → R such that
K (lm = 1, lf = 1, dm = 0, df = 0, a, wm, wf , hm, hf ;µ) = V
EE (a,wm, wf , hm, hf ;µ)
K (lm = 1, lf = 0, dm = 0, df = 1, a, wm, wf , hm, hf ;µ) = V
EUb (a,wm, hm, hf ;µ)
K (lm = 1, lf = 0, dm = 0, df = 0, a, wm, wf , hm, hf ;µ) = V
EUn (a,wm, hm, hf ;µ)
K (lm = 0, lf = 0, dm = 1, df = 0, a, wm, wf , hm, hf ;µ) = V
UbUn (a, hm, hf ;µ)
K (lm = 2, lf = 2, dm = 0, df = 0, a, wm, wf , hm, hf ;µ) = V
R (a)
and so on for other types of households with different employment statuses.
Then, we define the set of functions K : {0, 1} × {0, 1} × {0, 1} × {0, 1} × A ×W ×W ×
H×H×Z → R and let TK be an operator such that
TKK (·) = lmlf
[
max
a′≥aL
u (c) + β
[
(1− ζR)El′,h′,µ′K (·) + ζRK
(
l′ = 2, ·)]]
+lm (1− lf )
[
max
a′≥aL,sf∈{0,1}
u (c) + ηf (1− sf ) + max
w˜f
β
[
(1− ζR)EK (·) + ζRK
(
l′ = 2, ·)]]
+ (1− lm) lf
[
max
a′≥aL,sm∈{0,1}
u (c) + ηm (1− sm) + max
w˜m
β
[
(1− ζR)EK (·) + ζRK
(
l′ = 2, ·)]]
+ (1− lm) (1− lf )
 max
a′≥aL, sm,sf∈{0,1}
u (c) +
∑
i∈{m,f}
ηi (1− si)
+ max
w˜m,w˜f
{
β
[
(1− ζR)EK (·) + ζRK
(
l′ = 2, ·)]}]
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ y + φ (z; a, y) +
[
(1− lm) dmb (z;Ub, sm) + (1− lf ) dfb (z;Ub, sf )
]
(1− τ)
y =
[
lmwm + lfwf
]
(1− τ)
z′ ∼ Φ (z′ | z)
where none of the terms inside expectations (δ′m, δ′f , λ
′
b, λ
′
n, p
′
m, or p
′
f ) and value functions
K inside these expectations depend on Γ.6
6Here, I refrain the write out expectation explicitly to save space. However, these expectations are
shown above for reference.
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Assuming the utility function is bounded and continuous, K is the set of continuous and
bounded functions. Then, we can show that the operator TK maps a function from K into
K (i.e., TK : K → K). Then, using Blackwell’s sufficiency conditions for a contraction and
the assumptions of boundedness of sets of exogenous process Z, choice set W and A, and
human capital set H, we can show that TK is a contraction and has a unique fixed point
K∗ ∈ K. Thus, the solution to the household problem does depend on Γ. This constitutes a
BRE along with the solution to the firm’s problem and the implied labor market tightness
that does not depend on Γ, given that the government policy is a function of z only.
A.5 Computational Algorithm
Given that the model is block recursive, none of the equilibrium value functions, policy
functions, or market tightness depend on aggregate distribution of agents across states Γ.
This means that block recursive equilibrium (BRE) depends on µ only through z. BRE is
solved using the following steps:
1. Solve for the value function of the firm J (h, z).
2. Using the free-entry condition 0 = −κ+ q (θ (h, z)) J (h, z) and the functional form
of q (θ), we can solve for market tightness for any given human capital submarket h
and aggregate productivity z:
θ (h, z) = q−1
(
κ
J (h, z)
)
,
where we set θ (h, z) = 0 when the market is inactive.
3. Given the function θ, I can then solve for the household value functions and policy
functions using standard value function iteration. In order to decrease computation
time, I implement Howard’s improvement algorithm (policy-function iteration).
4. Once household policy functions are obtained, I simulate aggregate dynamics of the
model.
Computational algorithm of the model with endogenous wages is the same as the baseline
model with an addition that equilibrium objects are also functions of wage.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Data
SIPP data
We use the U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
to document the liquid asset holdings of individuals. The SIPP is a longitudinal survey
that follows individuals for a duration of up to five years, with interviews being held
in four-month intervals called waves. Each respondent is then assigned to one of four
rotation groups. The rotation group determines which month within a wave a respondent
is interviewed. Each interview covers information about the four months (reference months)
preceding the interview month. For example, when a new SIPP panel starts and Wave 1
(the first four months of the new panel) commences, the first rotation group is interviewed
in the first month of Wave 1, the second rotation group is interviewed in the second month
of Wave 1, and so on. Once all four rotation groups are interviewed at the end of the fourth
month of Wave 1, Wave 2 begins with the second interview of the first rotation group. This
way, all four rotation groups, and thus all respondents, will have been interviewed at the
end of each wave.
In each interview, respondents are asked questions about their income, labor force status
and government transfer receipts over the previous four months not including the interview
month. In the end, the SIPP provides monthly data on income and government transfers
and weekly data on labor force status. Most importantly, the SIPP also contains data on
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the asset holdings of the respondent. In each SIPP panel, respondents provide information
on various types of asset holdings at two or three waves of the panel, usually one year
or, equivalently, three waves apart. We use the 2004 panel of the SIPP, which contains
12 waves covering information between January 2004 and December 2007. This particular
panel allows us to observe data on asset holdings at Waves 3 and 6. Since it is the closest
date to the Great Recession, we calculate the asset distribution using Wave 6.
Asset distribution
We focus on the liquid asset holdings of individuals. The SIPP contains individual level
data on financial liquid assets such as interest-earning financial assets in banking and other
instutitions, amount in non-interest-earning checking accounts, equity in stocks and mutual
funds, and face value of U.S. savings bonds. Moreover, for married individuals, the survey
asks about the amount of these assets in joint accounts. Only one spouse is asked about
joint accounts; the response is then divided by two, and the divided amount is copied to
both spouses’ records. The SIPP also contains information about revolving debt on credit
card balances at the individual level for both single and joint accounts in the same fashion.
The summation of the amounts in liquid asset accounts net of revolving debt gives us the
net financial asset holdings of the individual. Finally, the SIPP provides data on equity in
cars at the household level. We split that amount between the members of the household
who are age 16 or older, and record that value as the amount of equity in cars for each
individual within the household. Adding this value to net financial asset holdings of the
individual gives us the measure of liquid asset holdings for each individual.1
1Net financial asset holdings are calculated as follows by us-
ing the following variables in SIPP data: Net financial assets =
TALICHA+TALJCHA+TALSBV+TIMIA+TIMJA+TIAITA+TIAJTA+ESMIV+ESMJV-
(EALIDAB+EALJDAB) where TALICHA (TALJCHA) is the amount of non-interest-earning checking
accounts in own name (joint account), TALSBV is the face value of U.S. savings bonds, TIMIA (TIMJA)
is amount of bonds/securities in own name (joint account), TIAITA (TIAJTA) is the amount in interest
earning account in own name (joint account), ESMIV (ESMJV) value of stocks/funds in own name
(joint account), and EALIDAB (EALJDAB) amount owed for store bills/credit cards in own name (joint
account). Then, net equity in vehicles of the household is given by THHVEHCL. We divide this value
among the members of the household above age 16. Thus, we get the net liquid asset holdings of the
individual as follows: Net liquid assets = Net financial assets +THHVEHCL /number of persons within
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The SIPP also provides information about the monthly gross job earnings for each in-
dividual. We use this information to determine the monthly gross labor income of the
individual. If the individual is unemployed during the interview month, we use her gross
labor income associated with the last employment from earlier waves. Next, using the
weekly employment status of the individual for that month, we calculate the weekly gross
labor income of the individual by dividing monthly gross labor income by the number of
weeks with a job during the interview month.
We then calculate annual income and payroll tax rates using the statutory U.S. income
tax codes in the following steps. First, we calculate the annual income of each individual.
Annual income includes labor income, capital income, and all kinds of government transfers
including UI received in the fiscal year. Next, we apply the year-specific federal income tax
schedule to the annual income net of year-specific personal exemptions and deductions to
obtain the total annual income tax for each respondent. After that, we calculate the total
annual payroll tax (Social Security and Medicare tax) for each individual. We obtain the
total annual payroll tax for each individual by applying the year-specific Social Security
and Medicare tax schedule to the total annual labor income of the individual for the time
period. 2 Then, our measure for the tax rate is
τ =
Share of labor income×Annual income tax + Annual payroll tax
Annual labor income
,
where the share of labor income is the ratio of annual labor income to annual income. We
then apply the tax rate τ for each individual in our sample and obtain weekly after-tax
labor income. Last, dividing the liquid asset holdings measure to weekly after-tax labor
income gives us the asset-to-income ratio for each individual.
B.2 Proofs
Opportunity cost of employment
In this section, we show the derivations of Equations (2.12) and (2.13) in the main text.
the household age 16 and above.
2We also consider the fact that there is a maximum taxable annual labor income for Social Security
tax, while Medicare tax does not have such a limit. As a result, we get total annual tax as the sum of total
annual income and payroll taxes.
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First, substituting (2.1) and (2.2) into (2.8), we have
SUE
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
=V W (a, w˜ (·) , β; p)− V UE (a,wUE , β; p)
=u
(
cW
)− u (cUE)+ ν (s)
+βE
[
δ
(
p′
) (
1− e (p′))V UE (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)
+ δ
(
p′
)
e
(
p′
)
V UI
(
a′W , β′; p′
)]
+βE
[(
1− δ (p′))V W (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)]
−βE
[
sf
(
θ
(
w˜ (·) ; p′))V W (a′UE , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)]
−βE [(1− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′))) (1− e (p′))V UE (a′UE , wUE , β′; p′)]
−βE [(1− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′))) e (p′)V UI (a′UE , β′; p′)]
In order to obtain (2.12), we add and subtract terms, rearrange them, then use (2.10), and
divide both sides by λW . This yields
SUE
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
λW
=
u
(
cW
)− u (cUE)+ ν (s)
λW
+
β
λW
E
[
sf
(
θ
(
w˜ (·) ; p′))
× (V W (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)− V W (a′UE , w˜ (·) , β′; p′))]
+
β
λW
E
[(
1− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′))− δ (p′) e (p′))
× (V UE (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)− V UE (a′UE , wUE , β′; p′))]
+
β
λW
E
[(
1− δ (p′)− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′)))
× (V W (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)− V W (a′W , w˜ (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′) , β′; p′))]
+
β
λW
E
[(
1− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′))− δ (p′)) e (p′)
× (V UE (a′UE , wUE , β′; p′)− V UI (a′UE , β′; p′))]
+ βE
[
λ′W
λW
(1− δ (p′)− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′)))S (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)
λ′W
]
where the summation of the second and third terms on the right-hand side is −zUEa , the
fourth term is −zUEw , and the fifth term is −zUEelg . Given the form of the utility function,
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we cannot isolate zUEflow from the first term on the right-hand side. However, since we
know that the flow value of employment is w˜
(
a,wUE , β; p
) × (1− τ), we can numerically
calculate zUEflow using the above equation as follows:
zUEflow =
SUE
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
λW
− w˜ (a,wUE , β; p)× (1− τ) + zUEa + zUEw + zUEelg
− βE
[
λ′W
λW
(1− δ (p′)− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′)))S (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)
λ′W
]
.
This gives us the opportunity cost of employment for the eligible unemployed zUE =
zUEflow + z
UE
a + z
UE
w + z
UE
elg for each state
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
.
Second, substituting (2.1) and (2.3) into (2.9), we have
SUI (a, β; p) = V W (a, w˜ (·) , β; p)− V UI (a, β; p)
= u
(
cW
)− u (cUI)+ ν (s)
+ βE
[
δ
(
p′
) [(
1− e (p′))V UE (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)+ e (p′)V UI (a′W , β′; p′)]]
+ βE
[(
1− δ (p′))V W (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)]
− βE [sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′))V W (a′UI , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)]
− βE [(1− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′)))V UI (a′UI , β′; p′)]
Similarly, in order to obtain (2.13), we again add and subtract terms, rearrange them, then
use (2.11), and divide both sides by λW . This yields
SUI (a, β; p)
λW
=
u
(
cW
)− u (cUI)+ ν (s)
λW
+
β
λW
E
[
sf
(
θ
(
w˜ (·) ; p′)) [V W (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)− V W (a′UI , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)]]
+
β
λW
E
[(
1− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′))) [V UI (a′W , β′; p′)− V UI (a′UI , β′; p′)]]
+
β
λW
E
[(
1− δ (p′)− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′)))
× (V W (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)− V W (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′))]
+
β
λW
E
[
δ
(
p′
) (
1− e (p′)) [V UE (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)− V UI (a′W , β′; p′)]]
+ βE
[
λ′W
λW
(1− δ (p′)− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′)))SUI (a′W , β′; p′)
λ′W
]
,
220
where the summation of the second and third terms on the right-hand side is −zUIa , the
fourth term is −zUIw , and the fifth term is −zUIelg . Similarly, we numerically calculate zUIflow
as follows:
zUIflow =
SUI (a, β; p)
λW
− w˜ (a, β; p)× (1− τ) + zUIa + zUIw + zUIelg
− βE
[
λ′W
λW
(
1− δ (p′)− sf (θ (w˜ (a′UI , β′; p′) ; p′)))SUI (a′W , β′; p′)
λ′W
]
.
This gives us the opportunity cost of employment for the eligible unemployed zUI = zUIflow+
zUIa + z
UI
w + z
UI
elg for each state (a, β; p) .
3
Block recursive equilibrium
Proposition 1: If i) utility function u (· ) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and
satisfies Inada conditions; ν (· ) is strictly increasing and strictly convex, ii) choice sets W
and A, and sets of exogenous processes P and B are bounded, iii) matching function M
exhibits constant returns to scale, and iv) UI policy is restricted to be only a function of
current aggregate labor productivity, then there exists a Block Recursive Equilibrium for
this economy. If, in addition, M = min {v, S}, then the Block Recursive Equilibrium is the
only recursive equilibrium.
Proof: The proof presented here follows from Karahan and Rhee (2013) and Herkenhoff
(2017), which are extensions of Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011). We extend the former’s proof
to a model in which government finances the time-varying UI benefits and show that the
model still admits block recursivity. We then use the model to study how UI policy must
vary over the business cycle. In doing so, the additional assumption we make here is to
restrict the class of UI policies to be a function of current aggregate labor productivity.
Existence: We prove the existence of the BRE in two steps. In the first step, we show
that the firm value functions and the corresponding labor market tightness depend on
the aggregate state of the economy only through the current aggregate labor productivity.
Then, in the second step, given that UI policy instruments are restricted to be a function
3In this numerical calculation, we calculate the opportunity cost under fixed wages and disregard zUEw
and zUIw .
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of the current aggregate labor productivity, we show that the household value functions do
not depend on the aggregate distribution of agents across states. As a result, we show that
given the UI policy, the solution of the household’s problem together with the solution of
the firm’s problem and labor market tightness, constitute a block recursive equilibrium.
Let J (W,P) be the set of bounded and continuous functions J such that J :W×P → R
and let TJ be an operator associated with (2.4) such that TJ : J → J . Then, using
Blackwell’s sufficiency conditions for a contraction and the assumptions of the boundedness
of sets of exogenous processes P and B, and choice setsW and A, we can show that TJ is a
contraction and has a unique fixed point J∗ ∈ J . Thus, the firm value function satisfying
(2.4) depends on the aggregate state of the economy µ only through the aggregate labor
productivity p. This means that the set of wages posted by the firms in equilibrium W
is determined by the aggregate labor productivity p as well. Then, plugging J∗ into (2.6)
yields
θ∗ (w; p) =
q
−1
(
κ
J∗(w;p)
)
if w ∈ W (p)
0 otherwise
Notice that, as explained in the main text, the constant-returns-to-scale property of the
matching function M is crucial here so that we can write the job finding rate and vacancy
filling rate as a function of θ only.4 Hence, we show that equilibrium market tightness does
not depend on the distribution of agents across states as well.
Next, using this result and the assumption that the UI policy only depends on p, we show
that the household value functions do not depend on the aggregate distribution of agents
across states. To do so, we first collapse the problem of households into one functional
equation and show that it is a contraction. Then, we show that the functional equation
maps the set of functions that depend on the aggregate state µ only through p.
Let Ω denote the possible realizations of the aggregate state µ and define a value function
R : {0, 1} × {0, 1} × A×W × B ×Ω → R such that
R (l = 1, d = 0, a, w, β;µ) = V W (a,w, β;µ)
R (l = 0, d = 1, a, w, β;µ) = V UE (a,w, β;µ)
R (l = 0, d = 0, a, w, β;µ) = V UI (a, β;µ)
4The free entry condition (2.6) is also important to pin down market tightness.
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Then, we define the set of functions R : {0, 1} × {0, 1} ×A×W ×B ×P → R and let TR
be an operator such that
(TRR) (l, d, a, w, β; p) =l
[
max
c,a′
u (c) + βE
[
δ
(
p′
) (
1− e (p′))R (l = 0, d = 1, ·)
+δ
(
p′
)
e
(
p′
)
R (l = 0, d = 0, ·) + (1− δ (p′))R (l = 1, d = 0, ·)]]
+ (1− l) d
[
max
c,a′,s
u (c)− ν (s) + βE
[
max
w˜
{
sf (θ (·))R (l = 1, d = 0, ·)
+ (1− sf (θ (·))) (1− e (p′))R (l = 0, d = 1, ·)
+ (1− sf (θ (·))) e (p′)R (l = 0, d = 0, ·)}]]
+ (1− l) (1− d)
[
max
c,a′,s
u (c)− ν (s)
+ βE
[
max
w˜
{
sf (θ (·))R (l = 1, d = 0, ·)
+ (1− sf (θ (·)))R (l = 0, d = 0, ·)
}]]
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ lw (1− τ) + (1− l) d [φ (p)w (1− τ) + h]
+ (1− l) (1− d)h
a′ ≥ −a
p′ ∼ F (p′ | p)
where we use the result from above that market tightness does depend on Γ.
Assuming the utility function is bounded and continuous, R is the set of continuous and
bounded functions. Then, we can show that the operator TR maps a function from R into
R (i.e., TR : R → R). Then, using Blackwell’s sufficiency conditions for a contraction and
the assumptions of boundedness of sets of exogenous processes P and B, and choice sets
W and A, we can show that TR is a contraction and has a unique fixed point R∗ ∈ R.
Thus, the solution to the household problem does depend on Γ. This constitutes a BRE
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along with the solution to the firm’s problem and the implied labor market tightness that
does not depend on Γ, given that the UI policy is a function of p only.
Uniqueness: We know that policy functions of the household do not depend on Γ. Now,
we prove the uniqueness of the policy functions for assets
{
gla (a,w, β; p)
}
l={W,UE}
, and
gUIa (a, β; p), wage choice g
UE
w (a,w, β; p) and g
UI
w (a, β; p), and search effort g
UE
s (a,w, β; p)
and gUIs (a, β; p).
Wage policy function: Under the assumptions on u (· ) and ν (· ) together with the
assumptions of boundedness of sets of exogenous processes P and B, and choice sets W
and A, value functions V l are strictly concave in w for l = {W,UE} and V UI is constant
in w. For simplicity, assume that p is non-stochastic and δ (p) = δ. We then obtain the
equilibrium value of a matched firm using Equation (2.4) as follows:5
J∗ (w; p) =
p− w
r + δ
(1 + r)
Then, we can write the equilibrium labor market tightness as
f (θ∗ (w; p)) = θ∗ (w; p) =
J∗ (w; p)
κ
where the first equality uses the assumption that M = min {v, S}, and the second equality
uses the free entry condition. Using the expression for J∗ (w; p) gives
f (θ∗ (w; p)) =
1 + r
κ (r + δ)
[p− w] > 0.
This implies that the job finding rate f (· ) is linear and decreasing in w. Then, rewriting
the objective function for the wage choice of eligible unemployed, we have
max
w˜
sf (θ (w˜; p))V W
(
a′, w˜, β′; p
)
+ (1− sf (θ (w˜; p)))
× [(1− e (p))V UE (a′, w, β′; p)+ e (p)V UI (a′, β′; p)]
Using the result that V l is strictly concave in w for l = {W,UE} and V UI is constant in w,
and that f (· ) is linear and decreasing in w, it is easy to show that the objective function
5The following results can be obtained under N state Markov process assumption for p and no restric-
tions on the job destruction rate.
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above is strictly concave in w. This implies that the wage policy function gUEw (a,w, β; p)
is unique.
Similarly, rewriting the objective function for the wage choice of ineligible unemployed
yields
max
w˜
sf (θ (w˜; p))V W
(
a′, w˜, β′; p
)
+ (1− sf (θ (w˜; p)))V UI (a′, β′; p) ,
and using the same reasoning implies that the wage policy function gUIw (a, β; p) is also
unique.
Asset policy function: Under the assumptions on the utility functions u (· ) and ν (· )
and choice sets A, W and exogenous proceses B, P, value functions V l are strictly concave
in assets. This implies that the objective functions for the asset choice of each employment
status are strictly concave in a′, and thus asset policy functions gla (a,w, β; p) are unique
for l = {W,UE,UI}
Search effort policy function: Using the same reasoning, objective functions for search
effort choice of eligible and ineligible unemployed are strictly concave in s. This implies
that the search effort policy functions gUEs (a,w, β; p) and g
UI
s (a, β; p) are unique.
B.3 Welfare Calculation for Great Recession Simulation
First, we focus on individual i. Let t = 0 be December 2007 and let T be December
2013. For ease of exposition, we discuss the calculation of welfare in two separate parts:
let period (A) include any time t ∈ [0, . . . T ] during the Great Recession and recovery and
(B) represent the terminal time period post-December 2013 t > T .
Let cji (xt, pt) and s
j
i (xt, pt) denote the consumption and search effort policy functions of
individual i with individual state xt at time t when aggregate productivity is pt and UI
policy is j ∈ {b, f, n}, where b denotes the benchmark policy, f denotes the flat policy,
and n denotes the new/alternative policy.6 To evaluate the welfare gains from the optimal
policy in this exercise, we set policy n to be the optimal policy.
6Notice here that we are using the result that policy functions of the agents in our economy depend on
the aggregate state of economy only through p as a result of block recursivity.
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First consider welfare in period (A). Under the benchmark policy b, the utility of individual
i during period (A) when endowed with additional p¯i percent of consumption for her lifetime
is given by
T∑
t=0
(βi,t)
t U
(
cbi (xt, pt) (1 + p¯i) , s
b
i (xt, pt)
)
,
where U
(
cbi (xt, pt) (1 + p¯i) , s
b
i
)
=
[cbi (xt,pt)(1+p¯i)]
1−σ
1−σ − 1U
[
α
sbi (xt,pt)
1+χ
1+χ
]
. Note that in the
above expression, {pt}Tt=0 represents the labor productivity that is fed into the model during
the recession, while {βi,t}Tt=0 represents the realized values of discount factor β. Agents,
however, take expectations on aggregate labor productivity using the AR(1) process.
Now consider period (B). The continuation value of the individual post-December 2013 is
given by
ET+1
∞∑
t=T+1
(βi,t)
t U
(
cji (xt, pt) (1 + p¯i) , s
j
i (xt, pt)
)
,
which recursively can be written as (βi,T+1)
T+1 V li,jp¯i (aT+1, wT+1, βT+1, pT+1) where V
li,j
p¯i
denotes the value of individual i with labor force status li ∈ {W,UE,UI} under the
policy j when consumption is multiplied by 1 + p¯i every period from t = T + 1 onward.
Computationally, we can find V lip¯i once we have obtained the policy functions associated
with the underlying value function V li . We do this recursively by policy function iteration
with the difference being that consumption is multiplied by (1 + p¯i) at every iteration.
Under the original exercise where the policy is permanent, we set j = b, while under the
exercise when the policy is discretionary/temporary, the government reverts back to the
flat policy postrecession and thus j = f .
Hence, the welfare of agent i who is endowed with an additional p¯i percent of lifetime
consumption over periods (A) and (B) under the baseline policy b can be written as
T∑
t=0
[
(βi,t)
t U
(
cbi (xt, pt) (1 + p¯i) , s
b
i (xt, pt)
)]
+ (βi,T+1)
T+1 V li,jp¯i (aT+1, wT+1, βT+1, pT+1) .
Now, aggregating across individuals at each point in time, we can write the left-hand side
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of Equation (2.15) as
T∑
t=0
[∫
i
(βi,t)
t U
(
cbi (xt, pt) (1 + p¯i) , s
b
i (xt, pt)
)
dΓbt (i)
]
+
∫
i
(βi,T+1)
T+1 V li,jp¯i (aT+1, wT+1, βT+1, pT+1) dΓ
b
T+1 (i) , (B.1)
where Γbt is the distribution of the economy at time t under policy b.
Similarly, the right-hand-side of equation (2.15) is computed by solving
T∑
t=0
[∫
i
(βi,t)
t U (cni (xt, pt) , s
n
i (xt, pt)) dΓ
n
t (i)
]
+
∫
i
(βi,T+1)
T+1 V li,j (aT+1, wT+1, βT+1, pT+1) dΓ
n
T+1 (i) , (B.2)
where Γnt is the corresponding distribution under policy n and the superscript j of the
value function in (B) depends on whether the policy is permanent (j = n) or temporary
(j = f).
Under a temporary policy, we emphasize that even if the policy reverts to the flat policy
f after December 2013, the terminal value will be different for policy b and n because the
distribution of each economy at t = T + 1 is going to be different from each other (i.e.,
ΓbT+1 6= ΓnT+1).
Then, we simply use a zero-finder to find p¯i that makes equations (B.1) and (B.2) the
same.7
B.4 Model with Endogenous Quits
In this section, we present the extended model that incorporates the endogenous quit
decisions of workers.
Worker’s problem
Under the model with quits, workers matched with a firm can decide to leave employment.
After the separation shock realizes, a firm-worker pair that is not dissolved exogenously
7Note that there is no closed-form solution for p¯i given the functional form of the utility function.
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may endogenously be separated if the worker chooses to quit. The worker’s problem is now
given by
V W (a,w, β;µ) = max
c,a′
u (c) + βE
[
δ
(
p′
) (
1− e (p′))V UE (a′, w, β′;µ′)
+δ
(
p′
)
e
(
p′
)
V UI
(
a′, β′;µ′
)
+
(
1− δ (p′)) max
d∈{0,1}
{
dV UI
(
a′, β′;µ′
)
+ (1− d)V W (a′, w, β′;µ′)}]
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ w (1− τ)
a′ ≥ −a
Γ′ = H
(
µ, p′
)
and p′ ∼ F (p′ | p) .
Firm’s problem
The value of a matched firm is modified to account for the possibility of a quit. Even if a
match is not dissolved by the exogenous shock δ, it can be dissolved if the worker’s decision
to quit is gd = 1:
J (a,w, β;µ) = p− w (B.3)
× 1
1 + r
E
[(
1− δ (p′)) (1− gd (a′, w, β′, µ′)) J (a′, w, β′;µ′) ∣∣∣β, µ]
subject to
Γ′ = H
(
µ, p′
)
and p′ ∼ F (p′ | p) ,
where a′ = ga (a,w, β, µ).
So, the value of posting a vacancy is given by
V (a,w, β;µ) = −κ+ q (θ (a,w, β;µ)) J (a,w, β;µ) (B.4)
and market tightness can be obtained by solving
θ (a,w, β;µ) =
q
−1
(
κ
J(a,w,β;µ)
)
if w ∈ W (µ)
0 otherwise.
(B.5)
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Notice that the value of a firm J depends on individual states x = (a,w, β, b) because
heterogeneous workers will have different quit thresholds. This would then imply that
market tightness θ is also a function of these states.
Unemployed’s problem
The unemployed’s problem remains unchanged, except that market tightness is now a
function of other individual states x = (a,w, β, b) for reasons stated in the firm’s problem.
B.5 Computational Algorithm
Solving the baseline model
The model is solved using the following steps:
1. Solve for the value function of the firm J (w, p).
2. Using the free-entry condition 0 = −κ+q (θ (w, p)) J (w, p) and the functional form of
q (θ), we can solve for market tightness for any given wage submarket w and aggregate
productivity p:
θ (w, p) = q−1
(
κ
J (w, p)
)
,
where we set θ (w, p) = 0 when the market is inactive.
3. Given the function θ, we can then solve for the household value functions V W , V UE ,
and V UI using standard value function iteration. In order to decrease computation
time, we implement Howard’s improvement algorithm (policy-function iteration).
4. Once household policy functions are obtained, we are able to simulate aggregate
dynamics of the model.
Extended model with endogenous quits
Solving the model will require modifying the baseline algorithm above as follows:
1. Guess a market tightness function θ0 (a
′, w, β′, p′).
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2. Taking θ0 as given, solve for the household’s problem.
3. Using the household’s policy function gWd (θ0) and g
W
a (θ0), solve for the firm’s prob-
lem.
4. After obtaining J0 (a,w, β, p), use Equation B.5 to back out the implied market tight-
ness θ1 (a
′, w, β′, p′).
5. If convergence criterion ‖ θ1 − θ0 ‖≤ θ is not satisfied, use θ1 as a guess and repeat
the steps outlined above.
230
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
In this appendix, we provide details on the data sources and construction of variables for
our analysis in “What Do Survey Data Tell Us about U.S. Businesses?” We also include
the auxiliary tables and figures omitted from the main text.
C.1 Data Sources
The main data sources are:
• Statistics of Income of the Internal Revenue Service (SOI);
• Survey of Consumer Finances of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (SCF);
• Survey of Income and Program Participation of the U.S. Census Bureau in the De-
partment of Commerce (SIPP);
• Panel Study of Income Dynamics of the Survey Research Center, Institute for Social
Research, University of Michigan (PSID);
• Current Population Survey at the Bureau of Labor Statistics (CPS);
• Center for Research in Security Prices and Compustat (CRSP);
• Pratt’s Stats (now renamed as DealStats) from Business Valuation Resources.
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Besides the main data sources listed above, we also use information from the national
income and product accounts and fixed asset tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis;
financial accounts of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Panel Study
of Entrepreneurial Dynamics of the Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research,
University of Michigan; and the Kauffman Firm Survey of the Kauffman Foundation.
We construct business incomes and numbers of returns and owners by using variables
from the IRS, SCF, SIPP, PSID, and CPS. In addition to these variables, we use BEA
estimates of income misreporting by noncorporate businesses and General Accountability
Office (GAO) estimates of income misreporting by S corporations to adjust IRS pass-
through business income. BEA estimates of income misreporting over time are obtained
from NIPA Table 7.14 (line 2). The GAO estimates are taken from reports GAO 14-453
and 10-195, which summarize the progress of the tax compliance studies conducted by the
IRS through the National Research Program.
To verify the consistency of sole proprietorship income in the SCF, we compared two
measures of net income from a sole proprietorship or a farm. Results of the comparison
were reported in the main text. The first uses pretax net income variables (coded by
X3132, X3232, and X3332) from Form 1040, Schedule C (line 31). The second is X5704,
which measures net annual income from a sole proprietorship or a farm before deductions.
Specifically, this variable codes responses to the question asking for combined incomes
appearing on lines 12 and 18 of IRS Form 1040.
Finally, to verify whether respondents in the SCF check documents, we use variable X6536,
which provides information on the frequency of checking any documents when answering
interview questions. Variable X7451 informs us about whether the respondent referred
to income tax documents, and variables X7452 through X7455 inform us about whether
the respondent referred to other financial documents, namely, pension documents, account
statements, investment or business records, and loan documents, respectively. If a respon-
dent says that he or she checked the income tax document (X7451=1), we use his or her
answers to X6536 to obtain the frequency of checking this document. The respondent
did not check the income tax document if either (X7451=5 or X7451=0 or X7451=-7) or
(X6536=4). We use the same steps to check referencing of other financial documents by
using X7452–X7455 instead of X7451. We classify a respondent who checks at least one of
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these four documents as someone who refers to any other tax documents. We then obtain
the weighted fraction of the group of respondents who check these two types of documents
frequently, sometimes, rarely, or never. Roughly 4 percent of all respondents have nonap-
plicable responses (NaN). We adjust for this nonresponse rate in the results of the main
text so that our fractions sum to 100 percent.
C.2 Additional Results
Next, we report on our auxiliary tables and figures that relate to our findings on business
incomes, receipts, and returns.
Business income
Aggregate
In Section 3.3.1 of the main text, we discussed business income per return and the number of
returns across years and legal forms. In Figure C.1, we report aggregate business incomes
and show that they are overstated for all pass-through businesses. In Figure C.2, we
compare the aggregate business income from the SCF with other surveys, namely, the
SIPP, PSID, and CPS, and extend the analysis from Section 3.6 of the main text.
Distribution
In Section 3.3.2, we discussed the distribution of business income by splitting pass-through
businesses into two categories: those that make profits and those that make losses (or no
income). In Figures C.3 and C.4, we plot business income per return by legal status for
those making profits and losses, respectively. In Figures C.5 and C.6, we plot the number of
returns for the same sets of businesses. In Table C.1, we extend the analysis of decomposing
the total percentage error into the overstatement of profits and understatement of losses.
In Figure C.7, we report the distributional statistics for S corporations. As we noted in
the main text, the data for S corporations are only available for limited years, namely
2003–2012, but these data show similar inconsistencies between SCF and IRS data, as was
found with sole proprietorships.
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Broad business income
In Figure C.8, we extend the analysis of Section 3.5.2 in the main text by replicating the
analysis of Johnson and Moore (2008) for all years. As we noted in the main text, the
SCF estimates are still larger in all years than the IRS counterpart even with the broader
concept of income.
Business receipts
In Section 3.3.1 of the main text, we reported that business receipts per owner are over-
stated. In Figures C.9 and C.10, we corroborate that finding by showing aggregate business
receipts and business receipts per return across legal forms and across years.
Business returns
In this section, we provide additional details for the comparison of the income yields in
SCF to CRSP-Compustat, Pratt’s Stats, and other surveys to augment the analysis in
Section 3.4 of the main text.
In Table C.2, we provide several additional moments for the distribution of income yields
in the SCF. In the main text, we showed evidence that the SCF income yields are high
when compared to CRSP-Compustat or Pratt’s Stats. The additional moments show that
this is true regardless of year or legal structure.
In the main text, we compared the income yields for S and C corporations in the SCF
to small firms in CRSP where we defined “small” as corporations that are in the bottom
quintile of the size distribution as measured by the book value of total assets. In Table C.3,
we extend the analysis to two alternative definitions of “small”: (i) those in the bottom
quintile by market value and (ii) those in the bottom quintile by gross sales. Although there
are some differences in the magnitudes, the equally weighted and value-weighted yields are
negative in all years, regardless of how we classify the small firms.
In Table C.4, we report income yields from Pratt’s Stats for all legal forms. We see that sole
proprietors have higher yields than other pass-throughs and C corporations. However, since
these businesses have much smaller valuations, the value-weighted yield for all businesses
is relatively low when compared to SCF data.
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Finally, in Tables C.5 and C.6, we report the income yields in PSID and SIPP for all
years that the data are available. As we noted in the main text, the average yields are
comparable across the SCF, PSID, and SIPP, while the distributions are not. These tables
more clearly demonstrate this finding.
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Table C.1: SCF-IRS business income gap by legal structure
Tax SCF-IRS Percentage of Gap from
Year Gap ($) Overstatement of Profits (%) Understatement of Losses (%)
Sole Proprietorship
1988 67.09 58 42
1994 5.44 -515 615
2000 168.09 75 25
2006 91.66 29 71
2012 -28.22 359 -259
Partnership
1988 56.28 37 63
1994 500.59 92 8
2000 261.03 56 44
2006 724.62 83 17
2012 205.51 0 100
S Corporation
1988 35.78 57 43
1994 118.07 74 26
2000 206.06 78 22
2006 279.35 77 23
2012 41.06 -53 153
C Corporation
1994 -244.42 148 -48
2000 -57.00 670 -570
2006 -859.87 123 -23
2012 -747.36 138 -38
Note: This table shows the difference (gap) between aggregated business income by legal structure in the SCF and
IRS. The gap is then decomposed into the fraction attributable to an overstatement of profits or an understatement
of losses. Dollar amounts are in billions. The table shows results for every six years. See my website for the complete
results.
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Table C.2: Net income yields in the SCF by legal structure
Sole Proprietorship Partnership
Value- Equally
p25 p50 p75
Value- Equally
p25 p50 p75Tax Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted
Year Mean Mean Mean Mean
1988 19.9 105.0 3.2 20.0 80.0 13.6 111.4 0.0 8.0 50.0
1994 19.1 97.8 2.0 24.0 74.0 74.1 49.1 0.3 10.7 42.3
2000 26.6 89.8 0.9 25.5 75.0 24.5 203.1 0.1 11.9 40.0
2006 25.0 254.8 2.3 32.0 100.0 18.8 84.4 0.1 10.0 40.0
2012 24.7 87.4 0.0 23.2 82.4 11.5 36.8 0.0 5.4 33.7
S Corporation C Corporation
1988 12.7 23.5 0.5 6.0 37.5 17.8 101.7 3.2 16.7 30.5
1994 14.3 38.1 0.9 11.7 40.0 28.3 73.9 0.4 8.0 41.1
2000 16.1 120.7 4.4 18.4 40.0 26.5 90.8 2.9 15.8 46.0
2006 15.4 75.1 3.8 16.7 80.0 16.3 44.4 0.0 7.5 36.0
2012 14.4 57.6 2.7 15.2 52.2 15.4 55.4 0.0 9.0 41.3
All Pass-throughs All Businesses
1988 16.1 101.3 1.2 13.3 62.5 16.6 101.3 1.3 14.3 57.0
1994 32.2 80.8 1.1 20.0 64.0 31.5 80.8 1.1 19.0 62.9
2000 21.3 113.9 1.3 21.0 62.9 22.6 114.4 1.6 20.0 62.3
2006 18.4 183.7 2.0 22.0 80.0 18.1 171.7 1.6 20.0 73.3
2012 13.9 67.1 0.0 15.0 60.0 14.1 66.2 0.0 15.0 60.0
Note: This table shows moments of the net income yield distribution of businesses in the SCF by legal structure.
The sample includes businesses with positive net worth and excludes the bottom 1st percentile of these businesses.
The business income of each business that the family members own in the SCF is obtained from SCF variables that
correspond to information on business tax forms. The table shows results for every six years. See my website for the
complete results.
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Table C.3: Income yield for small firms in CRSP
by Market Capitalization
Tax Year EW VW p25 p50 p75
1988 −43.6 −27.0 −52.3 −14.3 6.1
1991 −72.9 −49.0 −72.4 −15.9 5.1
1994 −23.3 −14.2 −34.1 −4.1 9.3
1997 −29.9 −19.2 −43.2 −8.5 7.1
2000 −104.1 −71.8 −103.4 −16.4 10.4
2003 −14.2 −9.2 −21.0 −0.9 7.8
2006 −12.1 −8.1 −20.8 −0.2 7.6
2009 −65.0 −47.3 −72.4 −22.5 4.7
2012 −22.7 −12.6 −35.6 −3.8 10.4
2015 −59.6 −35.6 −55.4 −11.5 6.3
Mean −44.7 −29.4 −51.1 −9.8 7.5
by Sales
EW VW p25 p50 p75
−27.2 −8.8 −26.3 −8.6 1.1
−31.7 −6.0 −23.3 −5.6 1.5
−18.1 −9.2 −24.8 −6.6 4.0
−21.1 −8.5 −25.4 −8.0 2.7
−52.8 −12.4 −42.2 −10.7 2.2
−9.5 −7.2 −15.2 −3.3 5.5
−11.9 −8.6 −18.6 −5.1 4.7
−32.6 −11.0 −34.6 −10.8 3.0
−17.1 −5.7 −22.7 −5.4 6.7
−37.6 −11.5 −35.8 −11.9 1.9
−25.9 −8.9 −26.9 −7.6 3.3
Note: This table shows estimates of income yields for small businesses in CRSP-Compustat firms.The column “EW”
reports the equally weighted average, the column “VW” reports the value-weighted average, the column “p25” reports
the 25th percentile, the column “p50” reports the 50th percentile, and the column “p75” reports the 75th percentile.
Table C.4: Income yield from Pratt’s Stats
Legal Form EW VW p25 p50 p75
Sole Proprietorship 41.3 31.6 13.3 36.7 61.5
Partnership 26.6 4.8 2.7 20.5 48.8
S Corporation 30.3 6.9 6.5 23.3 47.8
C Corporation 6.8 -2.1 -2.3 6.5 29.8
Note: This table shows estimates of income yields from the Pratt’s Stats database.The column “EW” reports the
equally weighted average, the column “VW” reports the value-weighted average, the column “p25” reports the 25th
percentile, the column “p50” reports the 50th percentile, and the column “p75” reports the 75th percentile.
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Table C.5: Net income yields of unincorporated businesses in the PSID
Tax Year Value-Weighted Mean Equally Weighted Mean p25 p50 p75
1998 5.2 136.4 0.0 12.5 75.0
2000 21.7 182.4 0.0 7.5 73.3
2002 21.8 187.0 0.0 33.3 139.5
2004 22.2 287.7 3.9 36.9 140.0
2006 20.6 630.1 10.0 42.5 222.2
2008 10.9 175.8 2.7 28.8 125.0
2010 13.9 110.3 3.9 25.0 75.9
2012 10.7 90.8 3.3 23.0 83.3
2014 6.9 182.9 4.8 33.3 100.0
Mean 14.9 220.4 3.2 27.0 114.9
Note: This table shows moments of the net income yield distribution of unincorporated businesses in the PSID. The
sample includes businesses with positive net worth and excludes the bottom 1st percentile of these businesses.
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Table C.6: Net income yields in the SIPP
Value- Equally
Tax Weighted Weighted p25 p50 p75
Year Mean Mean
Sole Proprietorship
2004 20.2 545.0 6.8 44.8 240.0
2005 19.4 727.7 4.5 41.2 240.0
2009 13.0 3043.1 0.2 24.0 203.3
2010 15.8 5916.6 0.2 31.0 240.0
2011 14.9 8878.2 0.5 29.2 188.0
Mean 16.7 3822.1 2.4 34.0 222.3
Partnership
2004 25.1 605.9 0.6 29.2 220.0
2005 19.9 1271.2 0.3 22.6 189.1
2009 17.4 853.4 0.0 7.4 108.0
2010 21.3 2128.0 0.0 22.5 204.0
2011 18.9 1551.7 0.0 11.8 190.7
Mean 20.5 1282.0 0.2 18.7 182.4
Unincorporated
2004 22.0 2936.2 6.4 45.7 260.0
2005 19.8 12590.7 4.0 40.4 250.0
2009 14.0 15353.1 0.1 22.5 202.5
2010 17.2 38737.5 0.1 30.8 240.0
2011 15.3 7971.4 0.3 26.7 197.8
Mean 17.6 15517.8 2.2 33.2 230.1
Note: This table shows moments of the net income yield distribution of sole proprietorships, partnerships, and
unincorporated businesses in the SIPP 2004 and 2008 panels. Statistics are calculated for years where asset topical
modules are available. The sample includes businesses with positive net worth and excludes the bottom 1st percentile
of these businesses.
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Figure C.1: Business income by legal status, SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the total business income by legal status in the SCF and the IRS. Business income refers to
income reported on Form 1040 Schedule C for sole proprietorships, Form 1065 for partnerships, Form 1120S for S
corporations, and Form 1120 for C corporations. IRS data for partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations are
available only until 2013, and C-corporation data start from 1990 because data for Form 1120 are not available for
1988 and 1989.
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Figure C.2: Total unincorporated business income in SCF, SIPP, PSID, and CPS vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the total business income of unincorporated businesses in the SCF, SIPP, PSID, CPS, and
IRS. Before 2004, the SIPP does not provide information about an individual’s own share of business income from
an unincorporated business. Instead, it contains information about the total income of the business, which is not
enough information to calculate the total business income of unincorporated businesses.
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Figure C.3: Business income per tax return by legal status for businesses with net income,
SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the business income per tax return by legal status for businesses with net income in the SCF
and IRS. Business income refers to income reported on Form 1040 Schedule C for sole proprietorships, Form 1065 for
partnerships, Form 1120S for S corporations, and Form 1120 for C corporations. IRS data for sole proprietorships,
partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations are available only until 2013, and C-corporation data start from
1990 because data for Form 1120 are not available for 1988 and 1989.
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Figure C.4: Business income per tax return by legal status for businesses with net loss,
SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the business income per tax return by legal status for businesses with net loss in the SCF
and IRS. Business income refers to income reported on Form 1040 Schedule C for sole proprietorships, Form 1065 for
partnerships, Form 1120S for S corporations, and Form 1120 for C corporations. IRS data for sole proprietorships,
partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations are available only until 2013, and C-corporation data start from
1990 because data for Form 1120 are not available for 1988 and 1989. Businesses with zero net income are included
with those that have net losses.
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Figure C.5: Number of returns by legal status for businesses with net income, SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the number of business tax returns by legal status for business with net income in the SCF
and the IRS. Business income refers to income reported on Form 1040 Schedule C for sole proprietorships, Form 1065
for partnerships, Form 1120S for S corporations, and Form 1120 for C corporations. IRS data for sole proprietorships,
partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations are available only until 2013, and C corporations data starts from
1990 because data for Form 1120 is not available for 1988 and 1989.
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Figure C.6: Number of returns by legal status for businesses with net loss, SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the number of business tax returns by legal status for businesses with net loss in the SCF
and IRS. Business income refers to income reported on Form 1040 Schedule C for sole proprietorships, Form 1065 for
partnerships, Form 1120S for S corporations, and Form 1120 for C corporations. IRS data for sole proprietorships,
partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations are available only until 2013, and C- corporation data start from
1990 because data for Form 1120 are not available for 1988 and 1989. Businesses with zero net income are included
with those that have net losses.
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Figure C.7: Distribution of S-Corporation business income per return, SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots S-corporation business income per return for those with below- and above-median business
receipts.
Figure C.8: Broad business income, SCF vs. IRS
                                                 
   
    
    
    
 % L
 O O L
 R Q
   '
 R O
 O D
 U V
 6 & )
 , 5 6
Note: This figure compares a broader measure of business income in the SCF and IRS. Broad business income is
defined to be income derived from a business or profession (Form 1040 Schedule C) or farm (Form 1040 Schedule F);
income from rental real estate, royalties, partnerships, S corporations, estates, trusts (Form 1040 Schedule E); and
income from gains from the sale of capital and other property (Form 1040, lines 13 and 14).
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Figure C.9: Business receipts by legal status, SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the total business receipts by legal status in the SCF and IRS. Business receipts refers to
gross sales reported on Form 1040 Schedule C for sole proprietorships, Form 1065 for partnerships, Form 1120S for
S corporations, and Form 1120 for C corporations. IRS data for partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations
are available only until 2013, and C-corporation data start from 1990 because data for Form 1120 are not available
for 1988 and 1989.
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Figure C.10: Business receipts per tax return by legal status, SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the business receipts per tax return by legal status in the SCF and IRS. Business receipts
refers to gross sales reported on Form 1040 Schedule C for sole proprietorships, Form 1065 for partnerships, Form
1120S for S corporations, and Form 1120 for C corporations. IRS data for partnerships, S corporations, and C
corporations are available only until 2013, and C-corporation data start from 1990 because data for Form 1120 are
not available for 1988 and 1989.
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